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Abstract
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) is a combination of information and communica-
tion technologies used in transportation systems to improve efficiency and safety for trans-
port users. It also encompasses the growing field of connected and autonomous vehicles
that is expected to have significant benefits for the economy and overall safety of travel.
Two of the main challenges within ITS are managing the scalability of large networks, and
securing communication between ITS entities, especially given that entities may be mali-
cious and need to be revoked.
To address security and privacy concerns within ITS, public key infrastructure (PKI) has
been deployed in vehicular communication architectures. Such architectures detail how
entities (vehicles, road-side units, etc.) communicate with each other and how their cre-
dentials need to be revoked when they become malicious so that they cannot continue to
communicate with other entities. This thesis covers both analysis of protocols within exist-
ing architectures and also proposes new architectures.
Our work contributes to the analysis of existing architectures for revocation. We present
a symbolic analysis of existing REWIRE protocols using the TAMARIN PROVER, and show that
not all their desired security goals are met. We propose a new variant of REWIRE called O-
TOKEN which addresses the required properties based on vehicular public key infrastruc-
ture.
Vehicular communication architectures are becoming more heterogeneous and there-
fore there is active research in identifying how vehicles can themselves become a root of
trust for supporting secure communications in ITS.We present a new vehicular communic-
ation architecture, based on trusted computing,which removes the need for additional PKI
infrastructure within an ITS. It enables secure operations to be performed within vehicles
without relying on constant message exchange with infrastructure. The novelty of our ar-
chitecture is the use of Direct Anonymous Attestation to manage the security and privacy
of entities, to improve the scalability and revocation in large networks. Furthermore, the
architecture is resilient to colluding trusted third party infrastructure.
Our final contribution is an analysis of one variant of Direct Anonymous Attestation,
ECC-DAA, based on the ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 standard. We evaluate whether it provides
viii
the security and privacy guarantees needed in order for it to be a central technique within
our scalable vehicular communication architecture. Our symbolic analysis of an ECC-DAA
specification using the TAMARIN PROVER identifies an attack which exploits a single com-
promised trusted platformmodule to undermine other uncompromised ones. We propose
a solution and demonstrate the revised specification ensures the protocol’s robustness.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we discuss the motivation for our work and present the overall structure of
the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are a combination of transportation and Inform-
ation Communication Technology Systems designed to provide safer, coordinated, envir-
onmentally friendly, and smarter transportation networks [176]. The modes of transporta-
tion include vehicular, rail and aviation. Practical applications of such ITS integrate traffic
control systems, cruise control, navigation, parking guidance and fleet management. In
ITS [99] the term Vehicle-to-Anything (V2X) [232, 176] encapsulates communication be-
tween all the entities involved, e.g., vehicles, road side units, traffic lights etc [99]. Within
this architecture, V2X security protocols enable secure message exchange between entities
and some of these security protocols use hardware security [99, 172, 104, 111, 181] in order
to support secure message exchange.
In this thesis various aspects of the security and the trustworthiness of future ITS archi-
tectures are investigated. As ITS start to emerge and becomemore prevalent, their security
protocols play a critical role in securing the vehicular network infrastructures and they im-
pact on the safety of participants that use the systems. The thesis analyses some existing
approaches to secure and privacy-preserving vehicular architectures and proposes a num-
ber of improvements which address some of the weaknesses of existing architectures dis-
covered as part of our analysis. Notably the thesis contributes to the growing body of work
in the formal analysis of security protocols and standardised security schemes.
Over recent years, emphasis in secure ITS research has converged on the use of Vehicu-
lar Public Key Infrastructures (VPKIs) [100, 132] for credential management and privacy-
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preserving authentication services through the use of short-term anonymous credentials,
i.e., pseudonyms [176, 173]. In particular the European Telecommunications Standards In-
stitute (ETSI), a lead developer of standards for vehicle-to-infrastructure and vehicle-to-
vehicle communications within Europe, has proposed the use of public key infrastructure
for secure message management [100]. In order to facilitate the communication between
ITS entities, pseudonym certificates (pseudonyms) [176] are used. Pseudonyms are short-
lived certificates that change frequently often to preserve anonymity of ITS entities such as
vehicles. One of the leading privacy concerns is the tracking andprofiling of entities as a res-
ult of frequent broadcasting of real-time positioning of ITS entities [194]. This means that
systematic collection and inference of private information is possible. Since pseudonyms
can be used to preserve anonymity of ITS entities they mitigate the tracking and profiling
of entities.
A number of barriers exist in the deployment of ITS, and in particular the issues sur-
rounding:
• Revocation [176], which is the process of removing a malicious or misbehaving en-
tity from a network. State-of-the-art vehicular revocation requires that a certificate
revocation list [142, 160, 145, 174, 121], that contains all revoked pseudonyms, be
published to all relying parties in the network in a timely manner.
• Scalability [102, 111]. Deploying a vehicular public key infrastructure that fails to
factor in the growth of the trusted third parties and its entities – e.g., vehicles, road
side units, etc – will eventually need to be redesigned as the system scales, resulting
in lost productivity and system downtime. In a system that is expected to have new
entities connecting frequently and demanding access tomultiple serviceswill require
that the public key infrastructure scalability has to be considered from the outset dur-
ing design time. Therefore, since pseudonyms are short-lived certificates, a scalable
infrastructure will need to support changing pseudonyms.
In traditional public key infrastructures the use of certificate revocation lists (CRL) is the
current solution, but CRLs also suffer from distribution issues. Alternatively, the Online
Certificate Status Protocol [163] has been proposed that can check the status of each certi-
ficate but this is a computationally intensive task. Thus, neither solution is optimal at scale
or timely. These problems persist in public key infrastructure for ITS.
In this thesis we present work that falls in two areas. We describe an analysis of existing
protocols within ITS and propose a new ITS infrastructure to support secure message ex-
change. Since communication is the backbone of any ITS it is desirable to performanalysis
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on the specification of security protocols within an ITS infrastructure to ensure they are
correct.
We analyse existing protocols for vehicular revocation highlighting the need of a new
version of existing protocols. Our analysis demonstrates that the revocation protocols fail
to guarantee revocation in the context of changing pseudonyms. Therefore, the existing
protocols cannot be used within a scalable vehicular architecture. The analysis is based
on building models in the TAMARIN PROVER, a well-established tool for analysing security
protocols. There is a strong body of work in the formal analysis of security protocols.
In this thesis, we will focus on exploiting analysis tools based on formal methods to im-
prove the security and privacy of existing protocols, and support analysis at design time
of novel protocols. Performing formal analysis at design time aims to increase the system
designers’ confidence that the system has the desired security and privacy properties. In
particular we use the TAMARIN PROVER [156] for the analysis of security protocols since it
has been used to analyse large real world protocols. For example, the TAMARIN PROVER
has successfully been used in the verification of TLS 1.3 [77, 79, 223, 202], PKCS#11 [146],
electronic voting [22, 43], control flow integrity in industrial systems [96], and other applic-
ations [75, 78].
Our second area of work proposes a new architecture which distributes trust within a
vehicular architecture to better address areas of revocation and scalability. We outline an
architecture that enables entities to havemore control on their privacy duringV2Xmessage
exchange andwhen changingpseudonyms so that there is reduced emphasis on using trus-
ted third parties in an architecture. In the thesis, we examine how trusted computing can
be used to support the distribution of trust.
We go beyond proposing a candidate architecture and consider a particular security
technique that could be used in the implementation of such an architecture to support the
distribution of trust. The technique we focus on is Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA)
[38] which is an anonymous group digital signature scheme that provides authentication
of a user whilst preserving privacy of the user. Hence, it provides a suitable basis for entities
within a new V2X architecture to have user-controlled privacy. Moreover, the Trusted Com-
puting Group (TCG), an international group specialising in trusted computing, have pub-
lished an automotive thin profile [218] that proposes to use Trusted PlatformModules (TPM)
in vehicles. TPMs are naturally suitable to perform operations required by a DAA scheme.
The standardisation process for DAA has been successful, with several research works
[38–40, 206–208, 13, 37, 48, 60, 58, 226, 57, 50, 49, 48] influencing the design of the DAA
schemes. In particular the International Standards Organisation / International Electro-
technical Commission (ISO/IEC), and the TCG have a family of specifications for DAA [138,
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139]. Our formal analysis of DAA in the thesis highlights the value of identifying issues at
design time.
1.2 Structure and Contributions
This thesis is made up of seven chapters. Chapter 2 constitutes the background chapter
of the thesis and introduces all the preliminaries needed in the thesis. In particular we
introduce cryptographic notation, and a broad introduction to trusted computing and ITS.
In Chapter 3 we introduce security protocols, verifying protocols in the symbolic setting
and cover the necessary TAMARIN PROVER fundamentals supported by examples.
We identify threemain contributions in our research in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 respectively.
1. A formal analysis of V2X revocation protocols.
2. A new V2X architecture based on trusted computing that is not dependent on tradi-
tional Public Key Infrastructure.
3. Formal analysis of ECC-basedDirect AnonymousAttestation standardised in ISO/IEC
20008-2:2013 that can be used in the proposed architecture.
The first contribution presented in Chapter 4 formally analyses two versions of the REWIRE
protocols proposed by Förster et al. [104]. These protocols represent the state-of-the-art of
those protocols proposed for revocation in V2X architectures. We define symbolic models
using the TAMARIN PROVER and analyse them. They have previously not been formally
verified. We formalise the properties of the protocols. Our formal analysis confirms a flaw
that was observed by Förster et al. [104]. Our analysis of the R-TOKEN protocol identifies a
hitherto unknown flaw: that it does not guarantee authentication properties, in particular
it does not guarantee that the confirmation of revocation actually came from the intended
vehicle. This unknown weakness is acknowledged by the authors of the R-TOKEN protocol
as a flaw.
The insights gained from the formal modelling of the existing protocols motivated our
proposal for a new revocation protocol. In Chapter 4 we also develop a new protocol
that proposes improvements to the REWIRE protocols to ensure correct revocation of a
vehicle under any pseudonym without requiring resolution even if its active pseudonym
has changed by the time of revocation. We refer to our new protocol as theOBSCURE TOKEN
(O-TOKEN) protocol.
The second contributionpresented in Chapter 5 proposes the use of trusted computing
technologies to significantly enhance the state-of-the-art in security and privacy of V2X. As
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part of this novel decentralised approach, anonymous credentials are leveraged through
the use of DAA [38]. More specifically, our proposed solution:
1. is scalable and decentralised based on DAA removing the need for federated trust of
the infrastructure entities in existing V2X architectures.
2. efficiently removesmalicious or misbehaving vehicles without revealing the vehicle’s
identity nor requiring the use of computationally intensive technologies.
The third contribution presented in Chapter 6 develops TAMARIN models of a stand-
ardised DAA scheme published by Chen et al. [60]. It is the first mechanised analysis of
a standardised DAA scheme. Our analysis confirms that the protocol’s expected authen-
tication and secrecy properties fail when the integrity of one device is compromised. We
propose and formally verify a minimal fix to this standard. The research contributes to the
growing body of work demonstrating the use of formal tools in supporting standardisation
processes for cryptographic protocols.
In Chapter 7 we conclude and discuss avenues for future work.

Chapter 2
Background
This chapter introduces the cryptographic preliminaries,an overviewof trusted computing,
and the state-of-the-art of vehicular architectures for ITS.
2.1 Cryptography
Cryptography is the process of transforming the input of an original message known as
the plaintext, into an encoded output of the message known as the ciphertext. The pro-
cess of transforming the plaintext to a ciphertext is called encryption denoted E; and the
restoration of the plaintext from a ciphertext is called decryption denoted D. Encryption
conceals the contents of a block or stream of data by performing substitutions and trans-
formations on the input (plaintext). The encrypted data (ciphertext) is later decrypted to
recover the plaintext. Keys are also additional input parameters to encryption algorithms.
A key is a unique value that is independent of the data and algorithmand a different cipher-
text will be produced depending on the key. The exact substitutions and transformations
made by the encryption algorithm is dependent on the key. The encryption and decryption
algorithms do not need to be kept secret, however the key must be kept secret.
There are two types of cryptographic systems symmetricand asymmetricwhichwedefine
below. Both of these systems rely on the design of encryption and decryption algorithms.
Note to differentiate between the two cryptographic systems we use “secret key” for sym-
metric encryption and “private key” for asymmetric encryption.
2.1.1 Symmetric Encryption
In these schemes of cryptography the same secret key is used for both the encryption of
the plaintext and the decryption of the ciphertext. Therefore, decryption is only possible
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by using the same key as used during encryption. Symmetric cryptographic systems are
analogous to the physical security of a padlocked box, which is locked and unlocked using
the matching key.
In this cryptographic system a symmetric secret key is generated and this key must be
kept secret. However, in order for two agents to communicate with one another the secret
key has to be distributed in some fashion. To encrypt a plaintext under this scheme we can
use the following notation:
c =Esk(p)
for encrypting the plaintext p under the secret key sk using the encryption algorithmE and
producing the ciphertext. Similarly the notation:
p =Dsk (Esk(p))
is used for decrypting the ciphertext under the secret key sk using the decryption algorithm
D to recover the plaintext p.
One of the most prominent symmetric ciphers used today is the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [165, 82, 209], which was published by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) in 2001. AES is a block cipher that takes a plaintext block size of
128 bits, and the key length can be 128, 192 or 256 bits. AES is often referred to as AES-128,
AES-192 or AES-256 depending on the length of the key.
2.1.2 Asymmetric Encryption
Asymmetric Encryption is commonly known as public-key cryptography. These schemes
rely on one key for encryption (public key) and a different but related key for decryption
(private key). These related keys are known as the key-pair. A general approach for asym-
metric encryption is the following:
1. Each agent x computes its own key pair for use in encryption and decryption. skx /
pkx .
2. Each agent submits their public key to a public register and keeps their related private
key secret. Other agents can then keep a copy of the collection of public keys for use
later.
3. If an agent Alice wants to send a message to Bob confidentially, Alice can use Bob’s
public key, pkb , and apply the encryption algorithm to generate a ciphertext to send
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to Bob.
c =Epkb (p)
4. Bob receives the message containing the ciphertext, and he decrypts it using his
private key, skb , and decryption algorithm to recover the plaintext. Only Bob can
decrypt the message as only Bob knows Bob’s private key.
p =Dskb (Epkb (p))
By following this approach all agents have access to public keys,and unlike symmetric cryp-
tographic systems the private key never needs to be distributed.
2.1.3 Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman (DH) is a key exchange system [89, 199, 209], and is referred to as DH key
exchange, and it can be used for the generation of a shared key. However, DH cannot be
used for the encryption and decryption of messages.
For DH key exchange there are two publicly known numbers, n and g , such that g is
primitive mod n. Suppose two agents A and B want to generate a shared key, they would
proceed as follows:
1. Agent A selects a large random integer x and sends A’s public key X to the agent B :
X = g x (mod n)
A keeps x secret.
2. Agent B selects a large random integer y and sends B ’s public key Y to the agent A:
Y = g y (mod n)
B keeps y secret.
3. Agent A computes:
k = Y x (mod n)
4. Agent B computes:
k ′ = X y (mod n)
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At the end of the DH key exchange both k and k ′ are equal to g xy (mod n). The key agree-
ment is secure unless the agents can compute the discrete logarithm and recover x or y .
Hence, k is the private key that both agents A and B independently computed.
Note that the security of DH is dependent on the choice of g and n. The number n
should be a large prime. Any g can be selected, such that g is primitivemod n — generally
the smallest g possible. The security of DH is reliant on the difficulty of computing discrete
logarithms in a finite field. This means that given Y and g in:
g x ≡ Y (2.1)
it is very hard to work out x. Note in additive groups this still holds andwould be expressed
as:
xg ≡ Y (2.2)
This property is commonly referred to as the DH assumption.
2.1.4 RSA Cryptographic System
One of the most known and widely used public-key cryptographic systems was proposed
by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978 and was subsequently named after them, RSA [188,
209, 199]. The RSA scheme relies on the computationally difficult problem of finding the
prime factorisation of a large integer n [36], and the DH assumption (Section 2.1.3) Equa-
tion 2.1. Briefly, RSA has four steps and these are key generation, key distribution, encryp-
tion and decryption. We explain each step in turn.
Key Generation.
The RSA cryptographic system requires two keys to be generated, the public key,
(n,e), and the private key, d . To generate (n,e) select two random large primes, p
and q . Compute the modulus n:
n = pq
Calculate Euler’s totient function of n:
φ(n)= (p−1)(q−1)
Then randomly select an encryption key, e , that is relatively coprime using the exten-
ded Euclidean algorithm such that:
gcd(e,φ(n))= 1 where 1< e <φ(n)
2.2 Hash Functions 11
Finally, the private key is calculated as the inverse of e , such that:
d = e−1 (mod φ(n))
To conclude the key generation process the values n and e are published. The private
key, d , is kept secret and the two primes p and q are discarded.
Encryption.
E(n,e)(m)=m
e (mod n)
An agent can encrypt a messagem, since the values n and e are publicly known val-
ues. To encrypt a message m, to produce the ciphertext c the encryption formula
above is used. The resulting ciphertext is then sent to the agent whom owns the cor-
responding private key, d .
Decryption.
Dd (c)= c
d (mod n)
To decrypt an encrypted message c, the above decryption formula is used. Decryp-
tionworks because the private key, d , was carefully chosen as being the inverse of the
encryption key e . This is shown by the following formula:
med (mod n)=m (mod n)
Currently, there exists no efficient classical algorithm for solving the integer factorisa-
tion problem, hence themessagem cannot be computed even when the values (n,e)
are publicly known.
2.2 Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions provide an integrity check of blocks of data. The data blocks
can be of any length while, the output, a hash code, has a fixed size. We denote a hash
function asH( f ) [209] The properties of hash functions are:
• One-way. Given any string y , it is computationally infeasible to find any f such that:
H( f )= y
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• Collision-free. It should be infeasible to find any two messages f and f ′ that hash to
the same value:
H( f )=H( f ′)
Cryptographic hash functions enable commitment to a value, i.e., no two different values
produce the same hash, without revealing the value used to produce the hash. Hashes are
often used as a building block of a digital signature. Hash functions usemanipulations sim-
ilar to those used in symmetric cryptographic systems, but with no input key. Standardised
hash functions include SHA-1 [164], MD5 [187] (considered weak and should not be used),
SHA-2 [167] (recommended) and SHA-3 [168].
2.3 Message Authentication Codes
Message authentication codes [136] (MAC) are small fixed-size blocks generated using a
secret key. When sending a message, a MAC can be generated and appended to the mes-
sage, thus providing evidence of authenticity of amessages origin. AMAC scheme assumes
that a pre-shared secret key, k, is shared between two communicating parties when want-
ing to send amessagem. We denote a MAC function [209, 199] as C:
MAC =C(k,m)
Upon receipt of a MAC the receiver knows that themessagem cannot have been altered in
transit. If an adversary alteredm and not the MAC, then the receiver will generate a differ-
ent MAC. It is assumed that an adversary does not know the key k, therefore the adversary
cannot alterm and re-calculate theMAC. Thus, the receiver is additionally assured that the
message came from the alleged sender since no one else could calculate the MAC without
knowledge of the secret key k. Like a hash function, MAC’s are not reversible.
2.4 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures provide assurances about the authenticity of a message and its origin
[166, 209, 199]. Asymmetric cryptography is used for digital signatures, and we define two
functions:
Sskx (m)=σm
The S function is used for the signing of a digital signature by encrypting a message, m,
under the private key, skx , of agent x and produces the signature, σm . For the verification
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of a digital signature we define the function:
Vpkx (σm)=m
This function takes a signature, σm , with the public key, pkx , of the agent x and decrypts
the signature and retrieves the original messagem, therefore verifying the signature.
Digital signatures are implemented using one-way hash functions, rather than themes-
sage itself as this is more efficient. To construct a digital signature an agent creates a hash
of a message,m, and signs it using its private key:
Sskx (H(m))=σm , Vpkx (σm)=H(m)
The receiver of the message and digital signature then computes the hash on the message
m, runs the verification function, V, to recover the hash, H(m), and compares it with the
hash the receiver computed and checks if they match. If the recovered hash matches the
hash the receiver generated, then the signature is valid. Once a message is signed and sent,
it can be replayed in a context outside the expectations of the signatory. Therefore, like
most security mechanisms, digitally signing messages is a component that can be integ-
rated into a broader security scheme to contribute towards satisfying a specific set of secur-
ity requirements.
2.5 Digital Certificates
Digital certificates [144, 87, 209] are used by agents to exchange public keys, without con-
tacting a trusted third party (TTP). A TTP is an organisation that is trusted by a community
of agents. Briefly, a digital certificate contains a public key, an identifier of the agent owning
the key, and a signature signed by the TTP. An agent presents their public key to the TTP to
obtain a digital certificate, and this certificate is then published for other agents to use. Be-
fore other agents use this public key contained in the digital certificate they check that the
certificate is valid by verifying the attached signature was created by the TTP. An agent can
also directly convey its certificate to other agents, and these agents can verify the certificate
was created by the TTP. The following requirements of a digital certificate scheme are:
• Any agent can read a certificate to establish the name and public key of the certific-
ate’s owner.
• Any agent can verify that a certificate originated from the TTP and it is not counter-
feit.
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• Only the TTP can construct and update certificates.
• Any agent can verify the currency of a certificate, i.e., that the date and time is valid.
For an agent x, the TTP provides a certificate,CA, of the form:
CA =Eskt tp ([T ∥ IDx ∥ pkx ])
Where skt tp is the private key used by the TTP, T is a timestamp, IDx is the identity of the
agent owning the certificate, and pkx is the public key of the agent x. The agent may then
exchange this certificate with any other agent, whom can read and verify the certificate by:
Dpkt tp (CA)=Dpkt tp (Eskt tp ([T ∥ IDx ∥ pkx ]))= [T ∥ IDx ∥ pkx ]
The verifying agent uses the TTP’s public key, pkt tp , to decrypt the certificate. Since the
certificate is only readable using the TTP’s public key, this verifies that the certificate was
signed and could only have came from the TTP. The TTP is often referred to as the Certific-
ate Authority (CA) in the literature.
The most widely known and deployed certificate format is X.509 [73]. The X.509 certi-
ficate is standardised by the International Telecommunication Union as part of the X.500
standards series to define a directory service. Essentially, this service maintains a database
about its agents and captures the relation between an agent and a network address, and
other attributes. Typically information contained in an X.509 certificate is its version, serial
number, signature algorithm identifier, issuer name, validity period, identity of the subject,
the public key of the subject, the public key algorithm used, the signature algorithm used
and the certificate signature.
The RFC 4949 [204] defines an architecture, based on digital signatures, called Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI). This architecture has been designed to create, manage, store, dis-
tribute and revoke digital certificates. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has a
working group to drive the implementation of PKI based on the X.509 certificate format
(PKIX) suitable for application deployment on the internet. Additionally, the CA is respons-
ible for the administrative functionof creating andmaintainingCertificateRevocationLists
(CRL). Certificates that are no longer considered trustworthy are added to the CRL, and
agents will receive updates of new additions to the CRL. Reasons for revocation include
private key compromise, changes in affiliation and name changes.
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2.6 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Zero-Knowledge Proofs [199] are a method of enabling one entity, known as a prover, to
convince another entity, known as a verifier, that they know a secret without revealing the
secret. A zero-knowledge proof enables a prover to convince a verifier the truth of an asser-
tion, without revealing anything but the validity of the proof. If a proof of knowledge is also
a zero-knowledge proof, then it is called a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK) .
A Non-Interactive ZKPK [34, 35, 192, 193] as the name suggests requires no interaction
between a prover and verifier. This is achieved by using a one-way hash function as a
commitment, as no entity can predict the output of the hash function or its inputs. The
commitments that are used to construct the ZKPK hash are only known after verification.
In Section 2.9 we explain ZKPK by example using a Schnorr signature.
2.7 Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Systems
An alternative asymmetric cryptographic system, “Elliptic CurveCryptography” (ECC), was
proposed by Koblitz [143] and Miller [161]. ECC is used extensively. For example, in Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) [186], and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [170]. The benefit of ECC
over RSA, is that an equal level of security is offered but utilises smaller key sizes, therefore
reduces the processing required for encryption and decryption. This section is not inten-
ded to give a comprehensive guide to ECC, but to give an overview as a full mathematical
description is beyond the scope of this thesis.
An elliptic curve, E , is a set of points, (x, y), satisfying the equation [118]:
E : y2 = x3+ax+b (mod q)
where x and y are elements of the finite field, Fq , with q a primenumber. These points form
a cyclic group, G, if the generator is P any point can be written [k]P and if [p]P equals the
identity, p is the order of the group. This group satisfies the DH assumption, i.e., given two
points P andQ such that,Q = [k]P it is infeasible to work out k. This is the DH assumption,
see Equation 2.2 in Section 2.1.3.
2.8 BilinearMapping
A bilinear map [118] is a function that is used to combine the elements of two groups, G1
and G2, and produce an element in a third group, Gτ. Let G1 and G2 be two additive cyclic
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groups of prime order p over an elliptic curve. Gτ is a multiplicative cyclic group with the
same prime order as G1 and G2. This function is defined as a bilinear map e (also called a
“pairing function”):
e :G1×G2→Gτ
Themap e satisfies the following three properties:
• Bilinearity. For all S ∈G1, T ∈G2, and all positive integers a,b ∈Zn , the following holds
e(Sa ,T b)= e(S,T )ab
• Non-degeneration. For all S ∈ G1 and T ∈ G2, e(S,T ) 6= 1τ where 1τ is the identity ele-
ment in Gτ.
• Computability. For all S ∈G1 andT ∈G2, there exists an efficient algorithm to compute
e(S,T ).
A bilinear mapping where G1 and G2 are the same are referred to as symmetric, otherwise
the bilinearmapping are referred to as asymmetric [106]. There exists elliptic curves for use
in cryptography that are bilinear mapping friendly, such that G1, G2, Gτ are elliptic curve
subgroups. Examples of these are published in NIST FIPS 186-4 [166], Barreto-Naehrig
(BN) curves [15], Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC2) [210] and RFC 5639 Brain-
pool [149].
2.9 Schnorr Signature
A Schnorr signature [200, 201] is a realised digital signature scheme that is based on the
discrete logarithmproblem. The remainder of this section presents an example of a Elliptic
Curve Schnorr signature (ECSchnorr).
Briefly the following notation is used, [x]P is a scalar multiplication operator that takes
a positive integer x and a point P on an elliptic curve. The ’+’ operator represents addition,
’−’ operator is subtraction,← operator is assignment, and · is a multiplication operator.
The following procedure details the construction of an ECSchnorr signature. To use a
Schnorr signature the signer chooses an elliptic curve, G of order p, and a generator P1.
The signer chooses a private key, f , from Zp and calculates the corresponding public key,
Q2:
Q2= [ f ]P1 (2.3)
2.10 Trusted Computing 17
To sign a message the signer chooses a random number, u, from Zp and performs the fol-
lowing calculations:
u←Zp
U = [u]P1
v =H(P1, Q2, U , m) (mod p)
w = u+v · f (mod p)
σm = (w,v)
(2.4)
σm is the signature of messagem, consists of a tuple (w,v) where v is a hash of the values
P1,Q2,U and themessagem, and w incorporates the private key of the signer.
To verify the signature,σm , the verifying agent computesU
′ and v ′ where:
U ′ = [w]P1− [v ]Q2
v ′ =H(P1, Q2, U ′, m) (mod p)
(2.5)
If v ′ = v then the signature is valid otherwise it is not. The verifying agent can verify the
signature without knowledge of f because:
U ′ = [w]P1− [v ]Q2=U
= [u+v · f ]P1− [v ][ f ]P1
= [u]P1+ [v · f ]P1− [v · f ]P1
= [u]P1
=U
(2.6)
and therefore v ′ will equal v . Thus this corresponds to a ZKPK.
2.10 Trusted Computing
Devices such as laptops, smartphones and tablets, which connect to the Internet, are com-
monplace. Trusted computing is one approach that enhances the security on these devices
by installing a “root of trust” (RoT). These roots of trust are used to attest that devices are in
a “trustworthy” state, meaning that the devices behave as expected for a specific purpose.
A RoT must be established in order to begin establishing trust in a system.
Roots of trust can be used to collect evidence and provide reports about a system’s code
and data during boot time. Such evidence collected can include the time it takes to load
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code from disk to memory, and measurements, such as hashes of code, can be calculated
to detect tampering. A RoT provides a tamper-proof store for thesemeasurements. It is de-
sirable that such device measurements and reporting, known as attestations, are conduc-
ted in a secure and privacy-preserving manner to protect users, and reduce the knowledge
external entities can learn about a system. Two popular anonymous attestation schemes
are Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [38] and Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) [37].
In the remainder of this section we discuss the leading trusted execution environment
technologies and introduce the Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme.
2.10.1 Trusted Execution Environments
Many modern processors are equipped with hardware extensions to support the set up of
a trusted execution environment (TEE). This allows programs to run securely, protected
from other programs or operating system software running on the processor. TEEs are an
attractive way to provide software implementations (e.g., for user authentication) with se-
curity similar to that provided by hardware. There are a variety of TEE-supporting hardware
extensions, with similar security assumptions, threat models, and potential attack vectors.
TEEs are embedded within a commodity device which we refer to as the host. TEEs aim
to provide the following properties (i) isolation: separate and protected from the normal
system operation of the host in the event of compromise; (ii) protected execution: ensures
the operation is executed and not interfered with; and (iii) secure storage: storage which is
only accessible by the TEE if the system is in a trustworthy state.
There are three main implementations of a TEE. Firstly, the TPM [219, 139] is a separate
chip present in most modern computers. A TPM is a resource-constrained cryptographic
co-processor which is embeddedwithin the host. Software can execute cryptographic oper-
ations on the TPM via its interfaces and API. It stores cryptographic keys and other sensitive
data in protected memory. Together with Intel Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT) [133],
the TPM provides a limited ability to create TEEs. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) re-
ports there are billions of TPMs installed in branded PCs, laptops and servers [220] and this
is why we focussed on the TPM.
Secondly, Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) [154] is a set of x86 64 extensions that
makes it possible to set up TEEs known as enclaves. These enclaves do not require trust
in anything but the processor and the code users place inside their enclaves. Enclaves are
protected by the processor: the processor controls access to enclave memory and caches.
SGX also supports sealed storage and both local and remote attestation.
Finally, ARMTrustZone (TZ) [11] is a set of hardware extensions to ARMprocessors,aim-
ing at separating “secure world” and “normal world” operating modes, creating the effect
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of two virtual CPU cores with different privileges and a strictly controlled communication
interface. Thus, this is a logical separation as opposed to a physical one.
One particularly interesting example of TEE was proposed by Raj et al. [184], and they
introduced the design andproof of concept of a Firmware TPM ( f TPM), that allows TPM func-
tionality to be run in ARM TZ. This work demonstrated the possibility of including a TPM
within the CPU, and hence no longer requiring dedicated hardware. Intel has provided
a f TPM, Intel Platform Trust Technology (PTT), offering the capabilities of a TPM on its
CPUs [134]. AMD also have the Platform Security Processor [9] (PSP) that provides TPM
functionality. PSP did suffer a vulnerability [52] which allowed a stack overflow to happen,
but this has since been fixed.
2.10.2 Direct Anonymous Attestation
Direct Anonymous Attestation is an anonymous digital group signature scheme that pro-
vides authentication and privacy, to ensure the integrity of devices. DAA can be seen as a
group signature for which the identity of the signer is not recoverable. The DAA signatures
are not traceable, but they can be linked using a basename. There are two variants of a
DAA scheme built from asymmetric cryptographic systems: the RSA-DAA and the ECC-DAA
scheme respectively [39, 56, 60]. The ECC-DAA variant ismore efficient for low-end resource-
constrained devices [60] which is appropriate for hardware roots of trust. These anonym-
ous signature schemes have been standardised in ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 [137]. ISO/IEC
20008-2:2013 is implemented and deployed widely today within TPMs, more specifically,
including three DAA-related mechanisms: Mechanism 2 is an RSA-DAA scheme, which is
implemented in the TPM 1.2 specification. Mechanism 3 is the EPID scheme, which does
not split the TPM and host operations, and Mechanism 4, the focus of our work, is an ECC-
DAA scheme, which is implemented in early versions of the TPM 2.0 specification. The TPM
API of ECC-DAA in the TPM 2.0 specification is designed to support two ECC-DAA schemes:
mechanism 4 and amodification of mechanism 3 with the splitting operations.
Brickell et al. [40] state that an ECC-DAA scheme must satisfy notions of correctness,
user-controlled anonymity and user-controlled traceability. Intuitively these correctness,
security and privacy propertiesmean the following:
• Correctness: valid signatures are verifiable and linkable, when needed;
• User-controlled anonymity: the identity of a device cannot be revealed from the sig-
nature;
• User-controlled traceability: the HOST controls whether signatures can be linked.
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The ISO/IEC standard directly cites Brickell et al. [40] as the reference for the schemes se-
curity and privacy properties.
ADAA scheme considers a set of entities: ISSUERs, HOSTs, TPMs, and VERIFIERs; theHOST
and TPM together form a trusted PLATFORM. The ISSUER is a trusted third party responsible
for attesting and authorising PLATFORMs to join the network. A VERIFIER is any other system
entity or trusted third-party that can verify a PLATFORM’s credentials in a privacy-preserving
manner usingDAAoperations;without the need of knowing a PLATFORM’s identity. TheDAA
scheme is a two phase process with five operations. Phase one consists of SETUP and JOIN
while phase two uses SIGN, VERIFY and LINK.
In a nutshell, DAA is a two-step process where, firstly, the registration of a TPM executes
once and during this phase the TPM chooses a private key (SETUP). This private key is stored
in secure storage so that theHOST cannot have access to it. Next the TPM talks to the ISSUER
so that it can provide the necessary guarantees of its validity (JOIN). The ISSUER then
places a signature on the public key, producing an Attestation Identity Credential (AIC).
The second step is to use the AIC for anonymous attestations of the PLATFORM (SIGN), using
zero-knowledge proofs [114]. These proofs convince a VERIFIER that a message is signed by
some key that was certified by the ISSUER, without knowledge of the TPM’s DAA key or AIC
(VERIFY). Of course, the VERIFIER has to trust that the ISSUER only issues AICs to valid TPMs.
Traditional digital signaturemechanisms enable the holder(s) of a private key to gener-
ate a digital signature for amessage. The related verification key (public key) is then used to
verify the validity of a signed message. In contrast, an anonymous digital signature mech-
anism is a special class of a digital signature where no (authorised or unauthorised) entity
can discover the identity of the user who signed themessage. As with traditional digital sig-
nature mechanisms, anonymous digital signature mechanisms are based on asymmetric
cryptography. The difference between traditional digital signature mechanisms and an-
onymous digital signatures is that to verify an anonymous signature, a user makes use of
a group public key (group signature) or multiple public keys (ring signature), neither of
which is bound to an individual user.
2.11 Intelligent Transportation Systems
The term Intelligent Transportation Systems denotes the on going trend to include inform-
ation and communication technologies in vehicles and transportation infrastructure in or-
der to enable safer, coordinated, environmentally friendly, and smarter transportation net-
works [232]. The rapid growth of ITS has embraced a variety of services intended to max-
imise transport efficiency and increased safety; ranging from collision avoidance and crash
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notifications to traffic information and infotainment services [109] among others. Having
smarter transportation systems typically involves extending the communication capabilit-
ies between the involved entities. Vehicular Communications (VC) play a central role in
this effort collecting and communicating large amounts of data among vehicles, road-side
units, humans and the surrounding environments. V2X communication involves various
forms of ad-hoc and cellular networking among vehicles and infrastructure. Security and
privacy in V2X have played an important role right from the start in ITS [173]. Connec-
ted vehicles will constantly be beaconing Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) and
Decentralized Environmental NotificationMessages (DENMs), at a high rate to provide co-
operative awareness messaging between ITS entities.
In order to provide implementations for ITS,many challenges have to be overcomewith
security and privacy being critical pillars [234]; especially in the context of safety applica-
tionswhere critical decisions are based on information collected by vehicles regarding their
status (e.g., position, speed, etc.) or surrounding events (e.g., traffic jam, icy road, etc.).
Privacy requirements have been well documented in the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) TS 102 941 [100], and IEEEWireless Access in Vehicular Environ-
ments (WAVE) [128] standards highlighting the following properties:
• Anonymity: ability of a vehicle to use a resource or service without disclosing the
vehicle’s identity.
• Pseudonymity: ability of a vehicle to use a resource or service without disclosing the
vehicle’s identity while still being accountable for that action.
• Unlinkability: ability of a vehicle tomakemultiple uses of resources or serviceswithout
others being able to link them together (i.e., infer mobility patterns).
• Unobservability: ability of a vehicle to use a resource or service without others, espe-
cially third parties, being able to observe that the resource or service is being used.
Over recent years, the emphasis in secure ITS research has converged on the use of
Vehicular Public Key Infrastructures (VPKIs) [132, 99, 100] for credential management and
privacy-friendly authentication services through the use of short-term anonymous creden-
tials, i.e., pseudonyms [176]. The common denominator in such architectures is the exist-
ence of trusted (centralised) infrastructure entities for the support of services such as au-
thenticated vehicle registration, pseudonym provision, pseudonym revocation, etc. While
intensive research efforts have proven the security and privacy guarantees provided in VP-
KIs, there are still a number of challenges to be conquered [236, 102].
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Firstly, it is essential to provide efficient, reliable and timely and privacy-preserving
communications to all vehicles and their embedded sensors. The reliance on infrastructure
entities within the overall architecture for such services raises questions towards a system’s
availability and scalability in the case of a technical fault or attack.
Secondly, many researchers have demonstrated the privacy weaknesses of varying
pseudonym re-usage policies; even in the case of unconditional anonymitywhere frequently
changing pseudonyms (one per message) has been proposed for a vehicle to avoid being
tracked, it has been shown to be ineffective due to the timing information of changing
pseudonyms [110].
Thirdly, in the context of revocation policies for removing misbehaving nodes from the
network, revocation can only be achieved when the employed pseudonym scheme sup-
ports the resolution of participants’ long-term identities (VID) from their pseudonyms [111,
176]. In this case, information about the revocation of a vehicle’s pseudonyms associated
with the VID, is disseminated to other participants through CRLs or other means. Besides
being computationally intensive (i.e., the use of CRLs also assumes enhanced connectivity
so that all vehicles can periodically retrieve any updated lists [120]), this is harmful to the
protection of their privacy [112].
To support the ongoing evolution of ITS all the aforementioned challenges need to be
resolved while taking into consideration the key technological transformations of the auto-
motive industry, empowered with advanced 5G capabilities [1]. Beyond the adaptation of
VC design, new types of secure and privacy-preserving protocols are needed. These proto-
cols are envisioned to provide security and privacy while augmenting the efficiency of the
current infrastructuremodel.
2.11.1 Pseudonym Lifecycle
Schaub et al. [194] discuss various requirements for such a pseudonym system and Petit et
al. [176] survey a large body of existing work and from there identify an abstract pseudo-
nym life cycle which comprises five main phases: issuance, use, change, resolution and
revocation.
The pseudonym lifecycle for existing asymmetric pseudonym protocols follow the pat-
tern depicted in Figure 2.1. The infrastructure entities in such architectures can be broadly
classified as a Certification Authority (CA), Pseudonym Provider (PP) and Revocation Au-
thority (RA) that are responsible for the provision of services such as authenticated vehicle
registration, pseudonym provision and vehicle credentials revocation, respectively. In a
nutshell, the CA and PP issue long-term certificates and credentials for the pseudonym (re-
spectively) to vehicles. To allow resolution of pseudonyms for revocation, the CA and PP es-
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Figure 2.1 Asymmetric Pseudonym scheme lifecycle [176]
crow the relationship between the pseudonyms issued and the VID. Thus this implements
a resolution mechanism to allow linking back pseudonyms to VID (Steps 1-5) to revoke
pseudonyms. During communication between vehicles (Steps 6, 7 and 8), they monitor
each other’s behaviour, using misbehaviour detection mechanisms, and may issue reports
ofmisbehaving vehicles to theRA (Step 9). The RA, then,makes a decision onwhether to re-
voke reportedpseudonymsbased on some evidence [189, 221]. In this case, the RA colludes
with the PP, CA and Top-level CA requesting the resolution of the given pseudonym back to
the VID that it was issued to (Steps 10-11). With the VID the PP can provide a list of all the
pseudonyms that was generated for the vehicle, and the pseudonyms are then dissemin-
ated to other vehicles using (for example) CRLs – we refer to this as pseudonym resolution.
However, as described in the previous section, such schemes have been shown to suffer
from scalability issues [102, 111] and privacy weaknesses of varying pseudonym re-usage
and revocation policies [176]; especially against scenarios where the (trusted) authorities
collude with each other to resolve pseudonyms and link vehicles’ actions or completely de-
anonymize their identity. It is evident that these challenges are important to solve, since a
number of European projects have been funded to investigate.
Intensive efforts in academia, industry and standardizationbodies have spurred a num-
ber of European projects. The E-Safety Vehicle Intrusion protected Applications (EVITA)
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project [227] developed a prototype for securing in-car networks, while the Secure Vehicle
Communication (SeVeCom) [171] and Privacy Enabled Capability in Co-operative Systems
and Safety Applications (PRECIOSA) [180] projects addressed the complex security and
privacy challenges over the wireless channel. Most recent efforts such as the Preparing
Secure Vehicle-to-X Communication Systems (PRESERVE) [181] and COmmunication Net-
work VEhicle Global Extension (CONVERGE) [72] projects worked towards the design, im-
plementation, and evaluation of a complete secure and privacy-preserving subsystem that
employs a Hardware Security Module (HSM). Recently, the PETRAS [177] project has been
investigating safety and security within IoT, and vehicular as an application area. Their
project on vehicular Transport and Mobility Demonstrator Audit (TMDA) [178] is focusing
on investigating state-of-the-art security and resilience within proposed ITS. From these
findings guidelines and policies will be developed and delivered to the UK government for
consideration into theUK’s future ITS. SeVeCom, EVITA, and PRECIOSA investigated secur-
ing V2X architectures using trusted components (TC). The PRESERVE project prototyped
the trusted component aspect using a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) for secure
ITS.
In the literature, proposals for ITS are not necessarily compliant with the standards, but
focus on security, privacy and scalability enhancements. Förster et al. propose PUCA [105],
a pseudonym scheme based on anonymous credentials where privacy of the vehicle owner
has absolute priority and no way exists for resolving pseudonyms. PUCA foresees no way
of credential revocation. However, the same authors then also propose REWIRE [104], a
modular revocationmechanismwithin a decentralised network which is not relying on the
resolution approach that can be used to introduce revocation in PUCA. Instead, REWIRE
assumes on-board TC in vehicles to support revocation. Recent work, however, described
how an adversary can intercept a REWIRE revocation message and create a valid confirm-
ation that is sent and accepted by the RA. An enhanced variant is presented in this thesis
in Chapter 4. Although the abovementionedwork propose a (limited) security and privacy-
oriented set of services leveraging trusted computing, they do not provide a comprehens-
ive solution addressing all key V2X aspects. In this thesiswe present amore comprehensive
solution.
Effective revocation has been identified as a challenge [185] due to the decentralised
nature of vehicle networks and the ability of vehicles to change their active pseudonyms.
Pseudonym revocation techniques have largely been based on the distribution of CRLs
[185, 176], such that when a misbehaving vehicle is revoked, an updated CRL is broadcast
to all vehicles. Several approaches have been taken to optimise the protocols and distribu-
tion process of CRL delivery [103, 174, 152, 160, 145, 121, 120]. However, these approaches
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often either revoke only one pseudonym of a vehicle – thereby missing the goal of remov-
ing a misbehaving vehicle completely – or they create a way of linking pseudonyms – thus
reducing the level of privacy offered.
Bißmeyer et al. [27] propose the CORPA protocol that allows conditional pseudonym
resolutionwhich preserves privacy. Raya et al. [185] propose an infrastructure-based revoc-
ation protocol, which remotely deletes keys in a TC. Their protocol requires that a vehicle’s
identity is known to perform revocation, in combinationwith a CRL and is a clear drawback
with respect to privacy. Schaub et al. propose V -Tokens [195], which introduces embed-
ding vehicle resolution information directly into pseudonyms. A V-Token is a ciphertext
field in the pseudonym certificate that is created from a vehicle’s identity, the CA’s identity
and a randomisation factor r all encryptedwith the RA’s public key. In this schememultiple
trusted parties need to collaborate to resolve the pseudonym,which then reveals a vehicle’s
identity that is used for revocation. In the case of a revocation, this therefore violates the pri-
vacy of vehicles, as resolution of their pseudonym to an identity is required. Feiri et al. [102]
propose to use TCs to store pseudonyms in secure storage and use a physical-unclonable
function (PUF) to reduce the need for large amounts of secure storage.
This thesis focuses on asymmetric pseudonym systems, however it is important to note
that other proposed architectures exist. There are four other proposed applications of cryp-
tography for ITS and these are Identity-based cryptography (IBC), Group Signatures, Sym-
metric, and Attribute-Based Credentials (ABC). For the remainder of this section we briefly
discuss these proposed schemes, and for further details see [176].
Zhao. et al. [237] provide a survey anddetailed background on IBC tomobile ad-hocnet-
works. For the vehicular use case, an IBC scheme has been proposed by Kamat et al. [141]
and Sun et al. [212], where public identity information about a vehicle is used to derive
a pseudonym certificate. A corresponding private key is derived from the public identity
by a trusted third party, referred to as the TTP. Only the TTP has complete knowledge of
the system parameters used to generate private keys and assign them to vehicles, thus
other vehicles cannot create their own key-pairs hence ensuring authentication. Signed
messages with the generated private key can be verified with only knowledge of the public
identity, and public system parameters. For the initial authentication of a vehicle, a min-
imal PKI is required [141] in order to have a certificate for each vehicle based on its real
identity.
Several drawbacks exist in IBC for VANETs, and the biggest drawback is the uncondi-
tional trust in the TTP as this single entity is responsible for the registration of vehicles,
issuance of pseudonyms, and pseudonym resolution and revocation. Research by Kamat
et al. [141] and Sun et al. [212], propose architectures where the role of the TTP can be de-
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centralised by using other ITS entities, e.g., Road Side Units (RSU). Another limitation in
IBC is revocation as it requires two steps. Firstly, pseudonym resolution; where the real
identity of the vehicle is returned and therefore all other pseudonyms used by the vehicle
can be used to trace the journey and breaks privacy. Secondly, revocation requires revoc-
ation of the VID which is not feasible and exposes the identity of vehicles, again breaking
privacy. Each pseudonym as in VPKI schemes can be revoked individually but poses prob-
lems and challenges with scalability. One final drawback is pseudonym issuance as this
requires unconditional trust in the TTP, and a constant online connection as pseudonyms
are only generated by the TTP.
Group Signatures have also been proposed for VANETs originally by Calandriello et al.
[45], which allowed vehicles to generate and sign their own pseudonyms without requir-
ing interaction with a trusted third party. Guo et al. [119] and Sampigethaya et al. [191]
also propose schemes based on group signatures that provide authentication and privacy
of messages within V2X. Briefly, a group signature scheme provides a member of a group
to construct a signature on behalf of the group, this means that the constructed signature
can be verified with a group-wide public key which can be thought of as the pseudonym.
Additionally, this scheme provides privacy for signers as each member of the group is an-
onymous. Consequently, this also means that messages produced by the group are not
linkable, i.e., it is not possible to identify if two messages were signed by the same vehicle.
This scheme can be realised without requiring any trusted third parties and done entirely
with vehicles. Every group requires a GroupManager (GM) and this entity sets the security
parameters, changes the group public keys, andmay revoke anonymity as amember of the
group to remove amember. In addition theGM is responsible for deriving a newprivate key
for each member as it joins the group, and the GM can provide accountability by tracing a
signature to the vehicle which produced it using the GM private key.
There are three significant challenges in group signature VANET schemes and these are
the election of the GM, identity escrow, and revocation. First, the election of the GM from
a group of peers is not a straightforward task [5, 88], since there are network performance
criteria to consider and security criteria of the entity that is to be the GM. Zhang et al. [235]
propose to use RSUs as the GM, such that when a vehicle passes an RSU it joins the group
within that radius, and to manage the keys Park et al. [175] propose that RSUs be used as
key distribution centres. Secondly, in the event where a GM becomes compromised this
has an impact on the privacy of groupmembers’ and also potentially can prevent the iden-
tification and revocation of vehicles. In a system where the GM is an RSU, it has been
proposed [123] to add an additional layer of layer of authentication to certify each RSU.
This adds an additional layer of PKI where the CA certifies each RSU, and these certific-
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ates are verified by vehicles prior to joining a group. Finally, revocation in group signa-
ture schemes is amammoth challenge and currently revocation is problematic to vehicular
privacy, since removal of a member from the group requires identifying the vehicle in the
group temporarily impacting the privacy of other honest members. Several solutions have
been proposed and have their drawbacks, for example the use of HSMs [182], novel proto-
cols [211, 140, 151], additional trusted third parties [213], and revocation lists [153].
Symmetric cryptographic systems have been proposed because of their efficiency in
terms of both computation and communication overheads. It is important to acknowledge
that symmetric schemes are clearly not as flexible as an asymmetric scheme (VPKI), and
symmetric schemes may not be able to provide non-repudiation. Few examples applying
symmetric cryptography for VANETs exist, but notably the proposed scheme by Choi et
al. [64] demonstrated the feasibility of symmetric authentication and privacy in VANETs.
Themain drawbacks of this scheme is the reliance on the infrastructure toperformmessage
verification (e.g., RSUs), and thus the time delay introduced to message verification.
Attribute-Based Credentials (ABC) within VANETs [169] by Neven et al. conceptualise
the use of ABCs, which allows for the creation of pseudonyms locally within vehicles. The
scheme is designed to only allow one valid pseudonym at any given time, and are limited
for usewith low frequency signedmessages due to computational requirement. Thework is
limited and the paper does not contain explicit definitions of protocols or implementation
details.
Recently, Dragan et al. [93] suggest that the use of Hierarchical Attribute-based Signa-
tures (HABs) are applicable in VANETs, in which the authors describe as “lightweight” since
they use Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. In comparison to ABC, HABS performs
delegation of attributes from the top-level CA down to the users while ensuring that sig-
natures produced preserve user privacy, and this includes the path of delegation; i.e., the
credential and signature produced are not identifiable to a particular user. The research
does not contain explicit definitions of protocols, implementationdetails, efficiency results
or an architecture application within VANETs. Additionally, revocation is currently solved
in the scheme by use of a Revocation List and this is similar to a CRL, which as discussed
earlier suffer from scalability issues.

Chapter 3
Modelling and Analysis of Security
Protocols
This chapter introduces the TAMARIN approach to symbolic modelling which forms the
basis of the technique used in Chapters 4 and 6. The chapter also presents an overview of
security and privacy properties and illustrates how they are modelled using the TAMARIN
PROVER.
This chapter presents several running examples and focuses on the modelling and ana-
lysis of the Schnorr Signature protocol [200] .
3.1 Security Protocols
A security protocol describes message exchanges between agents and the operations per-
formed locally by agents [190]. They use cryptography to distribute secrets, authenticate
agents and data, and protect certain messages. To claim that a security protocol is secure
means that a protocol satisfies its security properties under a set of assumptions in face of
attack from an adversary. In this thesis, we will focus on the Dolev-Yao adversary [91] as
described in Section 3.2. Desired goals are referred to as security properties, which include
confidentiality (secrecy ofmessage, anonymity, privacy), integrity (authenticity,distributed
agreement) and availability (denial of service prevention). We will discuss the properties
that we focus on in this thesis in Section 3.3.
In Figure 3.1 we give an example of a security protocol. The protocol comprises two
roles: the initiator, I , and responder, R , and each role has one action to perform. An agent
Alice that is executing the role of I for this protocol begins by generating a fresh random
value ni . This random value, ni , is commonly known as a nonce, number used only once.
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I
skI , pkI , pkR
R
skR, pkR, pkI
Fresh ni
{| ni |}pkR
Decrypt message with
skR to recover ni
Figure 3.1 An example of a security protocol
Before sending ni over the network to Bob
executing the role of R , Alice first encrypts
the data item under Bob’s public key pkR ,
denoted by {|ni |}pkR . Bob then receives
the message from the network, decrypts
the message to recover ni and completes a
successful execution of the protocol if the
message can be decrypted, or else fails and
aborts the execution of the protocol. A com-
plete instance of a protocol role executed
by an agent is called a session. Wemay wish
for this protocol to have the property that,when two communicating agents (Alice andBob)
execute the protocol with one another, Alice can verify that Bob received the intended data,
and at no other point can another agent learn the data sent between Alice and Bob. These
properties are informal examples of security properties.
3.2 Dolev-YaoModel
In 1983Dolev and Yao [91] introduced a formalmodel for analysing security protocols,com-
monly referred to as the Dolev-Yao (DY) model. The model captures three main assump-
tions:
1. Perfect Cryptography. The cryptography used in a protocol is assumed to be perfect,
i.e., the hash functions used are cryptographically secure and the adversary cannot
encrypt or decrypt messages without knowledge of the right key. In the symbolic
model, cryptographic primitives are perfect black boxes, expressed by function sym-
bols in an algebra of terms, with equations. Messages are algebraic terms on these
primitives.
2. Unbounded Execution. A protocol can be executed any number of times by an arbit-
rary set of agents assuming different roles.
3. Network Adversary. A adversary has full control over the network: it can intercept,
block, replay, spoof anymessage it can create as if it came from any source, and send
any message on the network. Additionally, the adversary learns all the content in all
messages it sees, unless they are cryptographically protected. Typically an adversary
is referred to as a DY adversary. It can compute, and derive knowledge only using
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terms and equations. For example, in the case of encryption the DY adversary can
only encrypt and decrypt messages if she knows the keys or can derive them.
3.3 Security and Privacy Properties
In this section we discuss the security properties that are relevant in this thesis. We firstly
focus on secrecy and authentication (which are often referred to as safety properties) and
then we also discuss privacy properties. Privacy properties are concerned with hiding in-
formation about the relationship between agents and the operations they perform. We do
not discuss non-repudiation (of receipt, submission, delivery), fairness, availability, and
sender invariance as they are not used in the protocols analysed in this thesis.
3.3.1 Secrecy
A secrecy property (also called confidentiality) expresses that certain data (e.g., key, nonce,
etc) is not revealed to, or known by an adversary even though it is communicated over an
untrusted network [190, 76]. A protocol provides secrecy if the adversary cannot obtain the
secret datawhen agents properly follow the protocol and donot otherwise disclose the data.
For example in Figure 3.1 the nonce ni is a secret shared between I and R . The adversary
cannot obtain ni through eavesdropping the communicated message since she does not
have the decryption key skR . Thus under the assumption that I and R do not otherwise
disclose ni , this ensures that ni remains a secret shared between I and R .
3.3.2 Authentication
Authentication provides assurance of the identity of a communicating agent in a protocol.
There has been significant research with respect to specifying and categorising authentic-
ation, including Cervesato and Syverson [214], Clark and Jacob [68] and Lowe [150]. Lowe
presents a hierarchy of authentication specifications, and the strongest form of authentic-
ation is injective agreement. In this thesis we adopt these definitions and summarise them
as follows:
Aliveness.
A form of authentication that guarantees that when the initiating agent I completes a
run of the protocol, apparently interacting with another agent R , then R has run the
protocol, but not necessarily with agent I .
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Weak Agreement.
A slightly stronger form of authentication than aliveness that guarantees that when
an initiator I completes a run of the protocol apparently with another agent R , then
R has also been running the protocol apparently with I .
Non-injective Agreement.
A stronger authentication property than weak agreement; it adds a further condition
to ensure that the two agents, I and R , agree on the roles they are taking and agree on
the data items used in their message exchange.
Injective Agreement.
This property adds a further constraint on top of non-injective agreement, which is
that there is a uniquematching partner run for each completed run of an agent. The
idea of injective agreement is to prevent replay attacks.
Consider an example of a protocol with two roles I and R . I invents a nonce, n j , and
the first protocol message sends a nonce signed by I from I to R denoted {n j }skI . R extracts
the nonce and creates a newmessage that includes the nonce and the identity of I . R signs
the message and sends it back to I {n j , I }skR . At the end of the protocol both parties know
each other and satisfy aliveness, weak agreement and non-injective agreement. Injective
agreement is not satisfied because an attacker can performa replay attack onRby replaying
the first message as it if is from I and then R sends the response, so R participates many
times having only received one communication from I .
The thesis will also consider other forms of authentication for example data origin au-
thentication whereMACs or digital signatures, introduced in Chapter 2, provide themeans
to verify the source and integrity of a message [115].
3.3.3 Anonymity
Anonymity is required in a variety of security protocol applications, for example, in elec-
tronic voting [86, 94, 162] it is essential that an adversary does not know for which candid-
ate an agent voted. A further example is Chaum’s eCash [54, 55]. When an agent spends its
cash the spend should not reveal the agent’s identity.
The definition for anonymity is highly dependent on the context of the application
[198], and a variety of definitions are proposed in the literature [179, 190, 122, 135] and
formalisations have been proposed [97, 14, 125, 198]. In this thesis anonymity is primarily
concerned with “protecting the identity of agents with respect to particular events or mes-
sages” [190].
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3.3.4 Unlinkability
Unlinkability is concerned with not being able to link the identity of an agent with opera-
tions, or the unlinkability of operations performed by the same agent. There are a num-
ber of definitions in the literature including Pfitzmann et al. [179], and ISO/IEC 15408-
2:2008 [135] which defines unlinkability as: “a user may make multiple uses of a service or
resource without others being able to link these uses together”. Formalisations of unlinkab-
ility properties have been proposed [125, 10]. Note that the definition for linkability is the
negation of unlinkability.
Unlinkability is required in a variety of security protocol applications, e.g., the Basic Ac-
cess Control e-passport protocol [127, 44]. The e-passport protocol ensures that data on an
e-passport can only be read by an agent who has knowledge of the key derived from pass-
port, hence any agent without this knowledge cannot track a passport. Note that Chothia
and Smirnov [65] found an attack violating unlinkability of e-passports allowing a passport
to be tracked without knowledge of the key.
3.4 Security Analysis
In order to perform a security analysis, a model of a system is required, together with a
model of the adversary. Security properties of interest also need to be identified and the
analysis examines if the identified properties hold in the context of the attack model. The
result of an analysis is that under assumptions about a system and the adversary, no attack
of a certain form will break the properties of interest. In this thesis, the models of secur-
ity protocols are defined at the design level and therefore, this level of abstraction will not
consider implementation details, e.g., memory models and computational power. There
are several examples of implementation attacks. For TLS there are examples of timing side-
channel attack POODLE [203] where a weakness in the RC4 hash algorithmcould also yield
an attack on TLS 1.2 if your implementation of TLS 1.2 uses RC4 [41, 203, 108, 8]. Other ex-
amples which were found by implementation but demonstrate design flaws includeWPA2
KRACK [224], and automotive key(less) entry system protocols [147, 124, 107, 225].
There has been significant research in the verification of security protocols based on
provable security and the symbolic approach. These are have been highly successful in
finding flaws, e.g., TLS 1.3 [26, 79, 77], UK banking protocols [66], 5G authenticated key
agreement protocols [18], smart grids [78], instant messaging protocols [70, 69], and train
to trackside communication protocols [217, 67, 84].
Abadi andRogaway [3, 4] also define the computational soundnessmodel of verification.
This approach brings together the provable security and symbolic approaches and estab-
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lishes that in some instances satisfied security properties in the symbolic model imply se-
curity properties in the computational model. Cortier et al. [74] survey the state-of-the-art
for computational soundness.
3.4.1 Provable Security
Cryptographic system designs are becoming increasingly complex, and as a consequence
cryptographic proofs developed by hand are becoming increasingly error prone and diffi-
cult to verify [16].
There exists several different proof methodologies for provable security, and the three
main approaches are Simulation-based [148], Game-based [23, 205] and the Universally
Composable (UC) [51] model. These proofs rely on the computational model. The mes-
sages in thesemodels are described as bitstrings and the cryptographic primitives are func-
tions on bitstrings. The adversary in these models are also typically any probabilitistic
(polynomial-time) Turing machine. These proofs are often done by reduction to known
hard problems [118] (e.g. discrete log, factorisation).
Examples of formal tools for computational security protocol verification includeCrypto-
Verif [29] and EasyCrypt [16]. These tools provide interactive proof frameworks and work
directly in the computational model. They produce proofs for any number of sessions in
the presence of an adversary and rigorously justify cryptographic reasoning.
3.4.2 Symbolic Approach
This thesis focusses on the symbolic approach where implementation details of the cryp-
tographic primitives of the protocols are abstracted away, and their execution is only mod-
elled symbolically. In contrast to the computational model, cryptographic primitives are
considered as perfect black-boxes, modelled by function symbols and possibly equations
(e.g., for encryption, pairing, signatures). The messages are terms on these primitives and
the adversary can reason using only these primitives. This alsomeans that implementation
flaws or side-channel attacks are not considered.
A number of techniques for verifying protocols in the symbolic model exist including
those based on epistemic logic (e.g. BAN logic); theorem proving (e.g. inductive approach);
and model checking. Model checking focuses on finding attacks and needs to limit the
search space to keep the analysis manageable. Theorem proving aims for general case and
establishing correctness.
There are a number of tools to support symbolic verification such as, Scyther [81], The
TAMARIN PROVER [158, 197], PROVERIF [33], Maude-NPA [98], and the Cryptographic Pro-
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tocol Shapes Analyzer (CPSA) [90]. A DY adversary is included within the TAMARIN PROVER,
PROVERIF, Scyther, and CPSA.
Scyther has been successfully applied to analyse a range of protocols, including the dis-
covery of new attacks on the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol [80], and the authentica-
tion standard ISO/IEC 9798 [19]. PROVERIF has been successfully applied to protocols, for
example, Avionic Protocols [31], TLS 1.3 [25], and banking protocols [66]. The Maude-NPA
tool has been applied to analyse IBMs CCA protocols [116] and PKCS#11 [117].
This thesis focusses on the use of the TAMARIN PROVER and we provide an introduction
to the TAMARIN PROVER in Section 3.5.
In symbolic analysis security properties fall into two main categories: trace properties
and equivalence properties. Trace properties are predicates over each execution trace of a
protocol. Trace properties are satisfied by verifying that each possible trace of the protocol
satisfies some predicate. Typically weak notions of secrecy and authentication properties
are examples of trace properties. For example, secrecy of ni in Figure 3.1 would be ex-
pressed that every execution trace of the protocol including the adversary does not result
in the adversary knowing ni . Authentication would be that every trace in which B authen-
ticates A must have A also in the trace doing what B has authenticated.
Equivalence properties (also referred to as indistinguishability properties) means that
two runs of a protocol are indistinguishable to the adversary if it cannot distinguish which
run of the protocol it is interacting with [20, 2, 63, 32]. This can be used to specify secur-
ity and privacy properties such as strong secrecy, anonymity, and unlinkability. Delaune
& Hirschi [85], and Chadha et al. [53] survey various anonymity and privacy related prop-
erties, including anonymity, unlinkability and strong secrecy, which can be proved using
equivalence-based reasoning.
In the literature there are already several examples where symbolic verification tools
have been used to analyse privacy properties. The TAMARIN PROVER has been extended
to include support for observations equivalance proofs [20] and examples of analysing pri-
vacy properties using observational equivalences include electronic voting [22, 43]. Other
tools, e.g., PROVERIF [33] have also been used to analyse privacy properties, for example,
vehicular [101, 83], and electronic voting [28].
3.5 The TAMARIN PROVER
As stated earlier, the TAMARIN PROVER [159, 158, 197, 196] is a state-of-the-art protocol veri-
fication tool for symbolic modelling. It supports unbounded verification, mutable global
state, and flexible user-defined equational theories. Protocols are modelled using multiset
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rewriting rules and properties are specified using first-order logic. The tool offers auto-
matic verification succeeding in many cases, as well as an interactive verification mode
with manual proof tree traversal. The tool provides both proofs, and disproofs by counter-
example, but may not terminate due to the undecidability of the underlying problem. The
TAMARIN PROVER has successfully been used in the verification of TLS 1.3 [77, 79, 223, 202],
PKCS#11 [146], electronic voting [22, 43], control flow integrity in industrial systems [96],
and other applications [75, 78]. We choose the TAMARIN PROVER as the tool used in this
thesis because it has demonstrated to be effective for analysing large real world protocols,
and provides the flexibility to define equational theories.
This section provides a high-level overview of the TAMARIN modelling approach. We il-
lustrate three examples: the example protocol depicted in Figure 3.1, a protocol that uses a
Schnorr Signature [200], and an observational equivalence example. The reader is referred
to the TAMARIN PROVER manual [159] for a comprehensive introduction, and for an explan-
ation of its theory and implementation [196, 155].
3.5.1 Terms and equations
In a symbolic model, all messages are described as terms, for example aenc(m,pk(k)) rep-
resents the asymmetric encryption of some plaintext m under a public key pk(k). Recall
that the notion of asymmetric encryption and decryption was introduced in Section 2.1.2.
We define a signature Σ as a number of operators, such as aenc, each equipped with an
arity, i.e., the number of arguments it accepts. Note that Σ is not a cryptographic signature.
We construct terms by applying operators to constants, variables, and other operators.
The cryptographic properties of the used primitives are then specified as equations.
The example of asymmetric encryption introduced above would also contain a decryption
operator adec, and an equation adec(aenc(m,pk(k)),k) = m that allows extracting the
plaintext message m using the private key k associated with the public key pk(k). The
equations specified in a model completely characterise all possible derivations, as we use
the perfect cryptography assumption, meaning there is no other way to break the defined
primitives. A set of equations, together with the underlying signature is called an equa-
tional theory. The TAMARIN PROVER allows convergent (i.e., both confluent and terminat-
ing) equational theories [95] that additionally satisfy the Finite Variant Property (FVP) [71].
The TAMARIN PROVER has a number of built-in equational theories that can be used in
models, for example the asymmetric-encryption built-in includes aenc, adec, and pk
operators and equations.
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Example 1. Amodel of asymmetric encryption considers Σ to be the signature comprising
the operators aenc(·, ·), adec(·, ·), and pk(·) with the equation:
adec(aenc(m,pk(k)),k)=m
3.5.2 States, facts, rules, and labelledmultiset rewriting
Distinguished terms, called facts, consisting of a top-level fact symbol of fixed arity and
with standard terms as arguments, build the state. Specifically, a state is a finite multiset of
facts, and it represents the current state of a protocol’s execution, including all participants’
local states, the DY adversary knowledge, and messages currently on the network. The dis-
tinguished Fr (x) fact represents fresh values and the semantics of all other facts is given by
the specified rules. The rules model the possible actions of protocol participants as well as
the DY adversary actions.
Rules are given as triples, written [l]--[a]->[r] with l, a, r finite sequences of facts,
representing the premises also referred to as the left hand side (LHS), actions, and conclu-
sions also referred to as the right hand side (RHS), respectively. Actions are the labels of the
rules. As a general DY is considered, a modelling convention is that messages are sent to
the network using a special Out fact, received from the network by In and the DY adversary
knowledge is represented by K facts. Note that the DY adversary can apply all the equations
given in the equational theory specified and modify messages as it wants, assuming it has
the necessary cryptographic keys available.
The set of rules specifying the protocol and DY adversary then yields a labelled trans-
ition system, with the initial state being the emptymultiset. The TAMARIN PROVER changes
its statemultiset by finding an applicable rule, i.e., onewhose premisesmatch existing facts
within the current state multiset to obtain a new state multiset where the facts used in the
premise are replaced with those from the rule’s conclusion. The actions associated with
each rule instance in the execution yield the trace. Each rule instance and all associated
actions are timestamped with the timepoint of their occurrence with ordered timepoints.
To define trace properties in the TAMARIN PROVER means that the actions must contain
enough information to describe the required properties. These properties are then cap-
tured as lemmas.
We present a concrete example of state, facts and rules in Example 2 for the protocol
depicted in Figure 3.1.
Example 2. Let us consider our simple protocol from Figure 3.1 that sends a message en-
crypted under a public key.
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rule Create:
[ Fr( ~k ) ]
-->
[ !Ltk( $X , ~k ), !Pk( $X , pk( ~k ) ) ]
rule Send:
[ !Pk( $R , pkr ), Fr( ~ni ) ]
--[ Sent( ~ni ) ]->
[ Out( aenc( ~ni , pkr ) ) ]
rule Receive:
[ !Ltk( $R , skr ), In( aenc( ni , pk( skr ) ) ) ]
--[ Answer( adec( aenc( ni , pk( skr ) ), skr ) ), Received( ni ) ]->
[ ]
In the Create rule there is a single premise, no actions, and two persistent facts are pro-
duced. The premise consumes a Fresh fact Fr(~k) and each term produced by the fresh
fact is unique, denoted by the∼. The term ~k here means that a fresh private key has been
generated. The conclusion of the rule is the production of two persistent facts !Ltk($X,~k)
and !Pk($X, pk(~k)). The !Ltk fact captures the relationship between a private key and the
agent X that owns the key. The $X denotes that type of the term is public. Similarly, the !Pk
fact captures the relationship between a public key and the agent X that owns the key.
The Send rule has one persistent fact (!Pk(...)), which can be used multiple times by
other rules, and one linear fact (Fr(~ni)), meaning that the fact can only be used once, in
its premise, one action fact (Sent), and produces one linear fact (Out). The premise of the
rule consumes the persistent fact !Pk, and this models the lookup of the responders public
key. The rule consumes a fresh fact that models the generation of the nonce ~ni. The rule
logs an action of Sent(~ni) to the trace. The rule concludes on the RHS with an Out fact
being produced, and this sends the encrypted message containing ni on the network, via
the DY adversary. Note that In facts model that a protocol receives a message on the public
channel, and Out facts model a protocol sending out a message on the public channel. The
public channel is the default TAMARIN PROVER setup, and thismodels the network which is
controlled by the DY adversary.
The corresponding Receive rule receives the encryptedmessage from the network by In
fact in its premise. Also consumed in the premise is the persistent fact !Ltk, and this mod-
els the agent loading its private key. Two actions are recorded Answer, and Received(ni) that
logs the nonce the agent received. The Answer action first applies the asymmetric decryp-
tion function using the ciphertext received from the In fact and its private key skr. When
the decryption is applied it results in the action Answer(ni). The conclusion of the rule is
empty.
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3.5.3 Dolev-Yao adversary
The TAMARIN PROVER uses the standard DY adversary, which was introduced earlier in Sec-
tion 3.2. The DY adversary has control over the network and this is modelled using the
rules irecv and isendwhich are pre-defined in the TAMARIN PROVER [196, 159]. These rules
model that when an agent outputs a message on the network, it goes through the DY ad-
versary before being received by another agent.
rule irecv:
[ Out(x) ]
-->
[ !KD(x) ]
The rule irecv defines that any message sent using the Out fact is learned by the DY ad-
versary, (referred to as knowledge down, !KD). Each message x is then analysed by the DY
adversary and broken down into its terms. The deduction performed by the DY adversary
are specified by its construction and deconstruction rules, and can utilise equational the-
ory specified in a model.
rule isend:
[ !KU(x) ]
--[ K(x) ]->
[ In(x) ]
The rule isend models receiving a message x from the DY adversary, and is produced only
by the DY adversary’s construction rules from its knowledge (!KU). Messages are consumed
by agents through the In fact, which is produced by the DY adversary as the consequence
of the isend rule. The isend rule affirms the knowledge of the DY adversary, K(x), as a
consequence of adversarial deduction (!KU(x)) and broadcasts this x to the network for
other agents to consume. Note the action label K, allows for the specification and reasoning
of DY adversary knowledge in properties. The details of the DY deduction of knowledge is
not relevant to the work contained within this thesis. For further information on the theory
and implementation of the DY deduction in the TAMARIN PROVER, see [196].
The DY adversary’s control of agents’ communication can be limited by the specifica-
tion of channel rules [159] so that all communication is not broadcast on the network us-
ing the In and Out facts. Such channels can be modelled with desired security properties,
e.g., confidentially, authenticity, and both confidentiality and authenticity. In Chapter 6 we
make extensive use of secure channel rules, to limit the behaviour of the DY adversary and
explain their details in the context of our models.
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3.5.4 Security property specification
Trace properties such as secrecy and agreement are expressed as first-order logic formulae.
These formulae introduce variables to reason about the ordering of actions traces ([156]
provides more detail). A formula φmay hold on trace tr and we lift the semantics to a set
of traces Tr . We say a formula holds for all traces when it is satisfied by any trace in the set
(which we use to prove security properties), and we say that there exists a trace satisfying
the formula (“exists- trace” semantics)when there is at least one trace onwhich the formula
holds. We use this semantics in general to show that some protocol is executable, or a
specific state can be reached.
Example 3. Extending Example 2 we earlier define an executability property on the pro-
tocol as follows:
lemma executable_example: exists-trace
"
Ex z #i #j .
Sent(z) @ #i & Received(z) @ #j
& i < j
"
where Sent(z) is recorded in the trace at timepoint i, where z is an arbitrary term but will
be bound to a nonce ni . Similarly Received(z) @ #j denotes that the action Received(z) is
recorded in the trace at timepoint j for the same bound z, with the term z term. We cap-
ture the relation between timepoints i and j, and constrain the trace to specify that there
is a Send action before a Received action. We show the proof of the executability lemma
in Figure 3.2.
An additional feature we make use of is that of restrictions. Restrictions are useful to
limit the set of traces one wants to consider in protocol analysis.
In addition to trace properties, the TAMARIN PROVER supports equivalence properties.
In the TAMARIN PROVER this means that we need to identify two sets of multiset rewrite
rules. This is achieved through the introduction of a diff operator within a rule. Basin et
al. [17] refer to such a TAMARIN model that contains a diff as a bi-system. The analysis of
a bi-system yields two instances of the protocol where the only difference between them
is how a diff term is instantiated. One instance replaces the diff term with its left subterm
and the other instance replaces the diff term with its right subterm. The verification then
proves that the two instances of the protocol are observationally equivalent and therefore
indistinguishable to the adversary. For example, in electronic voting if an adversary can
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not tell the difference between a vote for X and a vote for Y this would be a way of showing
that votes are indistinguishable. We encode an example of equivalence properties in the
TAMARIN PROVER in Section 3.7.
3.5.5 Protocol Visualisation
The TAMARIN PROVER provides a graphical user interface to explore, and prove proper-
ties for a protocol theory. The TAMARIN PROVER produces visualisations of traces for both
proofs and disproofs. We provide a visualisation of the proof for the executability lemma
from Example 3, in Figure 3.2 from combining Examples 1, 2, and 3 into a TAMARIN security
protocol theory file (*.spthy).
Each rectangular box in Figure 3.2 represents a rule. The top row is the LHS of the rule,
the middle row are the action facts of the rule, and the bottom row is the RHS of the rule.
Note also the variety of arrows, styles and colours in Figure 3.2, and each type of arrow has
its ownmeaning:
• Solid Grey: denotes that a persistent fact is used from the RHS of the rule where it was
instantiated, and used in the LHS of another rule.
• Solid Black: denotes that a linear fact is consumed from the RHS of the rule by an-
other rule on the LHS.
• Dotted Black: denotes timepoint relations (the order in which the rules are executed)
between instances of rules.
• Solid Red: denotes the DY deductions and interaction with the protocol.
Additionally, ellipses in Figure 3.2 denote DY adversary computations. In the trace the
TAMARIN PROVER produces, we explain each step of the protocol we have defined in Ex-
amples 1, 2, and 3 from this section in turn:
1 The Create rule executes and it creates a key-pair for the responder R , storing the
private and public keys in the persistent facts !Ltk and !Pk respectively. No actions
are recorded to the trace as a result of the rule executing.
2 This rule shows there is an instance of an agent running the initiator role I , denoted
by the Send rule. The agent I looks up the public key of the agent R that was created
in 1 and generates a fresh nonce. The agent I then outputs the encrypted message
of its generated nonce encrypted with the public key of the agent R . A single action
fact Sent(~ni) is recorded to the trace, that executes at timepoint #i.
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3 In this step, the message from I onto the network goes via the DY adversary who
learns the complete term of the encrypted message, but not the terms used to con-
struct it, and sends the message to R .
4 This rule shows there is an instance of an agent R . The agent R receives in from
the network the encrypted message from 2 , and loads its private key k that was
created in 1 . Using its private key the agent decrypts the message to recover the
nonce. Two action facts are recorded in the trace at timepoint #j. The first action
fact Answer(~ni) demonstrates the application of the adec equation, and presents the
result of the decryption being ~ni . The second action, Received, denotes that the
nonce was received.
This trace satisfies our lemma defined in Example 3 as the actions Sent and Received are
present, and the Sent action occurs before the Received action.
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3.6 Example: Schnorr Signature Protocol
In this section we present a protocol and implement the equational theory for a Schnorr
signature (introduced in Section 2.9) in the TAMARIN PROVER. This model also encodes a
PKI, and uses the built-in equational theory: asymmetric-encryption and diffie-hellman to
provide various security operations.
Alice
x, y, g
Bob
g
Generate k
r ← gk
e ← H(r ‖ m)
s ← k − xe
m, s, e
rv ← g
sye
ev ← H(rv ‖ m)
If ev 6= e abort.
Figure 3.3 Schnorr Signature Protocol
The protocol has three phases: key gen-
eration, sign, and verify. Prior to key gen-
eration, we assume that all participating
agents agree on the group generator g . For
key generation an agent generates a key-
pair and selects a private key x, computes
its public key y (g x), and registers its key-
pair, x and y , with the PKI. Note that Fig-
ure 3.3 only shows the key-pair for Alice.
The protocol proceeds as follows: the
agent Alice assumes the role of the signer,
and sends messagem, generates a nonce k
at random, computes r , e , and s to create a
signature formessagem. The signature ofm is the pair (s,e), and hence,m, s and e are sent
to the agent Bob assuming the role of a verifier. Bob receives the message and signature
pair from Alice, and computes rv = g
s ye using the agreed generator g . Using rv , Bob com-
putes the hash, ev = H(rv ∥m), and if e = ev , then the signature is verified, otherwise it is
aborted. The proof of correctness of a Schnorr signature is shown in Equation 3.1 below. If
the verification of the signature fails, then the message would be ignored by Bob.
rv = g
s ye = g k−xeg xe = g k = r
Hence ev =H(rv ∥m)=H(r ∥m)= e
(3.1)
The following describes the mapping of this description into a TAMARIN model. Every
TAMARIN model is defined as a theory delimitedbetween the keywords begin and end and is
given a name. Figure 3.4 illustrates the header of our SchnorrSignature theory. The builtins,
function symbols, equations and restrictions used in the theory are specified on lines 2, 3, 4
and 5 respectively. Multiset rewrite rules and lemmas are then specified in the body of the
file denoted by the keywords rule and lemma.
In TAMARIN, everymodel of a security protocol theory starts with a header of the follow-
ing form as presented in Figure 3.4. What follows after theory on line 1 defines the name of
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our theory SchnorrSignature, and after the begin keyword. Finally, note that every security
protocol theorymust be delimited with the end keyword as shown on line 7.
1 theory SchnorrSignature begin
2 builtins: diffie -hellman , asymmetric -encryption
3 functions: calcR/1, h2/2, minus/2, plus/2, multp/2
4 equations: calcR(multp(g^minus(k,multp(x,h2(gk ,m))), pk(x)^h2(gk,m))) = gk
5 restriction equality: "All #i x y . Eq( x, y ) @ i ==> x = y"
6 ...
7 end
Figure 3.4 Schnorr Signature theory: Header
We begin by describing the equational theory for our model that is explicitly captured
in the header of the theory. We construct a signature, Σ, to capture the cryptographic op-
erators, where aenc/2 is a binary operator and is the syntactic representation of aenc(·, ·)
from Example 1. More generally f /n introduces an n-ary operator called f .
Σ= {aenc/2, adec/2, pk/1, h2/2, calcR/1,
multp/2, plus/2, minus/2,
^/2, inv/1, 1/0, */2}
rule Generate_DH_key_pair:
[ Fr( ~x ) ]
-->
[
!Ltk( $A , ~x )
, !Pk( $A , pk( ~x ) )
, Out( pk( ~x ) )
]
rule Reveal_ltk:
[ !Ltk( $A , x ) ]
--[ LtkReveal( $A ) ]->
[ Out( x ) ]
Figure 3.5 Schnorr Signature theory: PKI
The aenc, adec and pk operators come
from the asymmetric-encryption built-in.
The ^, inv , 1 and ∗ operators come from
the diffie-hellman built-in. The ∗, inv
and 1 model the multiplicative group of
exponents. We postpone explaining what
is meant by equations and the equality
restriction (lines 4 and 5) until we have
presented the rules of themodel.
The model starts with modelling the
PKI using the Generate_DH_key_pair rule
in Figure 3.5. We use persistent facts to
define the relationship between an agent
and its private/public keys. The out action
represents the registration of an agents’ public key to the PKI. The Reveal_ltk rule mod-
els the dynamic compromise of an agent’s private key, and sends it to the DY adversary.
A more detailed explanation of these rules is given as follows. The LHS of the rule
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Generate_DH_key_pair first generates a private key ~x of type fresh, and a public name for
an agent, $A (of type public), for whom the key-pair is being generated. There are no action
facts. The RHS of the rule concludes by generating the persistent fact !Ltk($A,~x), which
captures the association between an agent A and its private key ~x. We generate an addi-
tional persistent fact !Pk($A, pk(~x)), and this associates the public key to agent A. We
represent the public key, y = g x , using pk(x). Any other rule in the model can repeatedly
use the !Pk fact since it is persistent. The final step in this rule is to output onto the network
the public key of agent A for the DY to learn.
The premise of the Reveal_ltk rule retrieves the private key, x, of an agent A, and the
rule concludes by outputting to the network the private key, thus giving it to the DY ad-
versary. There is an action fact LtkReveal($A) allowing for reasoning over which agent in a
trace is compromised.
rule sign_message:
let
r = 'g'^~k
e = h2( r, ~m )
s = minus( ~k, multp( ~ska , e ) )
in
[
Fr( ~m )
, !Ltk( $A , ~ska )
, Fr( ~k )
]
--[
Signed( ~m, $A )
, Create( $A )
, Running( $A, $B , ~m )
]->
[ Out( < ~m, e, s > ) ]
Figure 3.6 Schnorr Signature theory: Sign
The remaining rules in this section
model the Sign and Verify phases, includ-
ing the message exchange between two
agents Alice and Bob. Figure 3.6 defines
the sign_message rule which represents an
agent A constructing a message and its sig-
nature. The LHS of the rule generates a
fresh message m, a fresh nonce k, and re-
calls the private key of agent A state from
the multiset. With these state facts it is
possible to compute the terms r , e and s.
Note that when modelling more complex
protocols, a termmay occur multiple times
within the same rule or may be large/com-
plex terms. Macros are used to make spe-
cifications more readable. Each macro is
defined on a separate line in between the
let and in keywords and locally scoped to the rule they are defined in. The rule has three
action facts to affirm that agent A signed message m and that it believes it was running
the protocol with an agent B . They are used later in specifying security properties. The
rule concludes by the agent Alice outputting the messagem, and signature pair (e, s) to the
network via the DY adversary.
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The verify_message rule in Figure 3.7 defines the behaviour of a verifier. Note the mac-
ros for rv and ev are defined locally within this rule. Initially the messagem and signature
pair terms s and e are consumed from the network.
rule verify_message:
let
rv = calcR( multp( 'g'^s, pka^e ) )
ev = h2( rv , m )
in
[
In( < m, e, s > )
, !Pk( $A , pka )
]
--[
Eq( ev , e )
, Verified( m, $A, $B )
, Commit( $B, $A , m )
]->
[ ]
Figure 3.7 Schnorr Signature theory: Verify
Additionally, agent A’s public key is re-
called. With these terms the macro rv can
apply the equation calcR. On line 4 of Fig-
ure 3.4 we define the equation calcR to be
the reduction of rv to r as defined in Equa-
tion 3.1. We utilise the TAMARIN PROVER’s
pattern matching and the FVP as a faith-
ful abstraction that from rv the term r can
be produced. calcR matches on the nonce
k, the private key x is the associated key
for pk(x) and the message m. Thus, if the
terms that were used to construct the term
rv in TAMARIN arewell formed then it is pos-
sible to produce the sub-term r = g k . Note
that the argument of calcR is g s ye from
Equation 3.1. Also the hash, ev, from the term rv and the received message term m can be
constructed. In the actions, we define an equality action fact, Eq, andwe previously defined,
in Figure 3.4, the restriction equality. Essentially, the restriction says that for all action facts
of Eq across all rules in the multiset rewrite system, the term x is equal to y . Therefore, this
restriction ignores traces where the equality action fact is not satisfied. Hence, this model
captures an agent Bob verifying a Schnorr signature pair (s,e) where ev = e . Additionally,
there are two further action facts Verified and Commit are used to reason and capture se-
curity properties on our protocol. The conclusion of the rule is empty signifying that the
agent Bob has successfully executed the session of the protocol. This completes the formal
definition of the protocol.
Nowwe focus on identifying the properties the protocol should satisfy. Recall in section
3.5.4 that action labels form the basis of describing properties of the protocol. To analyse a
protocol with respect to authentication properties relevant rules are labelled with actions,
Create indicating the existence of an agent in a protocol, Running showing the involvement
of an agent in a protocol run, and Commit indicating an agent has completed a run. In our
Schnorr signature example these labels can be seen in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. Actions end-
ing with a Reveal indicate that an agent’s key has been compromised. Using reveal action
labels allows us to reason about agents that are compromised in runs of a protocol. For
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example, in our Schnorr signature example the LtkReveal action represents an agent’s long-
term key being revealed. We also introduced Signed and Verified labels in the example to
reason about the execution order of rules. Choosingmeaningful action labels aids with the
readability of lemmas.
We identify four properties that the protocol should satisfy. Thus, we define four lem-
mas: functional correctness, unforgeability, aliveness andweak agreement which are given
as follows.
Functional Correctness.
The intuition for this lemma is to demonstrate that the Schnorr protocol can run to
completion, without the DY adversary involvement. We encode this as an exists trace
property. In the TAMARIN PROVER, when modelling protocols, such proofs are useful
sanity checks to increase our confidence in the correctness of themodel.
1 lemma functional_correctness: exists -trace
2 "Ex A B m #i #j .
3 Signed(m,A) @ #i & Verified(m,A,B) @ #j & i < j & not(A = B)
4 & not(Ex C #k . LtkReveal(C) @ #k)
5 "
6
The lemma states that there exists a signedmessagem from an agent A at timepoint
i , and the message m sent from an agent A was verified by agent B at timepoint j ,
and the Signed action occurred before the Verified action. Additionally, it states that
the agent A and agent B are not the same agent, and at no point in the trace was any
compromised agent and that includes A or B .
Figure 3.8 demonstrates a run of the protocol that satisfies our lemma. We observe
from this trace that the protocol is executing as specified in the lemma,and that agent
A has not revealed its private key. Note that the trace did not require agent B to gen-
erate keys.
Unforgeability.
The intuition for this lemma is to demonstrate that signatures cannot be forged by the
DY adversary, unless she has knowledge of an agent’s private key. This is a stronger
property since we require it to be over all traces of the protocol.
1 lemma unforgeability:
2 "All A B m #i .
3 Verified( m, A, B ) @ #i
4 ==>
5 ( ( Ex #j. Signed( m, A ) @ #j & j < i )
3.6 Example: Schnorr Signature Protocol 49
6 | ( Ex #k . LtkReveal( A ) @ #k & k < i ) )
7 "
8
The lemma states that for all Verified messages sent from an agent to another agent
implies that either the agent A sent a signed message m, and the Signed action oc-
curred prior to the message being Verified. Or if it is the case that the agent A has
been compromised prior to themessage being Verified, hence the signature of mes-
sagem was forged by the DY adversary and verified by the agent B .
In Figure 3.9 we illustrate a trace where the agent A private key has been revealed by
the DY adversary. This proof trace shows that an agent A assumes the role of the initi-
ator, generates and registers its key-pair. In the next step the DY adversary comprom-
ises the agent A, and learns its private key x.1. The DY adversary with knowledge of
the private key x.1 can now forge signatures as if they were computed by A. Hence,
an agent B running a thread assuming the role of the verifier can verify the signature,
ev = e , using the public key of agent A.
Aliveness.
Recall the definition of aliveness from Section 3.3.2. The intuition for the lemma is
to guarantee that when an agent commits to a run of the protocol, another agent has
previously been involved in the same or another run of the protocol, or an agent has
become compromised. Its definition is as follows:
1 lemma aliveness:
2 "All a b n #i .
3 Commit(a, b, n) @ i
4 ==>
5 (Ex #j . Create(b) @ j) | (Ex C #r . LtkReveal(C) @ r)
6 "
7
The lemma states that an agent A commits to a running session of the protocol with
agent B on term n at timepoint i (where n is the message) using the action label
Commit. This then implies that either there exists an agent B executing the role of an
initiator, denoted by the Create label, or theDY adversary has compromised an agent.
For the Schnorr model this lemma is satisfied across all traces.
Weak Agreement.
Recall the definition of weak agreement from Section 3.3.2. The intuition for the
lemma is to guarantee that an agent A completed a run of the protocol with B , then
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B has been running the protocol apparently with A, or one of the agents has become
compromised. Note that they do not have to agree on the data items exchanged. Its
definition is as follows:
1 lemma weak_agreement:
2 "All a b n #i .
3 Commit(a, b, n) @ i
4 ==>
5 (Ex n2 #j. Running(b, a, n2) @ j) | (Ex C #r. LtkReveal(C) @ r)
6 "
7
We demonstrate that theweak agreement property is not satisfied. Figure 3.10 shows
a disproof found by the TAMARIN PROVER. The intuition for this lemma is that when
an agent A and an agent B commit to a running session of the protocol on the term
n, then there is a running session between agent B and agent A on some term n2 or
the DY adversary has compromised an agent, and is playing the role of an initiator.
Figure 3.10 shows that the agent A believes it is running the protocol with agent B.1,
however it is running a session with another agent B . This is possible due to the sig-
nature not capturing information about the agent B.1. This attack can be fixed by
encoding the identity of B in the hashes e and ev ← H(B ∥ r ∥m). With this modifica-
tion encodedweak agreement is satisfied.
3.6 Example: Schnorr Signature Protocol 51
F
ig
u
re
3
.8
S
ch
n
o
rr
S
ig
n
a
tu
re
P
ro
to
co
l:
F
u
n
ct
io
n
a
lC
o
rr
e
ct
n
e
ss
52 Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols
F
ig
u
re
3
.9
S
ch
n
o
rr
S
ig
n
a
tu
re
P
ro
to
co
l:
U
n
fo
rg
e
a
b
il
it
y
3.6 Example: Schnorr Signature Protocol 53
F
ig
u
re
3
.1
0
S
ch
n
o
rr
S
ig
n
a
tu
re
P
ro
to
co
l:
W
e
a
k
A
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
54 Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols
3.7 Example: Probabilistic Encryption
In this section we present another protocol and implement the equational theory for prob-
abilistic encryption by Basin et al. [17] and its encoding within the TAMARIN PROVER. This
example demonstrates the TAMARIN PROVER’s specification for observational equivalence,
introduced in Section 3.5.4. Figure 3.11 defines the TAMARIN theory for probabilistic en-
cryption.
theory probEnc
begin
functions: penc/3, pdec/2, pk/1
equations:
pdec(penc(m,pk(k),r), k) = m
rule gen:
[Fr(~k)]
-->
[!Key(~k), Out(pk(~k))]
rule enc:
[!Key(k), Fr(~r1), Fr(~r2), In(x)]
-->
[Out(diff(~r1, penc(x,pk(k) ,~r2)))]
end
Figure 3.11 Probabilistic Encryption theory
The theory defines three function sym-
bols penc, pdec, and pk. The equation pdec
takes two arguments. The first argument is
a ciphertext constructed from penc which
contains amessagem, the public key pk(k),
and fresh randomness r . The second argu-
ment is the private key related to the public
key used in the encryption. Successful ap-
plication of the pdec equation produces the
message termm.
The theory contains two rules gen and
enc. The gen on the LHS generates a fresh
key k, and on the RHS stores the key in a
persistent fact, and outputs to the network
the public key, pk(k), for the DY adversary
to learn.
The LHS of the enc rule requires a
private !Key persistent fact, generates two
fresh nonce terms r1 and r2, and a message x from the network. The rule concludes by
outputting either the nonce r1, or the ciphertext containing the message x and the nonce
r2 encrypted with the public key.
The enc rule contains the diff -term that is used to express a bi-system. The diff -term
yields two runs of the protocol, and in this example differ on the term (nonce or penc) con-
tained in Out fact in the conclusion of this rule. In the TAMARIN PROVER one execution of
the protocol is referred to as left system and the other run is called the right system.
The left system in the probabilistic encryption theory outputs the nonce r1, and in the
right system outputs the ciphertext penc(x,pk(k),~r2)). This bi-system expresses that a
probabilistic encryption cannot be distinguished from a random value. The DY adversary
compares the two resulting systems and from its observations and knowledge, attempts to
distinguish the two protocol executions. Figure 3.12 shows the execution of the bi-system.
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In common across both systems the DY adversary is inputting itsmessage x, illustrated
in Figure 3.12. Additionally, the agent creates and uses the same key k from the gen rule.
Figure 3.12a shows the left running system where the agent sends out random r1, and
Figure 3.12b shows the right running systemwhere the agent sends out the ciphertext penc.
In both systems the DY adversary receives each term respectively at timepoint #vk, and at
timepoint #i , iequality, theDY adversary compares the two terms,r1 and penc, for equality.
Recall from Section 3.5.3 the explanations of knowledge down and knowledge up. The r1
term is an atom and cannot be deconstructed (KD) further by the DY adversary. The penc
term cannot be deconstructed (KD) by theDY adversary since it does not have knowledge of
the private key k. Hence the proofs prove that theDY adversary cannot distinguishbetween
randomness and a ciphertext.
We edit the theory in Figure 3.11 anduse thebuilt-in asymmetric encryption.Wepresent
the deterministic encryption theory in Figure 3.13.
theory detEnc
begin
builtins: asymmetric -encryption
rule gen:
[Fr(~k)]
-->
[!Key(~k), Out(pk(~k))]
rule enc:
[!Key(k), Fr(~r), In(x)]
-->
[Out(diff(~r, aenc(x,pk(k))))]
end
Figure 3.13 Deterministic Encryption theory
This example is almost identical to Fig-
ure 3.11 except the Out diff in the enc rule is
either a random nonce r , or the encryption
of a message x under the public key pk(k).
In the encryption we use the built-in aenc
operator and remove the randomness.
The left system in the deterministic en-
cryption theory outputs the nonce r , and
in the right system outputs the ciphertext
aenc(x,pk(k))). This bi-system expresses
that a deterministic encryption cannot be
distinguished from a randomvalue. TheDY
adversary compares the two resulting sys-
tems and from its observations and know-
ledge attempts to distinguish the two pro-
tocol executions. Figure 3.14 shows the exe-
cution of the bi-system.
The TAMARIN PROVER finds an attack on the protocol in Figure 3.14, and indicates that
the DY adversary is able to distinguish between the left and right systems. The attack found
by the TAMARIN PROVER proceeds as follows:
1. The DY adversary constructs its own message and sends this to the agent.
2. The agent generates its asymmetric key-pair and outputs the public key. The DY ad-
versary learns the public key.
3.7 Example: Probabilistic Encryption 57
3. The message sent by the DY adversary is received by the agent, and it encrypts the
message with its public key and outputs the message to the network.
4. Using the public key the DY adversary encrypts its generated message, receives the
encrypted message from the agent and compares the terms.
Since the DY adversary has knowledge of the public key, and message it can distinguish
between the run of the protocol where the agent outputs a randomnonce or the ciphertext.
Figure 3.14 Attack found on the Deterministic Encryption theory

Chapter 4
Formal Analysis of V2X Revocation
Protocols
This chapter formally analyses two existing protocols for V2X revocation and proposes one
new revocation protocol to eliminate the flaws identified in the existing protocols in the
literature. Our analysis also independently confirms one of the previously identified flaws.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.1 presents a revocation scenario. Sec-
tion 4.2 introduces the security notation used throughout this chapter and the modelling
assumptions made in our models. Section 4.3 defines formal models and analyses of the
existing REWIRE protocols. Section 4.4 presents our new OBSCURE TOKEN protocol and its
analysis, and Section 4.5 provides conclusions and identifies preservation of privacy prop-
erties as an area of future analysis for revocation protocols.
4.1 SystemModel and Revocation Scenario
Recall from Section 2.11 in Figure 2.1 the VPKI lifecycle depicted a Certification Authority
(CA), Pseudonym Provider (PP) and Revocation Authority (RA) and detailed a lifecycle to
create, change and revoke pseudonyms. Within the REWIRE protocols the same authorities
and vehicles exist and their purpose is similar:
• The CA and PP issue long-term certificates and pseudonyms respectively to vehicles
andmay optionally implement a resolutionmechanism to allow linking back pseudo-
nyms to long-term IDs.
• Vehicles in the Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) communicate with other par-
ticipants. They monitor each others’ behaviour using misbehaviour detection mech-
anisms [222] andmay issue reports of vehicle misbehaviour to the RA.
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Figure 4.1 High-level V2X Revocation Scenario
• The RA collectsmisbehaviour reports from participating vehicles in an ITS, and takes
a decision to revoke reported pseudonyms. It then creates and broadcasts signed
revocationmessages to the misbehaving vehicle.
• Vehicles receive and process revocation commands to revoke their pseudonyms, and
send confirmations back to the RA.
Figure 2.1 Figure 4.1
1, 2 ⇋ 1
3, 4, 5 ⇋ 2
6, 7 ⇋
Secure V2V
Communication
8 ⇋ Vehicle
9, 10, 11 ⇋ 3, 4
12 ⇋ 5
n/a ⇋ 6
Table 4.1 Mapping of lifecycle steps
The REWIRE protocols only focus on revok-
ing pseudonyms, but in the context of having
created and being able to change pseudonyms.
This results in amore abstract lifecycle than Fig-
ure 2.1, as shown in Figure 4.1. There is clearly
a relationship between these two lifecycles as
shown in Table 4.1.
In step 1, vehicle V1 obtains a long-term
certificate from the CA enabling it to obtain
pseudonyms. In step 2, V1 obtains pseudo-
nyms from the PP to communicate securely
with other vehicles including vehicle V2. Steps
4.2 Background and assumptions 61
1 and 2 are not part of a revocation protocol it-
self, rather they are part of the issuance phase of pseudonyms. We shall see in our model
that these steps are abstracted.
During the V2V communication in the ITS, vehicleV1 will receive messages fromV2 un-
der a pseudonym that could change frequently. V2will applymisbehaviour detectionmech-
anisms [222] in order to detect indications of faulty or malicious behaviour. Examples of
such mechanisms may detect spoofed positions or incorrect speeds reported in messages.
In our model V2V communication is abstracted as are the details of changing pseudonyms.
In the case of misbehaviour, step 3 is triggered by V1 submitting a report to the RA ac-
cusing V2 of misbehaviour. Similarly other vehicles may make the same report to the RA
against V2 (omitted from Figure 4.1). The RA takes a decision to have V2’s access to the ITS
infrastructure revoked if some threshold is reached. The RA then crafts a report contain-
ing the reason for revocation and V2’s current pseudonym (step 4). The RA constructs the
revocation message and broadcasts it to all vehicles (step 5). V2 receives the designated
revocationmessage and its TEE is triggered to delete all of its pseudonyms.
Notably step 6 is introduced in the REWIRE protocols (which is not present in the VPKI
lifecycle) to confirm revocation messages have been received and actioned by the desig-
nated vehicle. The inclusion of a confirmation step is required in REWIRE to inform the RA
that all pseudonyms of the revoked vehicle have been deleted.
4.2 Background and assumptions
The notation defined in Table 4.2 is used across all models described in this chapter to
support the description of the PLAIN and R-TOKEN variants of REWIRE protocols. Moreover,
the last three entries are specific to our new O-TOKEN protocol in Section 4.4.
4.2.1 Security Properties
Förster et al. [104] proposed protocols with no explicit consideration of the properties they
satisfy. In order to conduct a formal analysis we first identify the security properties of
interest. The following functional correctness (G1 - G4) and security properties (G5 - G7)
are considered to capture the security requirements.
G1: Executable ensures the model is executable and demonstrates successful transmis-
sion of all core messages for revocation. It is a sanity check of themodel’s correctness.
G2: Revoke after change exists, states that if a vehicle changes its pseudonym and a pre-
vious pseudonym is revoked, it should still be possible for the vehicle to create a message
62 Formal Analysis of V2X Revocation Protocols
Syntax Description
Vj An arbitrary vehicle j
LTKVj Long-term symmetric key of a vehicle Vj
SKVj PKVj Asymmetric key pair for Vj
Psi(Vj) i
th pseudonym of Vj
SKPsi(Vj) PKPsi(Vj)
Asymmetric pseudonym key pair for Vj ’s i
th
pseudonym
SKRA PKRA Asymmetric key pair for the RA
σPsi(Vj) := {| Vj || PKVj || r |}PKVj
An R-token of the ith pseudonym of Vj ,
where r is a nonce
{PKPsi(Vj), σPsi(Vj)} Pseudonym in the R-token scheme
SKOPsi(Vj ) PKOPsi(Vj )
Asymmetric key pair for an O-token,
belonging to the ith pseudonym of Vj
φPsi(Vj) := {| SKPsi(Vj) |}LTKVj An O-token of the i
th pseudonym of Vj
{PKPsi(Vj), φPsi(Vj)} Pseudonym in the O-token scheme
Table 4.2 Security Notation
to confirm to the RA that it has actioned the revocation. This is a sanity check that a vehicle
can be revoked, even after a change of pseudonym.
G3: Order for self revocation (OSR) request received with change all, indicates that if a
vehicle receives the OSR request, the vehicle will perform the revocation and create a con-
firmation.
G4: Revoke with change all, states that if a confirmation of a pseudonym revocation is
accepted by the RA from a vehicle, then that vehicle will have accepted and processed a
revocation request from the RA.
G5: Weak agreement, recall the definition in Section 3.3.2. In the context of the revoca-
tion protocols, this defines the agent A is assuming the role of the initiator as the RA, and
an agent B is assuming the role of a vehicle.
G6: Non-injective agreement, recall the definition in Section 3.3.2. In the context of our
protocols, non-injective agreement guarantees that the RA and vehicle both agree upon the
completion of a run of the revocation protocol with one another and that in those runs, the
contents of the received revocation messages correspond to the sent revocationmessages.
G7: Non-injective synchronisation, one additional authentication property we consider
is defined by Cremers and Mauw [76]. It is similar to non-injective agreement but addi-
tionally requires that the corresponding send and receive messages have to be executed
in the expected order. This means that in the revocation protocols, revoke messages are
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sent prior to revocation confirmationmessages. Therefore, if a protocol preserves the non-
injective synchronisation property then the corresponding non-injective agreement prop-
erty will also hold.
4.2.2 Modelling Assumptions
Förster et al. focus on steps 3, 4 and 5 in Figure 4.1, and assume valid pseudonyms. There-
fore, in the formal models of the protocols we need to provide an abstraction of these as-
sumptions. We assume that, for each of themodels, a registrationand enrolment phase has
executed, resulting in vehicles holding valid pseudonyms. All vehicles in a network have a
TEE and this means that 1) vehicle keys cannot be leaked, and 2) vehicles cannot ignore re-
vocation messages, if the HOST forwards the messages to the TEE. We consider the CA, PP
and RA to be distinct roles and in the architecture and that there is one of each. These roles
are all trustworthy and therefore, we remove the possibility of their associated keys leaking
from the analysis. We employ a number of restrictions across all our models to capture our
assumptions:
R1 Equality Checks: We use the TAMARIN equality restriction so that all instances of an
equality action in a trace ensure that both arguments within an action are equal. We
use them tomodel the verification of revocation message signatures.
R2 Single Revocation Authority: We consider the RA to be a distinct role in the protocol.
This choice has beenmade to simplify the proof.
R3 No Revocation Authority Key Leak: We do not consider the RA to be a corrupt agent in
all runs of the protocol. This choice has been made to limit the scope of the analysis
to be on the revocationmessage exchange. ADY adversarywith knowledge of the RA’s
private key would allow it to forge revocation messages.
R4 Single LTK Setup: Once a vehicle has performed its setup to generate its long-term
key, it is not allowed to do this again.
R5 Single PSI Initialisation: Once a vehicle has performed its setup to generate its pseudo-
nym key-pair, it is not allowed to do this again since it can only obtain new pseudo-
nyms key-pairs following a change of pseudonym. This restriction only allows each
vehicle to initialise a pseudonym key-pair once. Without this restriction vehicles
could arbitrarily generate fresh pseudonym key-pairs, even after a vehicle has been
revoked. Therefore, the set of traces are restricted to those where there is only one
initialisation action per vehicle agent.
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R6 Single Pseudonym Initialisation: This restriction is specific to the R-TOKEN and O-
TOKEN models. Once a vehicle has constructed its initial pseudonym it cannot ex-
ecute the rule again, since it can only get newpseudonyms from the change of pseudo-
nym rule. R5 is applicable to the R-TOKEN and O-TOKEN models. Therefore, an ad-
ditional restriction is needed since pseudonyms in these models are more complex
than a simple key-pair.
rule RA_SETUP:
let PK_RA = pk(~SK_RA) in
[ Fr(~SK_RA) ]
--[
SetupRevAuthKeys()
, SetupRAKeys($RA , ~SK_RA)
]->
[
!RevAuthSK($RA , ~SK_RA)
, !RevAuthPK($RA , PK_RA)
, Out(PK_RA)
]
rule SETUP_VEHICLE_LTK:
[ Fr(~Ltk) ]
--[
SetupVehicleLtk($Vj)
, VehicleSetup($Vj , ~Ltk)
]->
[ !Ltk($Vj , ~Ltk) ]
rule SETUP_PSI_KEY:
let PK_PSi = pk(~SK_PSi) in
[ Fr(~SK_PSi) ]
--[ InitPSiKey($Vj) ]->
[
!VehiclePSi($Vj , ~SK_PSi)
, !VehiclePKPSi($Vj , PK_PSi)
, CanChange($Vj , ~SK_PSi)
]
Figure 4.2 Key Setup Rules
For example, the restriction R5 in Fig-
ure 4.3 defines that when the action
InitPsiKey for a particular vehicle oc-
curs at timepoint i , and again at another
timepoint j implies it is the same action.
Step 1 and 2 in Section 4.1 denotes
the issuing of asymmetric pseudonyms to
vehicles by the CA and will be abstractly
captured as a rule within our models. Fig-
ure 4.2 demonstrates the rules that form-
alise the various key initialisations of the
system, and the initial pseudonym genera-
tion. The model starts with modelling the
PKI using the RA_SETUP, SETUP_VEHICLE_LTK,
and SETUP_PSI_KEY rules.
The RA_SETUP rule generates a fresh
private key for the RA, and its related pub-
lic key PK_RA shown in the macro. The rule
appends two action facts to the trace that
specify the RA has created its key-pair used
in restriction R2. The RHS of the rule con-
cludes by storing its private and public keys
as their own persistent facts, and outputs
its public key to the network for the DY ad-
versary to learn.
The SETUP_VEHICLE_LTK rule models the
long-term credential of a vehicle. On the
LHS a fresh symmetric key Ltk is generated for each vehicle V j . Two action facts are re-
corded in a trace that specify an agent in the role of a vehicle has generated its long-term
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key used in restriction R4. The rule concludes on the RHS storing the vehicles long-term
key in a persistent fact.
restriction single_psi_init:
"All id #i #j .
InitPSiKey(id) @ i & InitPSiKey(id) @ j
==> #i = #j"
Figure 4.3 Restriction: Pseudonym Key Initialisa-
tion
The SETUP_PSI_KEY is an initialisa-
tion rule that generates a fresh pseudo-
nym for an agent in the role of a vehicle.
The LHS generates a fresh private
pseudonym key, there is a single ac-
tion fact InitPSiKey($Vj) that we log
and use this action in the restrictionR5
in Figure 4.3. The RHS of the rule concludes by creating a persistent fact of the pseudonym
private key belonging to a vehicle, and another persistent fact of the pseudonympublic key
that is related to the private key belonging to that vehicle. Additionally, we introduce a con-
trol fact, CanChange($Vj, SK_PSi), which is a linear fact. This control fact is used to control
when a vehicle is allowed to change its pseudonym, and during revocation of a pseudonym
this fact is consumed. Without the control fact it is not possible for vehicles to generate new
pseudonyms. We discuss in Section 4.3.1 how the CanChange fact is used in various rules to
control execution of rules.
The DY adversary (defined in Section 3.2) in ourmodels is in control of the network and
other untrusted parts of the system including the vehicles themselves. It is not in control
of the TEEs of the vehicles and the trusted third parties. In our adversarymodel we assume
the vehicle HOST to be honest, and deliver revocation messages. Additionally, we trust the
TEE for integrity to action and process revocationmessages.
4.3 REWIRE Protocols
This section describes ourmodelling and analysis of the PLAIN and R-TOKEN protocols. We
initially summarise the results we found from our analysis to highlight the weaknesses in
the existing protocols before we present them in detail. Our security and functional cor-
rectness analysis demonstrates the following results:
• If the PLAIN protocol executes a change of pseudonym, then no confirmation guaran-
tee can be communicated to the RA. Hence even though authentication properties
may hold, a misbehaving vehicle may avoid revocation by changing its pseudonym,
and so functional correctness will not be guaranteed. While the original paper [104]
already identified this issue and addressed it in the R-TOKEN version, TAMARIN ana-
lysis also independently revealed this problem.
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• Following attempted revocation of a vehicle’s pseudonym the RA is unable to verify
successful confirmation in the R-TOKEN scheme, thus none of the authentication
properties hold. In particular a confirmation can be spoofed by a malicious agent
and accepted by the RA, even when themisbehaving vehicle is not revoked. This flaw
was not previously recognised by Förster et al.
The revocation protocol focuses on steps 3, 4, 5 and 6 from Figure 4.1. Within the TAMARIN
model, steps 3 and 4 are abstractly represented by a report event which the RA receives.
Steps 5 and 6 are described in three rules which focus on themessage exchange to revoke a
vehicle and a confirmation to affirm the vehicle followed the request. All the formalmodels
follow this pattern of communication but the format of the messages and the verification
that can be performed on the signedmessages changes with each protocol.
We model the protocol roles of the RA and an arbitrary vehicle (V j ) in TAMARIN by a set
of rewrite rules, which correspond to the steps of the protocol. The PLAIN protocol consists
of 10 rules, and the R-TOKEN protocol consists of 11 rules.
Section 4.2.2 informally identified the steps of a revocation protocol based on the be-
haviour of an RA and a misbehaving vehicle. The PLAIN model has three distinct types of
rules to: 1) setup all required key-pairs for secure communication, 2) create misbehaviour
reports and 3) describe revocation requests and receiving subsequent confirmation.
rule REPORT:
let
PK_PSi = pk( SK_PSi )
in
[ ! VehiclePKPSi( $Vj , PK_PSi ) ]
--[
Reported( $Vj , PK_PSi )
, HasReport( $Vj )
]->
[ Report( $Vj , PK_PSi ) ]
Figure 4.4 Report creation
Across all the models we have a REPORT
rule, shown in Figure 4.4, that mod-
els the creation of misbehaviour reports
from other vehicles, that is sent to the
RA. The LHS of the rule selects an arbit-
rary public pseudonym key of a vehicle,
logs two actions to the trace to specify a
vehicle has been reported, and the RHS
of the rule concludes by creating a linear
Report($Vj,PK_PSi) fact. We use the Report
linear fact to send the report from a vehicle
to the RA, hence the DY adversary does not see the report.
4.3.1 PLAIN Protocol
Modelling. As stated the heart of the protocol involves an exchange ofmessages to effect re-
vocation: an Order for Self-Revocation (OSR) request, followed by a confirmation response.
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RA Vj
Ps1(Vj)
Change Pseudonym
Ps1(Vj ) to Ps2(Vj)Osr-req{| “revoke” || Ps1(Vj ) || reason |}SKRA
Figure 4.5 REWIRE: PLAIN Pseudonym Scheme incomplete run
The OSR request message OSR-REQ [104] is the first message sent to a vehicle, which
triggers its revocation process. OSR-REQ contains the command to revoke, the reported
misbehaving pseudonym and additional information as to why the revocation occurred.
The pseudonym, Psi (V j ), in this protocol is represented as PKPsi (V j ) belonging to a V j . OSR-
REQ is signed by the RA, and can be verified by receiving vehicles.
OSR-REQ := {| “revoke” || Psi (V j ) || reason |}SKRA
We model a well formed OSR-REQ message duly signed by the RA and addressed to its cur-
rent pseudonym. The OSR_REQ_SEND rule in Figure 4.6 details how this is modelled within
TAMARIN. rule OSR_REQ_SEND:
let
PK_PSi = pk( SK_PSi )
osrReq = <'revoke',PK_PSi ,'reason'>
osrReqSig = sign(osrReq , SK_RA)
osrReqMsg = <$RA ,$Vj ,osrReq ,
osrReqSig >
in
[ Report($Vj , PK_PSi)
, !RevAuthSK($RA , SK_RA)
]
--[ OsrReqMsgSentTo
($RA , $Vj , PK_PSi)
, Send($RA , osrReqMsg)
, Running($Vj , $RA , osrReqMsg)
]->
[ AwaitRevokeConfirmation
($RA , $Vj , PK_PSi , SK_RA)
, Out(osrReqMsg) ]
Figure 4.6 RA rule to send OSR-REQ message
The rule shown in Figure 4.6 is an agent
in the role of the RA. The rule has a number
of macros and osrReq is a tuple which mod-
els the OSR_REQ message. The osrReqSig
macro signs the osrReq tuple with the RA’s
private key. The final macro osrReqMsg is
the message sent in the conclusion of the
rule. This macro is a tuple containing pub-
lic information about the RA and vehicle,
the OSR-REQ message, and the signature of
the message.
The LHS of the OSR_REQ_SEND rule con-
sumes Report, a linear fact that is produced
by the REPORT rule, thus modelling the mis-
behaviour / malfunction reporting of other
vehicles. Note that the DY adversary does
not have knowledge of the report since the
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report was not on the Out channel. Additionally, the RA recalls its private key. The RA with
the pseudonym public key, PK_PSi, from the Report fact and its private key can now con-
struct the OSR-REQ message. There are three action facts to specify functional correctness
and authentication. Firstly, OsrReqMsgSentTo and Send are used in the specification of func-
tional correctness properties, and Running is used in specifying authentication properties.
The RHS of the rule concludes by creating a new linear fact AwaitRevokeConfirmation which
models an open session between the RA and a vehicle V j , with the public pseudonym key
to be revoked and the RA private key. This linear fact will be consumed later in the confirm-
ation of the revocation message by the RA. Finally, the RA outs the OSR-REQ message and
signature onto the network to be received by the vehicle agent to be revoked.
rule OSR_REQ_RECV:
let
PK_PSi = pk(SK_PSi)
osrReq = <'revoke', PK_PSi , 'reason'>
osrReqSig = sign(osrReq , SK_RA)
osrReqMsg = <$RA , $Vj , osrReq , osrReqSig>
osrConf = <$Vj , 'confirm', PK_PSi >
osrConfSig = sign(osrConf , SK_PSi)
osrConfMsg = <$Vj , $RA , osrConf , osrConfSig >
in
[
In(osrReqMsg)
, !RevAuthPK($RA , PK_RA)
, !VehiclePSi($Vj , SK_PSi)
, CanChange($Vj , SK_PSi)
]
--[ Eq(verify(osrReqSig , osrReq , PK_RA), true)
, Commit($RA , $Vj , osrReqMsg)
, OsrReqMsgRecvBy($Vj , $RA , PK_PSi)
, Recv($Vj , osrReqMsg)
, OsrReqVerified($Vj , PK_PSi)
, Running($RA , $Vj , osrConfMsg)
, OsrConfSentBy($Vj , $RA , PK_PSi)
]->
[ Out( osrConfMsg ) ]
Figure 4.7 Vehicle rule to action OSR-REQ message
TheOSR-REQ message is
received and verified by a
vehicle V j (shown in Fig-
ure 4.7), and the TEE in V j
can identify the pseudonym
as belonging to V j . Follow-
ing this identification the
vehicle constructs an OSR-
CONF message confirming
the command to revokewas
followed, and the TEE in
V j will flag all available
pseudonyms as revoked to
prevent their future use in
V2X communication. The
OSR-CONFmessage comprises
two terms: a confirm com-
mand and the active re-
ported public pseudonym
key. The OSR-CONF mes-
sage is signed with the cor-
responding private pseudo-
nym key, shown in Fig-
ure 4.8.
The vehicle verifies that
the message came from the RA and contains the vehicle’s active pseudonym, before delet-
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ing all its pseudonyms and creating the OSR-CONF message signed under the active private
pseudonymkey, which is sent back to the RA. TheDY adversary is able to learn theOSR-REQ
message terms and the signature. However, the DY adversary cannot modify the contents
of the message as the DY adversary does not posses the RA’s private key.
OSR-CONF := {| “confirm” || Psi (V j ) |}SKPsi (Vj )
Figure 4.8 REWIRE: PLAIN OSR-CONF message
The OSR_REQ_RECV rule in
Figure 4.7 details how we
model a vehicle receiving and
verifying of a OSR-REQ mes-
sage and constructing the
OSR-CONF message within TAMARIN. The first three macros specified in this rule are
identical to the ones specified in Figure 4.6, and the additional three macros are for the
OSR-CONF message. The term osrConf is a tuple containing the identity of the vehicle, con-
firmation, and the revoked pseudonym public key. The osrConfSig macro is the confirma-
tionmessage signed using the revoked pseudonyms private key, and the osrConfMsg macro
is a tuple containing the identity of the RA, revoked vehicle, OSR-CONF message, and the
signature.
The rule proceeds by receiving in from the network the osrReqMsg output from the
OSR_REQ_SEND rule. Upon receipt of the message the agent looks up the RA’s public key, and
loads its active pseudonym private key. The TAMARIN PROVER’s pattern matching asserts
that the private key is related to the revoked public key contained in osrReq, thus the revoc-
ation is designated for this agent vehicle. The final fact on the LHS is the linear CanChange
control fact which is consumed and not replaced on the RHS, therefore disabling this agent
in the role of a vehicle from obtaining fresh pseudonyms. This rule has a number of action
facts used in the specification of functional correctness and authentication lemmas. The
most significant action fact for this rule is the Eq action. Through this action the agent veri-
fies the signature, osrReqSig, was signed by the RA using the RA’s public key and the osrReq
message has not been modified. This is modelled using the action fact Eq, and this action
is defined in the restriction R1; meaning that all equality checks must succeed.
The verify equation reduces to the constant true if the signature is well formed. The
RHS of the rule concludes by outing the vehicles confirmationmessage, signifying that the
vehicle has followed revocation.
We also model the incoming OSR-CONF message from a V j . The RA verifies that the
OSR-CONF message is signed with the reported pseudonym public key, PKPsi (V j ). This
is shown through the REV_AUTH_OSR_CONF_RECV rule. Note that the macros in Figure 4.9
are identical to the macros described in the OSR_REQ_RECV rule from Figure 4.7. The LHS
of the rule receives in the OSR-CONF message from a vehicle, and the RA consumes the
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Goal Content Plain R-Token O-Token
G1 executable X X X
G2 revoke after change exists × X X
G3 osr req received with change all n/a X X
G4 revoke with change all n/a × X
G5 weak agreement X × X
G6 noninjective agreement X × X
G7 noninjective synchronisation X × X
Table 4.3 Summary of Results
AwaitRevokeConfirmation linear fact that recalls the state of the public pseudonym key and
its private key from the conclusion of the OSR_REQ_SEND rule (Figure 4.6). Hence this mod-
els the resumption of the revocation session between the RA and a vehicle. The action Eq
models the verification of the osrConfSigusing the public pseudonymkey, as described pre-
viously. The Commit action is used in the specification of authentication properties, and the
OsrConfAcceptedBy in the specification of both functional correctness and authentication.
The conclusion of the rule is empty, signalling the end of the protocol.
rule REV_AUTH_OSR_CONF_RECV:
let
PK_PSi = pk(SK_PSi)
osrConf = <$Vj , 'confirm ', PK_PSi >
osrConfSig = sign(osrConf , SK_PSi)
osrConfMsg = <$Vj , $RA , osrConf , osrConfSig >
in
[ In(osrConfMsg)
, AwaitRevokeConfirmation
($RA , $Vj , PK_PSi , SK_RA)
]
--[ Eq(verify(osrConfSig , osrConf , PK_PSi),
true)
, Commit($Vj , $RA , osrConfMsg)
, OsrConfAcceptedBy($RA , $Vj , PK_PSi)
]->
[ ]
Figure 4.9 RA verification of the OSR-CONF message
Proof Goals. We state
several proof goals for our
PLAIN model, functional cor-
rectness (G1) and authentic-
ation (G5-G7) discussed in
Section 4.2.1. The results
of whether each of the goals
hold are summarised in Table
4.3. We use X to indicate
that the property holds, and
× is used when the property
does not hold. The goalG2 in-
cludes the predicates requir-
ing that the vehicle’s long-
term secret key and private
pseudonym keys are not com-
promised. Therefore, correct
behaviour is dependent on these keys not being compromised.
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Executable. (G1)
A successful run of the model guarantees that V j was running the protocol with the
RA. Receipt of the OSR-CONF message represents completion of a run for the RA. An
OSR-REQ message is represented by facts from both the RA and vehicle’s perspective.
We demonstrate this through our executable lemma.
lemma executable: exists -trace
"Ex id_ra id_vj m t #i #j #k .
Send(id_ra , m) @ #i
& Recv(id_vj , m) @ #j
& OsrConfAcceptedBy(id_ra , id_vj , t) @ #k
& #i < #j
& #j < #k"
Figure 4.10 PLAIN: executable (G1S)
The lemma states that there exists aOSR-REQmessage sent from theRA, Send(id_ra,m),
at timepoint i and themessagewas received by a vehicle, Recv(id_vj,m), at timepoint
j ; and the vehicle sent an OSR-CONF message that was verified and accepted,
OsrConfAcceptedBy(id_ra, id_vj, t), by the RA at timepoint k. Figure 4.12 displays
the trace found by the TAMARIN PROVER.
Non-injective Synchronisation (G7)
The model observes that the RA can have completed runs and verified an associated
confirmation from a vehicle. Furthermore, the vehicle must have received the OSR-
REQ message before it is possible for the RA to receive the OSR-CONF message, hence
the communication order is preserved. We demonstrate this through the lemma
noninjective_synchronisation.
lemma noninjective_synchronisation:
"All id_ra id_vj ps #i .
OsrConfAcceptedBy( id_ra , id_vj , ps ) @ #i
& not( Ex k #n . VjSKPSiReveal( id_vj , k ) @ #n )
==> ( Ex #l . OsrReqMsgRecvBy( id_vj , id_ra , ps ) @ #l
& #l < #i )"
Figure 4.11 PLAIN: noninjective_synchronisation (G7)
Recall from Section 4.2.1 the explanation of the non-injective synchronisation prop-
erty. The lemma states that for all received and verifiedOSR-CONFmessages by theRA
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from the revoked vehicleV j , OsrConfAcceptedBy(id_ra,id_vj,ps), at timepoint i and
there has not been anypseudonymprivate key reveals forV j , VjSKPSiReveal(id_vj,k);
then there is a V j that received the OSR-REQ message from the RA, OsrReqMsgRecvBy
(id_vj,id_ra,ps), at timepoint l such that OSR-REQ is received prior to theOSR-CONF
message being accepted by the RA. Note that G7 is a stronger property [76] that G5
andG6. SinceG7 proves bothG5 andG6 also hold.
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4.3.2 PLAIN Protocol with change of pseudonym
rule CHANGE_PSEUDONYM:
let
old_PK_PSi = pk( old_SK_PSi )
PK_PSi = pk( ~SK_PSi )
in
[
Fr( ~SK_PSi ),
CanChange( $Vj , old_SK_PSi )
]
--[ ChangePseudonymForVehicle
( $Vj , old_PK_PSi , PK_PSi ) ]->
[
! VehiclePSi( $Vj , ~SK_PSi )
, CanChange( $Vj , ~SK_PSi )
, Out( PK_PSi )
]
Figure 4.13 Change of Pseudonym
Modelling. In the PLAIN pseudonym
scheme revocation of REWIRE [104], a
change of pseudonym for a vehicle can oc-
cur at any point prior to an OSR-REQ being
received. For example, consider a vehicle
V j and two of its pseudonyms Ps1(V j ) and
Ps2(V j ) in the following change of pseudo-
nym scenario. When the RA receives a re-
port to revoke V j , it broadcasts the OSR-
REQ message containing the misbehaving
pseudonym Ps1(V j ), as shown in Figure 4.5.
However, before an OSR-REQ message is
ever received byV j a change of pseudonym
can occur resulting in a new pseudonym
now being active. In a naïve implementa-
tion, changing to Ps2(V j ) means that the re-
ceipt of the OSR-REQ will be ignored as the
vehicle has deleted its previous pseudonym. Therefore, no OSR-CONF message will be gen-
erated byV j as the vehicle has deleted its previous pseudonyms and the revocation process
will fail. ConsequentlyV j can continue to misbehave under the new pseudonym Ps2(V j ).
The rule CHANGE_PSEUDONYM fromFigure 4.13models a vehicle changingpseudonym from
its active pseudonym, to another. The LHS of the rule requires the CanChange control fact
for the particular vehicle to be present in the multiset. Recall from Section 4.2.2 that the
CanChange linear fact is included to control when a vehicle can change its current pseudo-
nym. If the fact is not in the state of the system then it is the case that the vehicle has been
revoked, andwepresent the revocation rule later (Figure 4.17). In the case the control fact is
present, the fact is consumed and a fresh private pseudonym key is generated. We record in
the trace that a vehicle has changed its pseudonym from the active pseudonym,old_PK_PSi,
to the new one, PK_PSi, in the ChangePseudonymForVehicle action fact. The RHS of the rule
concludes by storing the new pseudonym private key in a persistent fact !VehiclePSi. Ad-
ditionally, a new CanChange linear fact is introduced that will allow for the vehicle to change
pseudonym again, and finally the public key of the fresh pseudonym is output on the net-
work. This rule allows for vehicle agents to change their pseudonyms arbitrarily often.
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The changing of pseudonyms creates a fresh pseudonymkeypair for an arbitrary vehicle
V j . The rule concludes by storing the new pseudonym private key for V j and outputs the
public key of the new pseudonym, which the DY adversary learns.
Proof Goals. Adding this extra behaviour to the protocol yields another proof goal,G2,
discussed in Section 4.2.1. If a vehicle changes its pseudonym and a previous pseudonym
is revoked, it should be possible for the vehicle to create anOSR-CONF message. Thismodel
fails for the PLAIN protocol, showing that the protocol does not guarantee a successful re-
vocation of a misbehaving vehicle in the presence of changing pseudonyms, and indeed
that if a vehicle changes its pseudonym then it can escape revocation.
Revoke after Change exists. (G2)
The intuition for this lemma is to show that when a vehicle is reported but changes its
pseudonym, it can confirm the revocation of the original pseudonym, provided the
vehicle is not compromised. Its definition is as follows:
lemma revoke_after_change_exists: exists -trace
"Ex id_vj id_ra ps1 ps2 #i #j #k .
( Reported( id_vj , ps1 ) @ #i
& ChangePseudonymForVehicle( id_vj , ps1 , ps2 ) @ #j
& OsrConfSentBy( id_vj , id_ra , ps1 ) @ #k
& #i < #j
& #j < #k
& not( Ex k #n. VehicleCompromised( id_vj , k ) @ #n )
& not( Ex k #n . VjSKPSiReveal( id_vj , k ) @ #n ) )"
Figure 4.14 PLAIN: revoke_after_change_exists (G2)
The lemma states that there exists a reported vehicle V j public pseudonym key,
Reported(id_vj, ps1), at timepoint i and the reported vehicleV j has changed pseudo-
nym, ChangePseudonymForVehicle(id_vj,ps1,ps2), at timepoint j and the vehicle sent
an OSR-CONF message for the old pseudonym, OsrConfSentBy(id_vj, id_ra, ps1),
at timepoint k. The lemma orders the timepoints and states that the report occurred
prior to the vehicle changingpseudonym, and the change of pseudonymoccurs prior
to a confirmation message being sent from the RA to the vehicle. Additionally, there
have been no key reveals of the vehicle long-term secret key and private pseudonym
key.
The analysis of this lemma reveals that when a change of pseudonym has occurred,
then it is not possible to have anOSR-CONF message. This is because it is not possible
to reach this state in the protocol.
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RA Vj
Change
Ps1(Vj) to Ps2(Vj)Osr-req{| “revoke” || Ps1(Vj) || reason |}SKRA
Decrypt
σPs1(Vj ) with SKVj
Osr-conf{| “confirm” || σPs1(Vj) |}SKVj
ni-sync
Figure 4.15 REWIRE: R-TOKEN Scheme
In summary, the PLAIN protocol is not functionally correct in the context of changingpseudo-
nyms. When a vehicle changes pseudonym it is no longer able to recognise that the revoc-
ation was designated for it, and the RA does not know which pseudonym the misbehaving
vehicle is now operating with. To address this shortcoming a variant to the PLAIN protocol
is proposed, referred to as the R-TOKEN protocol [105, 104].
4.3.3 R-TOKEN Protocol
Modelling. The R-TOKEN variant embeds additional data in pseudonym certificates with
the aim of allowing revocation even with changing pseudonyms. This additional data is an
R-TOKEN, σPsi (V j ), which is constructed from a vehicle’s public identity, public key and a
nonce r , encrypted under a vehicle’s public key. There is a fresh R-TOKEN for each pseudo-
nym. The pseudonym Psi (V j ) contains PKPsi (V j ) and the R-TOKEN σPsi (V j ).
It is the purpose of the R-TOKEN to allow a vehicle to later detect whether a revocation
request is directed to it, without allowing others to identify the vehicle. By encrypting the R-
TOKEN under PKV j , all vehicles must attempt to decrypt the R-TOKEN. Only the designated
vehicle for revocation can decrypt the R-TOKEN, meaning the revocation was intended for
the vehicle and should be revoked.
In PUCA [105] and REWIRE, a “cut and choose” approach [183] is used to generate the
R-TOKEN, but in themodel we have simply abstracted this to a fresh term that is encrypted
under the public key of the vehicle.
The R-TOKEN protocol is represented in Figure 4.15. The OSR-REQ message is of the
same format as the PLAIN protocol where the pseudonym contains the R-TOKEN. Once a
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vehicle receives an OSR-REQ it attempts to decrypt the R-TOKEN irrespective of its active
pseudonym. Only the designated vehicle can decrypt the R-TOKEN since the decryption
uses SKV j , others will simply ignore the OSR-REQ. The OSR-CONF message now contains
the R-TOKEN and not the pseudonym, and the message is signed with the vehicle’s secret
key.
OSR-CONF := {| “confirm” || σPsi (V j ) |}SKVj
The modelling of the rules for the R-TOKEN protocol are similar but there are four im-
portant changes.
1. An additional rule is required in setup to augment those in Figure 4.2 for pseudonym
creation.
2. The change of pseudonym rule in Figure 4.13 is augmented to also include the gener-
ation of R-TOKENs.
3. The OSR-REQ receive rule in Figure 4.7 includes one additional action fact that re-
quires a vehicle to decrypt an R-TOKEN.
4. The OSR-CONF receive rule in Figure 4.9 is weakened by removing the verify message
action fact (which checks the correctness of the confirmationσPsi (V j )) since the RA is
not in possession of SKV j .
Tomodel R-TOKEN’s in ourmodel we introduce an additional rule that generates pseudo-
nyms to include an R-TOKEN presented in Figure 4.16. We specify three macros in our
SETUP_VEHICLE_PSEUDONYM rule, and Table 4.2 (Page 62) defines the structure of an R-TOKEN.
The macro PK_PSi is the public key of the pseudonym as discussed in the previous section.
R is a tuple consisting of a vehicle’s public identifier, a vehicle’s long-term public key, and
a fresh nonce r . The R term is then encrypted under a vehicle’s long-term public key to
produce the R_Token. Additionally, in this model we specify a pseudonym as a tuple con-
structed from the active pseudonyms public key and the R-TOKEN. All the facts in the LHS
of the rule are used in the macros. The rule logs an action fact InitVjPseudonym which is
used in the restriction R6. The rule concludes by the vehicle storing its initial pseudonym
in a persistent fact, introduces the CanChange control fact and outputs the pseudonym to the
network for the DY adversary to learn.
The CHANGE_PSEUDONYM rule in Figure 4.13 is updated to also include the generation of
fresh R-TOKENs. Finally, there are three changes in the OSR_REQ_RECV rule from Figure 4.7.
The changes to the rule are as follows:
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rule SETUP_VEHICLE_PSEUDONYM:
let
PK_PSi = pk( SK_PSi )
R = < $Vj , PK_Vj , ~r >
R_Token = aenc( R, PK_Vj )
pseudonym = < PK_PSi , R_Token >
in
[ !VjSK( $Vj , SK_Vj )
, !VjPK( $Vj , PK_Vj )
, !VehiclePSi( $Vj , SK_PSi )
, Fr( ~r ) ]
--[ InitVjPseudonym( $Vj ) ]->
[ !VehiclePseudonym( $Vj , pseudonym )
, CanChange( $Vj , pseudonym )
, Out( pseudonym ) ]
Figure 4.16 R-TOKEN pseudonym creation rule
rule OSR_REQ_RECV:
let
R = < $Vj , PK_Vj , ~r >
R_Token = aenc( R, PK_Vj )
pseudonym = < PK_PSi , R_Token >
...
osrConf = < $Vj , 'confirm', R_Token >
osrConfSig = sign( osrConf , SK_Vj )
osrConfMsg = <$Vj , $RA , osrConf , osrConfSig >
in
[ In( osrReqMsg )
, !RevAuthPK( $RA , PK_RA )
, !VjSK( $Vj , SK_Vj )
, !VjPK( $Vj , PK_Vj )
, CanChange( $Vj , pseudonym ) ]
--[ ...
, Eq( adec( R_Token , SK_Vj ), R )
...
]->
[ Out( osrConfMsg ) ]
Figure 4.17 R-TOKEN OSR_REQ_RECV rule
First, the encoding of the
R, R_Token, and pseudonym terms
are encoded in the macros.
An additional change is to the
OSR-CONF message that now
includes the R-TOKEN and
the confirmation message is
signed using the vehicles long-
termprivate key SKV j . Finally,
an additional equality check
action fact is added to handle
the decryption of R-TOKENs.
With all these changes in-
corporated, we model the R-
TOKEN scheme as described
by Förster et al., and perform
verification on the protocol
against the goals described in
Section 4.2.1.
Proof Goals. For consist-
ency we analysed functional correctness. All the proof goals for the PLAIN protocol remain
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applicable. We provide the trace of G1 in Figure 4.18 to demonstrate how the R-TOKEN
protocol executes in our model. Proof goal G2 now holds because any vehicle can create
a confirmation message. Two additional goals are included to analyse the correct beha-
viour of the vehicle (G3) and RA (G4) in the context of changing pseudonyms, as shown
in Table 4.3. For goalsG3 andG4 we specify that SKV j is not compromised.
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Order for self-revocation request received with change. (G3)
This lemma captures a functional correctness property to ensure that when an hon-
est vehicle sends a revocation confirmation, it must have previously received a revoc-
ation request. Its definition is as follows:
lemma osr_req_received_with_change_all:
"( All id_vj id_ra t #i .
OsrConfSentBy( id_vj , id_ra , t ) @ #i
& not( Ex key #k. VehicleCompromised( id_vj , key ) @ #k )
==> ( Ex #a . OsrReqMsgSentTo( id_ra , id_vj , t ) @ #a
& a < i ) )"
Figure 4.19 R-TOKEN: osr_req_received_with_change_all (G3)
The lemma states that if anOSR-CONFmessage is sent by a vehicle to theRA at timepoint
i and the vehicle has not been compromised, then it is the case that the RA sent an
OSR-REQ message to the vehicle at timepoint a, and the OSR-REQ was sent before a
OSR-CONF.
Our analysis demonstrates that the lemma holds since when a vehicle receives a re-
vocationmessage, it can identify and decrypt the R-TOKEN and produce the confirm-
ationmessage. Therefore, the protocol from the perspective of an agent in the role of
a vehicle satisfies functional correctness.
Revoke with change all. (G4)
This lemma captures a functional correctness property. It demonstrates that across
all traces when an OSR-CONF message is verified, then there must have been a OSR-
REQ message received by the vehicle. Its definition is as follows:
lemma revoke_with_change_all:
"( All id_ra id_vj t #i .
OsrConfAcceptedBy( id_ra , id_vj , t ) @ i
& not( Ex key #k. VehicleCompromised( id_vj , key ) @ k )
==> ( Ex #l . OsrReqMsgRecvBy( id_vj , id_ra , t ) @ l
& l < i ) )"
Figure 4.20 R-TOKEN: revoke_with_change_all (G4)
The lemma states that for all OSR-CONF messages accept by the RA at timepoint i
and the vehicle to be revoked is not compromised, then this means that the OSR-REQ
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message was received by a vehicle at timepoint l , and the OSR-REQ was sent before
an OSR-CONF.
The analysis conducted demonstrates that the lemma is not satisfied since the DY
adversary is able to intercept the OSR-REQ message and create a OSR-CONF message
containing the inferred R-TOKEN. The DY adversary then generates a fresh private
key which is used to sign the OSR-CONF message. The created OSR-CONF is sent to
the RA. The RA accepts the confirmation but cannot verify its authenticity because
the SKV j is only known to V j and CA. Therefore, The RA does not obtain a guarantee
that it is communicating with a vehicle.
Since the functional correctness property, G4, of the R-TOKEN protocol is not satisfied
the analysis demonstrated that all the authentication properties (G5 -G7) are not satisfied.
We present an authentication lemmaG5 below used in the analysis of R-TOKEN (Table 4.3
on page 70).
Weak agreement. (G5)
Recall the definition of weak agreement from Section 3.3.2. The intuition for the
lemma is to guarantee thatwhen theRA commits to a run of the protocol by accepting
the OSR-CONF message, then a vehicle has previously been involved in the same or
another run of the protocol, or the vehicle has become compromised. Its definition
is as follows:
lemma weak_agreement:
"All id_vj id_ra t #i.
OsrConfAcceptedBy( id_ra , id_vj , t ) @ i
==> ( Ex t2 #j. OsrReqMsgRecvBy( id_vj , id_ra , t2 ) @ j )
| ( Ex #r. RevealSK( id_vj ) @ r )"
Figure 4.21 R-TOKEN: weak_agreement (G5)
The lemma states when the RA completes the revocation message by verifying the
OSR-CONF message t from vehicle V j , then there must have been a vehicle running
a revocation message session with the RA under some revocation message t2; or it is
the case that the vehicles long-term private key has leaked.
Weak agreement is not satisfied in R-TOKEN since a vehicle does not have to be in-
volved in a run of the protocol, as demonstrated through lemmaG4.
The authentication flaws in the protocol were not previously recognised, and has since
been accepted by the designers of the R-TOKEN protocol. The trace found by the TAMARIN
PROVER forG4 -G7 is presented in Figure 4.22.
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RA
SKRA, φPs1(Vj), PKOPs1(Vj )
Vj
PKRA, LTKVj
Change Pseudonym
Ps1(Vj) to Ps2(Vj )Osr-req{| “revoke” || Ps1(Vj) || reason |}SKRA
Verify and extract
φPs1(Vj)
Decrypt φPs1(Vj)
OR Fail
Delete all
PseudonymsOsr-conf{| “confirm” || φPs1(Vj) |}SKOPs1(Vj )
Verify Osr-conf
ni-sync ni-sync
Figure 4.23 O-TOKEN Revocation
4.4 O-TOKEN Protocol
Modelling. To solve the issue of the RA not being able to verify the confirmation message,
OSR-CONF, we propose theO-TOKEN protocol. Note that theO-TOKEN mimics the R-TOKEN
closely: the reason for generating different O-TOKENS for each pseudonym is the same as
for the R-TOKEN, to ensure unlinkability of the vehicle in question. If the R-TOKEN or O-
TOKEN remained the same, it would act as a vehicle identifier.
We replace the R-TOKEN in the previous scheme with a simpler construction: an O-
TOKEN for the i th pseudonym of V j , φPsi (V j ), consisting of a private key, SKOPsi (Vj ) , which
is encrypted under LTKV j . Each O-TOKEN is fresh and associated with one and only one
Psi (V j ) pseudonym.
φPsi (V j ) := {| SKOPsi (Vj ) |}LTKVj
The aim of using fresh SKOPsi (Vj ) keys is to make pseudonyms unlinkable.
The pseudonym also contains one additional field, PKOPsi (Vj ) , which is the correspond-
ing public key for the particular O-TOKEN. Therefore, the pseudonym contains enough in-
formation for the RA to verify a received OSR-CONF message and for the vehicle to change
its pseudonym.
A revocation runwhich uses O-TOKEN is shown in Figure 4.23. The OSR-REQ message is
of the same format as the other protocols but the pseudonym contains the O-TOKEN. The
OSR-CONF message now contains the O-TOKEN and the message is signed with SKOPsi (Vj )
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instead of signing with LTKV j which the vehicle extracted earlier:
OSR-CONF := {|“confirm” || φPsi (V j ) |}SKOPsi (Vj )
The subtle change in signing the OSR-CONF message, together with the RA’s knowledge
of PKOPsi (Vj ) enables the RA to verify the confirmationmessage.
Themodelling of the other rules for the O-TOKEN protocol is largely similar to R-TOKEN
but there are four changes:
1. The generation of pseudonyms create and contain O-TOKENs, instead of R-TOKENs
as shown in Figure 4.16.
2. The change of pseudonym rule is further augmented to generate O-TOKENs.
3. There is one additional action fact upon receipt of an OSR-REQ message vehicles at-
tempt to decrypt the O-TOKEN, instead of R-TOKENs as shown in Figure 4.17.
4. There is one additional action fact for the RA verification of revocationmessageswith
the public O key in the OSR-CONF received rule.
rule SETUP_VEHICLE_PSEUDONYM_INIT:
let
PK_PSi = pk( SK_PSi )
PK_O = pk( SK_O )
O_Token = senc( SK_O, Ltk )
pseudonym = <$Vj , PK_PSi , PK_O , O_Token >
in
[ !Ltk( $Vj , Ltk )
, !VehiclePSi( $Vj , SK_PSi )
, !VehicleOKey( $Vj , SK_O ) ]
--[ InitVjPseudonym( $Vj ) ]->
[ ! VehiclePseudonym( $Vj , pseudonym )
, CanChange( $Vj , pseudonym )
, Out( pseudonym ) ]
Figure 4.24 O-TOKEN pseudonym creation rule
The rule shown in Figure 4.24
defines the initialisation of pseudo-
nyms in the O-TOKEN model. The
changes to this rule specifically is
that the O-TOKEN macros replace
the R-TOKEN macros as shown in
Figure 4.16.
The first macro, PK_PSi, is
the pseudonym public key, the
second macro is the public key
for the private key contained in
the third macro O_Token. The
definition of an O-TOKEN is the
private O key encrypted using the
vehicles symmetric key, Ltk. The finalmacro is the definition of a pseudonym that is a tuple
with the terms $Vj a vehicles identity, PK_PSi the pseudonym public key, PK_O the public O
key related to the private O key contained in the O-TOKEN, and the last term is the O_Token.
The LHS of the rule requires that a vehicle has setup its long-term key, generated a
pseudonymkey-pair and its initialO key-pair. There is a single action fact, InitVjPseudonym,
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that records in the trace that the vehicle V j has initialised its first pseudonym and used in
restriction R6. The RHS of the rule is identical to pseudonym creation for R-TOKEN in Fig-
ure 4.16.
The OSR_REQ_RECV rule (Figure 4.25) to decrypt and recover the private O key, and sign
the OSR-CONF message with the private O key that contains the O-TOKEN. With the O-
TOKEN included in the OSR-CONF informs the RA which public O key to use, to verify the
confirmation.
rule OSR_REQ_RECV:
let
O_Token = senc( SK_O, Ltk )
pseudonym = <$Vj , PK_PSi , PK_O , O_Token >
...
osrConf = <$Vj , 'confirm', O_Token >
osrConfSig = sign( osrConf , SK_O )
osrConfMsg = <$Vj , $RA , osrConf , osrConfSig >
in
[
In( osrReqMsg )
, !RevAuthPK( $RA , PK_RA )
, !Ltk( $Vj , Ltk )
, CanChange( $Vj , pseudonym )
]
--[
...
, Eq( sdec( O_Token , Ltk ), SK_O )
...
]->
[ Out( osrConfMsg ) ]
Figure 4.25 O-TOKEN OSR-REQ receive rule
Specifically, the rule contains
the definitions of theO-TOKEN
and pseudonymmacros. The
osrConf contains the O_Token
of the revoked pseudonym,
and the osrConfSig is signed
with the private key SK_O, re-
covered from decrypting the
O_Token using Ltk. The LHS
of the rule receives in the
OSR-REQ message containing
the pseudonym to be revoked,
recalls the RA public key to
verify the OSR-REQ message,
the vehicle loads its long-
term key Ltk, and finally
consumes the control fact
CanChange so that the agent
vehicle cannot generate any
pseudonyms. The action fact
Eq checks that the O-TOKEN
can be decrypted using Ltk. Finally the RHS concludes by outing on the network the
osrConfMsg tuple.
Proof Goals. The results for the formal analysis for the O-TOKEN protocol is presented
in Table 4.3 and achieves all desired goals. Notably all the authentication properties, G5 -
G7, holdmeaning that the RA is communicatingwith the revoked vehicle and can verify the
received confirmation, which was not the case with the R-TOKEN protocol. Therefore, all
the desired functional correctness properties hold. In Figures 4.26 and 4.27wedemonstrate
executability and revocation when there has been a change of pseudonym respectively.
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4.5 Summary
ThenewO-TOKEN protocol proposed allows revocation even if vehicles have changed pseudo-
nym. It also allows the RA to verify a confirmation sent by a vehicle that it has deleted its
pseudonyms. The formal analysis establishes that verifying such a confirmation provides
a guarantee that the revocation occurred. We have therefore shown through formal ana-
lysis that the desired functional correctness and authentication properties hold. The new
O-TOKEN protocol for REWIRE was developed by first formallymodelling and analysing the
two previous variants of REWIRE, then identifying weaknesses in their functional correct-
ness and a failure to meet required authentication properties.
It is important to note that our O-TOKEN scheme is not Sybil attack [92] resistant. This is
because a vehicle can avoid revocation by not forwarding revocation messages to the TEE.
Currently, our trust assumptions are that vehicles HOSTs and TEEs are honest andmessage
forwarding always happens. We acknowledge that in practice itmay not be the case that the
HOST forwards all messages. Note that Sybil attacks are out of scope for this contribution.
Through thismodelling process we discovered that using linear facts was invaluable for
reachability analysis. In the models the CanChange fact is used to constrain the state space,
and hence narrows the search during the course of a proof. Therefore, for checking the
functional correctness of both the REWIRE PLAIN and R-TOKEN, and O-TOKEN using the
linear fact was invaluable. All of our REWIRE and O-TOKEN TAMARIN models are proved
automatically using the TAMARIN PROVER’s default heuristics.
In the analysis, we currently focus on functional correctness and authentication. Future
work will be to explore anonymity and privacy properties of revocation protocols and of
other V2X protocols and this will be discussed in Section 7.2.

Chapter 5
Privacy-Enhanced Capabilities for
VANETs using Direct Anonymous
Attestation
In this chapter, we outline a novel secure and privacy-preserving solution for V2X systems
built using widely accepted trusted computing technologies. Our approach systematically
addresses all key aspects, i.e., security, privacy and accountability (revocation). By reflect-
ing on state-of-the-art pseudonym architectures in Section 2.11, we identified their limit-
ations focusing on scalability and revocation mechanisms. We also saw in Chapter 4 that
designing revocation protocols that meets strong security properties in V2X is challenging.
We propose the use of Direct Anonymous Attestation to enhance existing V2X security ar-
chitectures to allow vehicles to be revoked directly with minimal interaction with trusted
third parties. The novelty of our proposed solution is its decentralised approach in shift-
ing trust from the infrastructure to vehicles. Applying DAA in V2X enables enhanced pri-
vacy protection than is possible in current architectures through user-controlled traceabil-
ity. The chapter presents the incorporation of DAA within V2X together with security and
privacy arguments.
Recall in Section 2.10.2 we introduced Direct Anonymous Attestation which is an an-
onymous digital signaturemechanism, where for each signature no entity can discover the
signer’s identity. However, DAA still has the property that only a legitimate signer (e.g., a
vehicle) can create a valid signature through the use of trusted computing hardware (e.g.,
an automotive variant of the TPM [218]). Under DAA, vehicles will be responsible for gen-
erating their own pseudonyms resulting in simplified infrastructuremodels where there is
no need for a dedicated entity to take up this role, as is the case in current VPKIs as dis-
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cussed in Section 2.11. DAA algorithmshas the ability to create pseudo-linkability between
changing pseudonymsmaking the revocation of misbehaving/malicious vehicles possible.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 provides the motiva-
tion for a new decentralised V2X architecture. Section 5.2 provides the details of the novel
secure and privacy-preserving pseudonym scheme for V2X usingDAA. Section 5.3 provides
a qualitative discussion of the security analysis, and Section 6.8 provides a summary.
5.1 Motivation andDesign Choices
Figure 5.1 DAA Pseudonym scheme lifecycle
Our novel DAA solution yieldsmany advantages over state-of-the-art asymmetric pseudo-
nym V2X architectures in terms of security, privacy and scalability. Evaluating the state-of-
the-art VPKI in Section 2.11, we note a number of challenges and limitations in V2X ar-
chitectures. In particular existing architectures have been shown to suffer from scalability
issues [102, 111] and from privacy weaknesses introduced by varying pseudonym re-usage
and revocation policies [176]; especially against scenarios where the (trusted) authorities
colludewith each other to link vehicles’ actions or completely deanonymize a vehicle’s iden-
tity. Figure 5.1 presents our proposed DAA solution, and in comparison to the VPKI archi-
tecture described in Section 2.11 our DAA solution simplifies themessage exchange during
the V2X lifecycle. During this lifecycle Steps 3, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of Figure 2.1 are no longer
required because trust is shifted to the edge points (vehicles) in the architecture.
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Our proposed distributed DAA-based approach:
1. does not need a trusted PP since pseudonyms are created by vehicles themselves. Us-
ingDAA, an in-vehicle TEE is responsible for creating an unlimited number of trusted
pseudonym credentials without involving any trusted third party. Since no trusted
thirdparty is involved in the creation of pseudonyms it removes the ability the ISSUER
and PP have to colludewith one another. Moreover, it is infeasible for any third-party
to reveal the identity of another vehicle, assuring that pseudonym resolution is not
possible in our solution.
2. does not require any type of pseudonym resolution as deterministic signatures (cre-
ated only by the TEE) are used for self-identification by vehicles for revocation.
3. does not require the use of a CRL since pseudonyms in our architecture are not pub-
lished and are only seen on an ad-hoc basis. Additionally, we employ the use of trus-
ted computing to force a vehicle to delete its credentials and this can be achieved
locally without reference to a CRL.
4. requires minimal interaction with trusted third parties since pseudonyms are self-
certified by the TEE, and DAA signatures are used to certify and verify each pseudo-
nym that is verifiable by all verifiers, e.g., other vehicles and ITS entities.
Our V2X architecture is motivated by the need for it to adhere to the privacy specifications
of ETSI TS 102 941 [100], whilst also adding an additional layer of security. By using DAA
we satisfy the privacy properties of the ETSI standard, and inherit the strong security guar-
antees of DAA. An evaluation of these properties for our V2X DAA solution is presented
in Section 5.3.2.
Our V2X architecture will be defined in terms of the following six operations:
• SETUP: Initialises a fresh DAA key-pair for a vehicle.
• JOIN: Attests the DAA key-pair of a vehicle and obtains a credential.
• CREATE: Generates fresh pseudonyms for a vehicle by randomising the credential,
and uses the TEE to certify the pseudonym using the DAA private key.
• SIGN: Uses a pseudonym key to sign a message in a V2X message exchange. This
signature is not a DAA signature, but a standard digital signature such as ECDSA.
• VERIFY: Verifies the DAA credential contained in the pseudonym and the signed V2X
message.
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V2X DAA Lifecycle
Setup Setup -
Join Join 1,2
Create Sign 3
Sign - 4
Verify Verify 5
Revoke - 6,7
Table 5.1 Mapping between vehicular operations and DAA
• REVOKE: Removes misbehaving / malfunctioning vehicles from the ITS. Utilises a
DAA signature during this operation.
There is a clear link between the operations in the vehicular architecture and the DAA op-
erations defined in Section 2.10.2. Their relationship is shown in Table 5.1 alongside their
mapping to the scheme’s lifecycle steps of Figure 5.1.
Notably, SETUP, JOIN and VERIFY have clear correspondences. However, the CREATE
operation makes use of the DAA SIGN operation. This could be confusing because we also
have a SIGN operation in the vehicular architecture. The vehicular SIGN operation does
not does not correspond to a DAA SIGN because it is creating a standard digital signature.
Similarly, REVOKE does not have a corresponding DAA operation.
Our revocation provides guarantees of successful completionwhen amisbehaviour has
been identified and reported correctly using existing protocols [189, 221]. This is mainly
due to the presence of the TEE that is responsible for executing the revocation command,
thus, not allowing to be circumvented by a (compromised) vehicle. Additionally, through
the use of DAA deterministic signatures, revocation under changing pseudonyms is still
possible and the RA can verify revocation messages without compromising the vehicles’
privacy. Additionally, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, REWIRE and O-TOKEN do not require
CRLs. This is also true for our architecture since the revocation mechanism triggers the
TEE to delete all of its keys, thus, not allowing any subsequent (authorised) communication
from themisbehaving vehicle.
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Figure 5.1 introduces how a typical DAA pseudonym lifecycle architecture executes for V2X.
As we can see, two trusted third parties are introduced; (i) the ISSUER who is responsible for
authenticating vehicles and (ii) the RA, as already exists in current architectures, that pre-
ventsmisbehaving vehicles fromusing the ITS. In our context, vehicles are the combination
of a HOST, that is a vehicular on-board computer “normal world”, and a TEE that executes
in the “secure world”; together they form the PLATFORM which we refer to from this point
onwards as the vehicle. We also have an additional role - this of verifierswhich are other ITS
entities,e.g., another vehicle, third party service, etc. As depicted, the use of pseudonyms
for V2X communications follows a similar pattern as in Figure 2.1, although they differ in
the way pseudonyms are introduced and revoked. There are many similarities with the
existing ITS architectures, demonstrating the feasibility of our DAA-based solution, since
with limited effort it could be implemented in compliance with ETSI standards.
We have to highlight that our proposed solution assumes on-board TEEs that support (i)
isolation: separate and protected from the HOST in the event of compromise, (ii) protected
execution: ensures the operation is executed and not interferedwith, and (ii) secure storage:
storage which is only accessible by the TEE if the vehicle is in a “good” state.
System Actor Data Item Description
Issuer
skI/pkI DAA key-pair.
pkltk/skltk Long-term key-pair.
KI DAA security parameters constructed
pkI from the Issuers DAA public key and
pkltk long-term public key, hashed.
Tee
DAASeed Unique secret installed at manufacture time.
cnt Counter value.
skTee :=hash( DAASeed ‖ KI ‖ cnt ) Private DAA key.
pkTee Public DAA key.
skekT ee/pkekT ee Tee endorsement key-pair.
skps / pkps Pseudonym key-pair.
Host
cre := blindSign(pkTee, skI) Attestation Identity Credential.
psCertTee Pseudonym
pkps Pseudonym public key.
Verifier
pkps A vehicle’s pseudonym public key.
ROGUEsktc Set of revoked Tee keys.
RA
skra/pkra RA key-pair
pkps A vehicle’s pseudonym public key RA wants to revoke.
Table 5.2 V2X DAA Security Notation
Figures 5.2 to 5.5 defines the specification of our DAA protocols. We describe each pro-
tocol execution by defining the responsibility of all system actors and separate the roles of
the TEE and HOST. This allows us to better reason against the required functionality of a
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TEE. The reader is referred to Table 5.2 for fully expanded explanations of the notation used
below.
5.2.1 Vehicle Registration
Join: Tee ⇋ Host ⇋ Issuer
skekTee , pkekT ee pkekT ee , pkTee pkekT ee , skI
skTee, pkTee pkI
pkekT ee , pkTee fresh nI
C C C = aenc(nI ‖ pkTee, pkekT ee)
adec(C, skekT ee)
nI ‖ pkTee nI ‖ pkTee nI ‖ pkTee cre = generateCredential( pkTee, skI )
fresh key
e = senc( cre, key )
d d, e d = aenc( key ‖ pkTee, pkekTee )
adec(d, skekT ee)
key ‖ pkTee key sdec(e, key)
store( cre )
Figure 5.2 High-level overview of the V2X DAA JOIN operation
The first step for a vehicle acquiring its certificates consists of two phases: SETUP for
generation of keys, and the enrolment phase to an ISSUER (JOIN) to authenticate vehicles.
For SETUP, we assume that during manufacture, the TEE will have a unique DAASeed
installed, a non-monotonic counter cnt , and the hardware will be endorsed by the man-
ufacturer through means of installing an endorsement key-pair: skekT EE / pkekT EE into the
TEE. For the SETUP phase the ISSUER publishes its public key pkI and the security paramet-
ers K I . A vehicle’s TEE generates a DAA key-pair: skT EE / pkT EE using K I , and publishes its
public key pkT EE. The TEE then releases the public keys pkekT EE and pkT EE to the vehicle.
This reflects the overview of SETUP in Section 2.10.2 since skekT EE and skT EE remain in the
TEE means that the HOST can’t have access to them.
The details of the JOIN operation detailed in Figure 5.2 represents lifecycle steps 1 and
2 of Figure 5.1. By the end of the JOIN operation, the vehicle (PLATFORM) will have acquired
a VID credential certifying that the vehicle has a valid TEE which has been enrolled with
the ISSUER. Recall from Section 2.10.2 that upon a successful JOIN operation a PLATFORM
receives an Attestation Identity Credential, which in Figure 5.1 is called VID credential. In
our operations we shorten it to cre to reflect its notation in DAA.
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To initiate the JOIN operation, a vehicle sends the ISSUER its public keys indicating it
wants to join the network, step 1 in Figure 5.2. The ISSUER responds to the vehicle with a
fresh challenge C which only the valid TEE can open. The vehicle then forwards C to its
TEE via a secure I/O, step 2 in Figure 5.2. The TEE opens the challenge, confirms its validity,
and sends the response to the HOST vehicle, which in turn, responds to the ISSUER with
the recovered data items, step 3 in Figure 5.2. The ISSUER verifies the received response,
confirming that the vehicle possesses a valid TEE. Following this verification, the ISSUER
generates the credential cre that contains the DAA key, and a fresh symmetric session key .
The credential cre, encrypted with the session key , is sent to the vehicle, along with an en-
cryption of key intended for the TEE, as e and d respectively in step 4 in Figure 5.2. Finally,
the vehicle uses the TEE to decrypt d , recovering the key . The TEE verifies the validity of d
and then releases the session key to the vehicle, step 5 in Figure 5.2. The vehicle decrypts
e , using the session key , to recover the certificate cre. We employ the use of d and e as a
method to establish both a secure and authentic channel,between the ISSUER and a vehicle.
Finally, it verifies cre using pkI and stores it for future use.
By the end of this operation, if successful, the vehicle is an authenticated and legitimate
member of the ITS, and ready to register to any of the ITS’ provided services including V2X
communication.
5.2.2 PseudonymCreation
Create: Tee ⇋ Host
skTee cre
fresh r
fresh skps/pkps ‘‘create’’ ‖ ĉre ĉre := blind(cre, r)
fresh r′
pssig := DAASign(pkps, r
′, skTee) = (σ1 ‖ σ2 ‖ ĉre)
σ1 := sign(pkps, skTee)
σ2 := sign(‘‘certified’’ ‖ pkps, r
′, skTee)
psCertTee := (pkps ‖ pssig)
store(skps) psCertTee store(psCertTee)
Figure 5.3 High-level overview of the V2X DAA CREATE operation
The creation of pseudonyms (CREATE in Figure 5.3) lies within the vehicles, allowing the
shift of trust from a third party to locally within the end-points. This is made possible by all
vehicles being equipped with a TEE, that is responsible for generating the pseudonyms in
an environment that enables protected execution, isolation and secure storage. From Fig-
ure 5.1 we focus on lifecycle step 3 of how pseudonyms are created locally exploiting the
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use of the on-board TEE. The CREATE operation for pseudonyms utilises the DAA SIGN op-
eration to sign each pseudonym using skT EE, the private DAA key.
Creating new pseudonyms for a vehicle does not require any external network com-
munication, and all message exchanges in the CREATE operation take place over secure
I/O between the HOST and TEE. To initiate the creation process the HOST blinds the cre
with freshly generated random nonces, and sends a “create” request to the TEE with ĉre.
Blinding the credential enables a vehicle to use cre multiple times without needing to
run the JOIN operation each time. Alternatively, the vehicle can choose not to “blind” its
credential and create pseudonyms which are linkable. While this is bad practice, it does
demonstrate that anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability and unobservability are under
the control of the vehicle. Upon receipt of the pseudonym creation request, the TEE cre-
ates a fresh pseudonym key-pair skps/pkps and fresh random r . Using the DAASign oper-
ation the TEE creates two signatures: σ1, the public pseudonym key signed with the DAA
private key skT EE, andσ2, a blind signature of the certified pkps key; ensuring the generated
pseudonyms are not linkable. σ1 is a “link token” which is created for the purpose of revoc-
ation, discussed in Section 5.2.4. Once the pseudonym signature is produced, pssi g , the
pseudonym certificate, psCer tT EE , is produced that is constructed from the public pseudo-
nym key, pkps , and the pseudonym signature. The TEE concludes by storing the generated
pseudonym private key, skps , and returns the pseudonym certificate to the HOST for use
in V2X communication. By the end of this operation a vehicle can use its pseudonyms to
communicate with the ITS’ various services.
5.2.3 V2X Communication
V2X Message: Tee ⇋ Host ⇋ Verifier
skps psCertTee pkI
mplain mplain := {|“70 mph” ‖ data |}
msign := sign(mplain, skps) msign msg := {| mplain ‖ msign ‖ psCertTee |}
msg
DAAVerify(pssig, pkI)
store(pkps)
verify(mplain, msign, pkps)
Figure 5.4 High-level overview of the V2Xmessage operation
Our scheme defines an operation, in Figure 5.4, for authenticatingmessage exchanges
between ITS services and V2X communication. This maps to lifecycle steps 4 and 5 in Fig-
ure 5.1.
To initiate a communication, the vehicle creates a safety message that wants to broad-
cast to other system participants. In our example, the vehicle creates a plain unsignedmes-
sage,mplain , stating its speed is “70 mph” and includes binary data information. The T
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is given mplain and signs it using the current pseudonym private key, skps , and responds
to the vehicle with a valid signature for mplain . Note that this is a standard digital signa-
ture, not the DAA SIGN operation. The vehicle then constructs the completemessage,msg ,
to broadcast to its surrounding vehicles. msg is constructed from the plain message, the
message signature and the current pseudonym certificate psCer tT EE . The surrounding ITS
entities (VERIFIER), e.g., vehicles, receive msg , and first verify that the attached psCer tT EE
was created by a valid TEE that has been authorised by the ISSUER. To achieve this, the
verifying vehicle extracts pssi g from the received psCer tT EE , and uses the DAA VERIFY oper-
ation with the ISSUER’s public key, pkI , to confirm the pseudonym was created by a valid
TEE. The vehicle stores pkps and uses it to verify the safety message. This links back to
Section 5.2.2, i.e., pseudonyms are signed using a vehicles private DAA key, skT EE, and thus
pseudonyms are verified by verifying the blinded credential, ĉre, with the ISSUER’s public
key, pkI , using the DAA VERIFY operation.
5.2.4 Revocation
Revoke: Tee ⇋ Host ⇋ Ra
skTee, pkra cre pkI , pkps, psCertTee , skra
msg := {| ‘‘revoke’’ || pkps || reason |}skra
fresh r msg
verify(msg, pkra) ĉre,msg ĉre = blind(cre, r)
fresh r′
σrvk := DAASign(pkps, r, skTee) = (σ
ra
1 ‖ σ
ra
2 ‖ ĉre)
σra1 := sign(pkps, skTee)
σra2 := sign(‘‘confirm’’ ‖ pkps, r
′, skTee) σrvk σrvk σrvk eq(σ1, σ
ra
1 , true)
DAAVerify(σrvk, pkI)
Figure 5.5 High-level overview of the V2X REVOKE operation
As aforementioned in Section 5.1, one of the most critical services in an ITS is revoca-
tion. In Figure 5.5 our REVOKE operation which revokes a vehicle in a privacy-preserving
manner and confirms that the vehicle is revoked and makes use of a DAA SIGN and DAA
VERIFY operation. Revocation messages have linkable signatures to guarantee the correct
receipt of a revocation command by the vehicle in question. Prior to the execution of this
operation, we assume a number of reports containing a misbehaving vehicle’s pseudonym
have been issued to the RA, and the decision to revoke the vehicle has been made. There-
fore, it is reasonable to assume that before the revocation operation executes, the RA has
knowledge of the ISSUER’s public key, pkI , themisbehaving vehicle’s pseudonym, psCer tT EE ,
and its public pseudonym key, pkps .
The RA initiates the REVOKE operation by creating a signed revocation message msg
using its private key skr a. It broadcastsmsg containing the public pseudonym key, pkps ,
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that needs to be revoked. All vehicles receive the revocation message since the HOSTs are
required to forward them to their TEEs (Section 5.3.2), and furthermore they generate fresh
random nonces and blind the credential producing ĉre which is again forwarded to their
TEEs. The TEE of the vehicle to be revoked recognises this message as a revocation request,
and verifies that the pseudonym public key was generated by the TEE and prepares to re-
spond to the RA. The TEE generates some fresh random nonce r , and uses the DAASign
operation to produce the revocation confirmation signaturesσr a1 and σ
r a
2 . σ
r a
1 is a determ-
inistic signature that is linkable with σ1 confirming the revocation is designated for this
vehicle. Then, σr a2 is a signed commitment to confirm that the pseudonym was revoked.
As a consequence of σr a being produced, the TEE deletes all pseudonyms and its DAA key-
pair skT EE/pkT EE. The TEE responds to the vehicle with the revocation confirmation σr vk ,
which is then sent to the RA. Upon receipt of the revocation confirmation, the RA verifies
that σr a1 is the same signature as σ1 from the pseudonym certificate implying that the cor-
rect vehicle has revoked itself. The entire signatureσr vk can be verified using DAAVerify as
being signed by the TEE that belongs to the revoked vehicle.
By the end of this operation, there are strong guarantees that the vehicle in question
has been revoked without the need for any pseudonym resolution. The RA has verifiable
evidence, from the vehicle, that it has performed the revocation enforced by the TEE. In the
event of a vehicle revocation, the vehicle would have to re-run the JOIN operation before it
could re-join the ITS and acquire a new VID credential.
5.3 SecurityModel
In this section, we discuss the proposed DAA-based solution with respect to the achieved
security and privacy properties. We consider the following roles within the scope of our
analysis to be Vehicles (Users are also considered here), TEEs, Verifiers, ISSUER and RA.
5.3.1 Threat and AdversaryModel
Vehicular Communication systems are susceptible to both outsider and insider adversar-
ies [111, 6]. The former are unauthorised entities (i.e., no credentials or trust relationships
with other system entities) that seek to compromise the system and disrupt its operation.
In contrast, the primary goal of an insider attacker would be to intercept, block or modify
network communications or impersonate a legitimate vehicle (Sybil attack [92]). Assum-
ing that it is impractical to break the security protocols, the remaining attack vector would
be to try and obtain a vehicle’s DAA VID credential in order to perform a malicious action.
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An adversary armed with such credentials may also try to extract the identity of the HOST
vehicle. For instance, signatures produced by the compromised DAA credentials could be
used to track the vehicle, thus, breaching its privacy, unlinkability and untraceability.
Furthermore, in our context, we are also considering Honest-But-Curious (HBC) [112]
adversarieswho represent legitimate participants (i.e., infrastructure entities and/or vehicles).
Their goal is not to disrupt the functionality of the network but to breach a vehicle’s privacy.
The HBC does not deviate from the defined protocol rules but possibly learns information
from legitimatemessage exchange and informationmonitoring.
Our trust assumptions for the HOST in the vehicle system is that we trust it to provide
the vehicle with privacy, but not integrity of pseudonym generation, or signing messages,
etc.. The HOST does not have access to the private keys since they are stored in the TEE. We
trust the TEE for its integrity to perform cryptographic operations, but not for privacy.
5.3.2 Security Analysis
The security assurances rest on the TEEs within the vehicles to provide the security guar-
antees, in particular their possession of an endorsement key-pair, skekT EE / pkekT EE , embed-
ded during manufacture which only a genuine TEE can have. We consider the following
key properties. The first three are DAA properties and the remaining properties are wanted
for our vehicular solution, focusing on revocation. For this analysis we recall the privacy
requirements specified in ETSI TS 102 941 [100] in Section 2.11 and DAA properties in Sec-
tion 2.10.2.
Correctness: DAA ensures that only valid and trustworthy TEEs are able to JOIN the
ITS by ensuring that the endorsed TEE keys, skekT EE and pkekT EE , have not been previously
compromised. This ensures that TEEs only produce valid signatures and can only be linked
when specified by a vehicle. This means that a pseudonym’s DAA signature signed with a
valid key-pair (using the private DAA key, skT EE, and VID credential, cre), verifies correctly
using the ISSUER’s public key, pkI . Note that the ETSI standard does not capture this notion
of security.
User-controlled anonymity: The ETSI properties of anonymity and pseudonymity are
satisfied through the DAA property user-controlled anonymity. The identity of a vehicle
(user), using the credentials provided by the CREATE operation, is not disclosed unless this
is dictated by the vehicle itself. In particular, the credentials do not contain any personal
identifying information. The private DAA key of the TEE, skT EE, is not linked to the vehicle,
and it is certified by the ISSUER producing the VID credential cre. Extracting to whom the
pseudonym corresponds to is infeasible because the identity of the TEE (and hence that of
the vehicle) is not linked to its private DAA key.
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User-controlled traceability: Unlinkability depicts that linking of subsequent commu-
nications (or service requests) originating from the same vehicle is infeasible. The un-
linkability property for ETSI is satisfied by DAA’s user-controlled traceability. Unlinkabil-
ity (and/or different levels of vehicle linkability) is controlled by the vehicle through the
DAA SIGN / VERIFY phases (Section 5.2.2 and Section 5.2.4). A vehicle has control over its
DAA credential, and can decide whether or not to “blind” (randomise) it, thus, producing
pseudonyms (and revocation) that are linkable. Our proposed solution provides privacy-
preserving linkability via DAA deterministic signatures (link tokens), where the use of a
pseudonym is unlinkable to any other pseudonyms owned by a vehicle. This property is
of particular interest to ITS as vehicles can demonstrate unobservability and unlinkabil-
ity (when using multiple services) while being accountable for these service invocations.
Therefore, any third-parties in possession of a DAA signature produced by vehicles cannot
identify and link subsequent service requests originating from the same vehicle. This is
also true in the presence of colluding third parties and other ITS entities.
In this context, if a vehicle wishes for two communications to be unlinkable then it can
do so by using different pseudonyms (hence “user controlled”). The certificate, psCer tT EE ,
in the two cases cannot be linked as being associated to the same TEE since: (i) the public
pseudonym key, pkps , is fresh and could have been generated by any TEE in each case, (ii)
the blinded credential, ĉre, is freshly blinded in each case, (iii) σ1 by itself is not a verifi-
able signature, and does not reveal which private DAA key, skT EE, was used or relate to a
particular public DAA key, pkT EE, and similarly (iv) the signatures in σ2 are blinded.
Within DAA when both anonymity and linkability are satisfied then an observer is not
able to reveal the identity of a signer or link multiple signatures, thus the ETSI unobservab-
ility property is satisfied.
Non-frameability: This property states that communication from a vehicle cannot be
faked or generated by some attacker (or even the ISSUER) without the involvement of the
vehicle’s TEE. This is achieved as any message mplain issued by a vehicle is signed by the
TEE in the V2X message operation. The signature on m is assured by the credential cre
signed by the ISSUER (together with psCer tT EE ) and, therefore, it can only be generated from
the associated TEE.
Assurance of revocation requests: A TEE should only accept genuine revocation re-
quests so as to ensure that attackers cannot arbitrarily REVOKE vehicles. This property is
achieved by including the RA’s signature on any revocation message, so that it will not be
accepted by the TEE as a valid revocation unless the signature is present. Since msg in-
cludes the pseudonym public key of the pseudonym to be revoked, it cannot be reused by
an attacker to revoke any other pseudonym.
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Assurance of revocation confirmation: An important requirement of the revocation
mechanism is to provide strong guarantees that when an RA has initiated and run the oper-
ation to completion, then the associated TEE must have been involved in the operation in-
stance and correctly received the revocation request. It is the TEE, as the trusted PLATFORM,
who is responsible for deleting the pseudonym certificates and no longer using them. In
particular, the RA should not reach the point of believing that the revocation has taken
place when in fact the TEE is unaware of it. This assurance is provided by the TEE signing
the confirmation against the pseudonym public key, pkps , whose revocation is requested,
and the RA can verify the TEE’s signature on that. No other party can create this signa-
ture, and the TEE will only create this confirmation when the pseudonym is being revoked.
Hence, no revocation confirmation can be used by an attacker to spoof a confirmation of
any other revocation request.
Assurance of revocation: If a revocation request reaches the TEE then it will trigger the
process of deleting all generated pseudonyms. However, the attacker model also allows a
vehicle to block messages intended for the TEE, including revocation requests. (Note that
this is also an issue for REWIRE and O-TOKEN from Chapter 4).
In our REVOKE operation, the message sent between the ISSUER and a HOST is simply
stated to be of the formmsg . If we consider these messages to be delivered via heartbeats
then the heartbeats will either be “keep alive”messages or potentially revocationmessages
for vehicles to action. Heartbeat mechanisms are typically used for monitoring the status
of one-hop vehicular topologies [62] and can provide protection against such malevolent
actions. Therefore, we propose to use heartbeats to provide an indistinguishable way of
sending revocation messages. Hence, this may provide a basis a method for protection
against non-delivery of revocation messages by the HOST.
In our architecture it would be the RA that would send out the heartbeats every cycle.
They are signed by the RA so they cannot be tampered with or spoofed, and only one mes-
sage is generated by the RA for each time period. Failure to receive a heartbeatmessage (or
a series of messages so as to allow possible limited connectivity) can act as indication for
potential misbehaviour that can also trigger revocation by the TEE.
5.4 Implementation Considerations
From the vehicular operations described in this chapter,we discuss implementation details
that would need to be considered in order to build our V2X architecture. The first consid-
eration is the choice of TEE, since this will influence a number of other implementation
choices.
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In Chapter 2 we discussed a number of different TEEs which might be appropriate for
our V2X solution. As DAA was designed to work with TPMs this would seem to be a natural
choice for a test implementation that requires a TEE to provide strong security and privacy
guarantees.
In the TCG TPM 2.0 library specification [216], only the elliptic curve variant of DAA
(ECC-DAA) is available. Since TPM 2.0 only supports BN P256 or BN P638 for the ECC-DAA
scheme in order to implement the schemewe would also need to use pairing groups based
on Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curves [15]. Additionally, the group generator and the point on
the curve is fixed within the TPM for ECC-DAA. Therefore, to implement the ISSUER function-
alities we will need to find a cryptographic library that is compatible with the curves and
points used in the TPM.
ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 [137] Annex C.2 and E.4 recommend security parameters to use
for ECC-DAA to achieve 128-bit security using the BN P256 curve. The parameters used by
the TPM implementation of ECC-DAA are compatible with the standard.
We need to study the various specification documents [216, 139] to identify the TPM
calls that can be used to implement the ECC-DAA operations. It is important to note that
TPM’s also have errata versions which may require different function calls across different
versions of the TPM.
The TCG have released a specification for TPMs to be used in automotive applications.
This specification, Automotive Thin Profile [218], promotes the security benefits that TPMs
can provide to vehicle systems, and defines their capabilities. The TCG have not explicitly
included DAA in this thin profile, but in the next chapter we demonstrate the strength of
DAA and hence its inclusion within the profile would also be an interesting area of future
work.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented our novel (distributed) DAA pseudonym framework for V2X,
which provides a comprehensive set of security, privacy and accountability services to V2X
systems. Leveraging widely accepted trusted computing technologies, our solution caters
to the needs of vehicular users while overcoming the limitations of existing VPKIs.
We optimised the number of trusted third parties, removed the need of a CRL, and ap-
plied trusted computing in order to promote scalability of our V2X solution. In our V2X
architecture vehicles have total control over their privacy, as no trusted third party is in-
volved in the creation of pseudonyms. Therefore, it is infeasible for any third party to reveal
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the identity of another vehicle assuring that pseudonym resolution is not possible in our
solution.
However, there are still a number of questions to be answered since the adoption of
such a (distributed) secure and privacy-preserving architecture, based on trusted comput-
ing, is not straightforward. For instance, what operational functions is it reasonable to
place within the “trusted world” of a TEE without compromising the overall performance?
The same question can be reversed for the context of the “untrusted world” provided by a
HOST: what types of services can be placed in thismodel without compromising the overall
security and privacy? These are interesting challenges for future work, where implement-
ation and experimentation could be performed to evaluate the feasibility of the DAA solu-
tion, and identify a TEE capable of performing the required functionality.
It is important to note that ourDAAarchitecture is not Sybil attack [92] resistant because
a vehicle is capable of producing an unlimited amount of pseudonyms. This is possible
because a HOST could choose not forward a revocation message to its TEE, and as a result
continue to request new pseudonyms from the TEE. The TEE is not aware of revocations as
it relies on its HOST to act honestly. Countermeasures for Sybil attacks is out of scope for
this contribution, but would need to be considered in an implementation of our proposed
architecture.
In this chapter we do not build our solution around a specific type of TEE and we leave
this as an implementation detail. For the DAA-based scheme, vehicles are required to have
a TEE and support the specified functionalities. Furthermore, as an additional implementa-
tion detail, we recommend the use of ECC-DAA, as this scheme is included in ISO/IEC20008-
2 2:2013 [138]. ECC-DAA is more efficient for low-end resource constrained devices, and this
is appropriate for DAA in the vehicular setting. Furthermore, the implementation and eval-
uation of our solution is ongoing to demonstrate its efficiency, practicality and scalability.
Various properties are of interest with a particular focus on pseudonym generation, revoc-
ation and network latency; the latter can be induced by vehicular mobility so as to better
assess the revocation operation under volatile network connectivity. The goal is to provide
strong evidence on the efficient provision of security-related services in vehicular network-
ing environments against existing architectures [111, 47].
Additionally, formal analysis can be conducted on the security arguments presented
in Section 5.3.2. Performing a formal analysis will strengthen our proposed architecture,
and since the proposed architecture is based onDAA, the next step for our research is to de-
velop a formalmodel of a particularDAA scheme, and analyse it with respect to the security
and privacy properties identified.

Chapter 6
A Symbolic Analysis of ECC-based Direct
Anonymous Attestation
In this chapter we develop TAMARIN models and analyse an ECC-based version of a DAA
scheme. Our analysis confirms that the scheme is securewhen all TPMs are assumedhonest,
but reveals a break in the scheme’s expected authentication and secrecy properties for all
TPMs even if only one is compromised. We propose and formally verify a minimal fix to the
scheme.
6.1 Overview
In earlier chapters we have discussed how devices can have hardware-backed roots of trust
and these roots of trust are then used to attest that devices are in a “trustworthy” state,
meaning that the devices behave as expected for a specific purpose. It is desirable that
such device attestationsbe conducted in a privacy-preservingmanner to protect users, and
reduce the knowledge adversariesmay learn. In Section 2.10 we identified several different
anonymous attestation schemes and in this chapterwe focus onECC-basedDAA (ECC-DAA).
We already discussed that DAA is compatible for use in TPM-based solutions for V2X.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2 we first clarify precisely which ECC-
DAA scheme we analyse in this thesis. In Section 6.3 we summarise the existing DAA ana-
lyses in the literature so that it is clear that our contribution is novel before describing
the scheme’s operations in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 describes the TAMARIN models of our
ECC-DAA scheme. In Section 6.6, we describe our threat model and formalise the security
and privacy guarantees required of a DAA scheme as identified by Brickell et al. [40]. Sec-
tion 6.7 describe our analysis results, which highlights a flaw in the model, proposes a fix
108 A Symbolic Analysis of ECC-based Direct Anonymous Attestation
that achieves the required security and privacy guarantees. Section 6.8 provides conclu-
sions.
6.2 ECC-basedDirect Anonymous Attestation
Direct Anonymous Attestation [38] is an authentication mechanism that enables the pro-
vision of privacy-preserving and accountable authentication services, as described in Sec-
tion 2.10.2. In the literature DAA is also referred to as an anonymous digital signature.
An ECC-DAA scheme is an implementation of DAA in the elliptic curve setting. In com-
parison, traditional digital signaturemechanisms [12, 24, 46] only provide entity authentic-
ation, non-repudiation and data integrity without anonymity.
The ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 [137] mechanism 4 defines operations: SETUP, JOIN, SIGN,
and VERIFY, which generate keys and produce and verify signatures. These will be dis-
cussed in detail in Section 6.4. ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 mechanism 4 splits the role of a
signer between a secure device (TPM), and a commodity computing device (HOST). In
ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 mechanism 4 a TPM is referred to as a principal signer. Throughout
the chapter a principal signer is referred to as PSIGNER and an assistant signer as ASIGNER.
We refer to a signer as a PLATFORM. Essentially, a PSIGNER can sign any arbitrary message
collaboratively with an ASIGNER which is the commodity device. This split utilises the high
level of security offered by a PSIGNER, in conjunction with the computational ability and
storage capacity offered by an ASIGNER (see [60] for a practical example). The communica-
tion between an ASIGNER and a PSIGNER is secure, i.e., no DY adversary can view the com-
munication between them. This is not unrealistic because the concept of a PLATFORM has
been designed to be that of a trusted entity.
Signed messages are sent to a verifier, which throughout the chapter is referred to as a
VERIFIER. In ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 [137] mechanism 4 states the communication between
the PSIGNER and an ISSUER is assumed to be over a secure and authentic channel. The
standard does not define how the secure and authentic channel is to be implemented. For
the work in the thesis we have based our analysis on the ISO/IEC 20008:2-2013 standard
combined with an endorsement key-pair and a MAC from the ECC-DAA scheme defined by
Chen et al. [60] to model how a secure and authentic channel can be created. We explain
the need for including an endorsement key-pair andMAC below.
If the channel between the PLATFORM and an ISSUER was completely resistant to eaves-
dropping andmodification it wouldmean that a DY adversary could not do anything. Even
in this case it could be possible to have a DY adversary operating on the ASIGNER or ISSUER
after the channel endpoint, i.e., once the information has been received and decrypted at
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the network layer. In the real world there are no perfectly secure channels. At best what can
be achieved is to make insecure channels more secure by making them as resistant to be-
ing eavesdropped and modification as possible. Therefore, in order to analyse an ECC-DAA
scheme we need to model an implementation of a secure and authentic channel.
To achieve this we need to identify approaches that would enable us to perform mes-
sage exchange from the PLATFORM to the ISSUER in a secure manner, and also performmes-
sage exchange from the ISSUER to the PLATFORM in a way that only that PLATFORM can de-
crypt it.
The Chen et al. scheme [60] uses a MAC to provide integrity and authenticity for mes-
sages sent from the PLATFORM to the ISSUER. Therefore, we include the concept of a MAC
in our model. We also use the TPMs endorsement key because a certificate is provided for
it by the manufacturer [216]. This key with its certificate of authenticity may be used to
associate credentials with other TPM keys (in particular the DAA key).
Throughout the thesis we refer to the standard along with these implementation con-
cepts as I-MECH4. It is I-MECH4 that we formally analyse.
6.3 Related Symbolic Analysis Work
There have been substantial efforts from the academic community in the development of
proofs analysing ECC-DAA, including simulation [38], game-based [56] and more recently
within the UC-model [48]. The formal methods tool PROVERIF [30] has been used to ana-
lyse symbolic abstractions of DAA [13, 206–208]. These symbolic analysis efforts have not
covered the HOST and TPM being split roles. All of these endeavours have helped to both
find weaknesses in DAA schemes and have guided the design decisions of subsequent re-
leases of DAA [49].
Previous symbolic analysis work by Backes et al. [13] introduced a framework in the
appliedpi calculus, for the reasoning and analysis of non-interactive zero-knowledgewithin
the PROVERIF tool. Preliminary analysis of the RSA-DAA operationswas used as a case study
for their framework. The analysis revealed a weakness in the JOIN operation showing that
if a TPM A was compromised and its endorsement key leaked then a DY adversary could
perform a JOIN impersonating A. This attack was then fixed in the operation by including
a TPMs identity in the zero-knowledge proof. Additional analysis of RSA-DAA anonymity in
SIGN was performed, and showed that two DAA signatures were indistinguishable. Work
by Backes et al. analysed the initial proposal by Brickell, Camenisch and Chen [38] and this
analysis pre-dates the standardisation of RSA-DAA in ISO/IEC 20008-2 2013mechanism 2.
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Smyth et al. [206] found a vulnerability of the RSA-DAA schemewhere user privacy could
be violated in the presence of a corrupt ISSUER and VERIFIER which collude. They demon-
strated that if a VERIFIER uses the same linking property (basename) as the ISSUER, then the
identity of a PLATFORM can be revealed. An ISSUER could also be a VERIFIER and it is not un-
reasonable that this single entity would have the same basename in both operations. This
is possible due to the way in which the basename is computed, e.g., hash(bsn) for both
JOIN and SIGN. The privacy violation is fixed by making a minor alteration to the RSA-DAA
scheme which introduces a 0 or 1 bit in the computation of basename, e.g., hash(0 ∥ bsn),
for the operations JOIN and SIGN respectively thus preserving untraceability. Again this
work pre-dates the standardisation of DAA in ISO/IEC 20008-2 2013, and the model was
developed using the initial standard defined by the TCG in version 1.2 revision 85 [215] in
2005.
The first formal analysis of an ECC-DAA scheme was presented by Smyth et al. [207]. It
is important to note that their model does not provide a full abstraction of the scheme, be-
cause the JOIN operation is omitted. Additionally, in the SIGN operation the DY adversary
was forbidden from re-blinding signatures which limits the DY adversary ability. The au-
thors analysed the user-controlled anonymity property of ECC-DAAusing observational equi-
valence and thiswas shown to hold. However, no general conclusions regarding anonymity
could bemade due to the level of abstraction of themodel. The authors state that the focus
of their work was on the ISO/IEC 20008-2:2011 draft standard.
Our analysis of an ECC-DAA scheme is based on the ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 mechanism
4 standard and also takes into account recommendations for ensuring that message ex-
change is resistant to eavesdropping andmodification. Our analysis is also based on a very
fine-grainedmodel in comparison to Smyth et al. as we will see in this chapter.
6.4 ECC-DAA operations
An ECC-DAA scheme considers a set of entities: ISSUERs, ASIGNERs, PSIGNERs, and VERIFIERs;
the ASIGNER and PSIGNER together form a trusted PLATFORM. The ISSUER is a trusted third
party responsible for attesting and authorising PLATFORMs to join the network of PLATFORMs.
A VERIFIER is any other system entity or trusted third party that can verify a PLATFORM’s cre-
dentials in a privacy-preserving manner using ECC-DAA operations; without the need of
knowing a PLATFORM’s identity. The ECC-DAA scheme is a two-phase process with five op-
erations. Phase one consists of SETUP and JOIN, while phase two uses SIGN, VERIFY and
LINK. The interactions between entities involved in the JOIN, SIGN and VERIFY operations
are shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The DAA notation followed in this chapter are as presen-
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ted in the ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 [137] document. Briefly, the notation used in Figures 6.1
and 6.2 is: [x]P is a multiplication operator that takes a positive integer x and a point P
on an elliptic curve. The ’+’ operator represents addition, ’−’ operator is subtraction, and
’∥’ operator is the concatenation of two data items. We next describe each of the ECC-DAA
operations in turn.
SETUP: The SETUP operation initialises the systemwith the security parameters (Ki, P1),
for each of the operations and long-term parameters of the ISSUER, and these parameters
are published to all entities. Prior to this operation, we assume during the manufacture
time of a PSIGNER, an endorsement key-pair (skekps / pkekps ) is embedded by the manu-
facturer in read-only memory (ROM) and ISSUERs have access to public endorsement keys.
Furthermore, a unique internal secret value DAASeed is set, and a monotonic counter (cnt)
is implemented on the PSIGNER. An external counter is available to the ASIGNER. The ISSUER
also generates its ECC-DAA key-pair (skI / pkI ), and publishes its public key.
JOIN: This operation of the ECC-DAA scheme is run between a PLATFORM (the ASIGNER
and PSIGNER) and an ISSUER. The JOIN operation executes as shown in Figure 6.1 and upon
successful completion attests a PLATFORM as being a genuine member of the group. The
PLATFORM receives a credential (cre) from the ISSUER for use in future communications
with VERIFIERs. The cre attests that the PSIGNER is valid, and the PSIGNER computes the D
element of cre containing the ECC-DAA private key tsk.
SIGN / VERIFY: The SIGN operation is run between a given PSIGNER and its associated
ASIGNER when a VERIFIER sends a message to be signed to the ASIGNER. The VERIFIER then
performs the subsequent VERIFY operation. Other VERIFIERs in the group can also verify a
signed message. Figure 6.2 describes the various steps of the SIGN and VERIFY operations,
and the interaction between entities.
An ASIGNER initiates the SIGN operation when it receives a message, nV , from a VERIFIER.
The ASIGNER SIGN step of the operation constructs one portion of the ECC-DAA signature
which includes randomising the ASIGNER’s credentials cre yielding R , S, T and W . The
VERIFIER basename, bsn, is either a fixed string value associated with the VERIFIER or not
specified (denoted by the special symbol ⊥), determines whether J is a randomly selected
group element or fixed as H1(bsn). The latter case is used when signatures are required
to be linkable. The ASIGNER sends its part of the ECC-DAA signature to the PSIGNER which
then uses these values to construct a proof of knowledge of its private key tsk which it
returns to the ASIGNER. The ASIGNER completes the SIGN operation by incorporating the
various computed values into the signatureσwhich the VERIFIER can now use to verify that
the message has been signed by a PLATFORM that is a member of the group. These proofs
convince a VERIFIER that a message is signed by a ECC-DAA key that was certified by the
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ISSUER, without knowledge of the PSIGNER’s ECC-DAA key or cre (VERIFY). Of course, the
VERIFIER has to trust that the ISSUER only issues cres to valid PSIGNERs.
LINK: The LINK operationmay be used by a VERIFIER to check if two or more signatures,
σ, are linked. Linkability is controlled in ECC-DAA by the value of the basename bsn either
being set or unset. If bsn=⊥ then an ASIGNER will select a fresh group element, J , uniformly
at random, else it computes J = H1(bsn). The ASIGNER then sends J to its PSIGNER, which
then computesK = [tsk]J . Thus, if J is always a hash of bsn then a PLATFORM’s messageswill
be linkable because J and K remain constant in all ECC-DAA SIGN responses. This assumes
that each of the signatures came from the same PLATFORM signed with its ECC-DAA private
key tsk.
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PSigner
skekps , pkI
ASigner
pkI
Issuer
pkekps , skI
Issuer Join One
Fresh
km, nI .
{|km, nI |}pkekps{|km, nI |}pkekps
PS Join One
tsk←PRF (DAASeed||KI ||cnt)
Decrypt message
to recover km and nI
Fresh u, Compute:
Q2← [tsk]P1; U ← [u]P1
v ← H2(P1||Q2||U ||pkI ||nI)
w ← u+ [v]tsk
γ ←MAC(Q2, v, w)km
Q2, v, w, γ Q2, v, w, γ
Issuer Join Two
verifyMAC(m,γ, km) = accept
Compute
U ′ ← [w]P1− [v]Q2;
v′ ← H2(P1||Q2||U
′||pkI ||nI)
if v′ 6= v then abort
Fresh r
Generate creI ←< A,B,C >
A← [r]P1; B ← [skI ]A
C ← [skI ]A+ [rskI ]Q2
{|creI |}pkekps{|creI |}pkekps
PS Join Two
Decrypt message to recover creI
Compute D ← [tsk]B
cre←< A,B,C,D >
cre
AS Join Four
verifyCre(A,B,C,D, pkI) = accept
store cre
aliveness
Figure 6.1 JOIN operation
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PSigner
tsk
ASigner
cre, pkI , bsn
Verifier
bsn, pkI
Verifier Sign One
Fresh nV , m
nV , m
ASigner Sign One
Fresh l
Randomise ĉre ← <R, S, T, W>
R← [l]A; S ← [l]B
T ← [l]C; W ← [l]D
Compute
c← H3(R,S, T,W, nV )
if bsn = ⊥ then
Fresh J
else J ← H1(bsn)
c, J, S,m, bsn
PSigner Sign One
Compute
K ← [tsk]J
Fresh nT , r
Compute
R1 ← [r]J ; R2 ← [r]S
h←
H4(c||m||J ||K||bsn||R1||R2||nT )
s← s(r, tsk)
K, h, s, nT
ASigner Sign Two
Construct signature
σ ←< R,S, T,W,
J,K, h, s, nV , nT >
σ, m
Verifier Verify One
verifyĉre(R,S, T,W, pkI) = accept
R′1 ← [s]J − [h]K
R′2 ← [s]S − [h]W
c′ ← H3(R||S||T ||W ||nV )
h′ ←
H4(c
′||m||J ||K||bsn||R′1||R
′
2||nT )
if h′ 6= h then abort
Figure 6.2 SIGN/VERIFY operation
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6.5 Modelling the Protocol in TAMARIN
6.5.1 Themodel
Using the TAMARIN PROVER we implemented a symbolic model of ECC-DAA that captures
the behaviour and split roles of I-MECH4. Our model captures these behaviours in the pres-
ence of a DY adversary. From Figure 6.2 it is clear that the functionality of the protocol is
different depending onwhether the basename (bsn) is fresh or fixed. This distinction is best
captured using different variants of our model to aid traceability and will only be import-
ant during the analysis. It would have been possible to produce one model to reflect the
functionality of both J being fixed and fresh but this would havemeant duplication of rules
and introduction new state facts to control the firing of the rules. This would have made
the model less readable. By producing two variants of the model it means that the rules
within each variant are more easily matched to the functionality of the ECC-DAA scheme
and provides a traceable mapping to the standards document.
Our model is more comprehensive than [207] as it is finer-grained and closer to the
standards document. In addition, we also, for the first time, capture in a symbolic set-
ting, all the authentication and privacy properties of ECC-DAA in a single model. The full
TAMARIN model is available [228] and contains 23 rules and comprises over 1300 lines of
code.
We begin by describing the equational theory for our ECC-DAA models. We construct
a signature, Σ, to capture the cryptographic operators, where aenc/2 is a binary operator
andmore generally f /n introduces an n-ary operator called f .
Σ= {aenc/2, adec/2, pk/1, MAC/2, verifyMAC/3,
accept/0, H2/5, multp/2, plus/2, minus/2, U/2,
calcU/1, verifyCre/5, verifyBlindCre/5, H1/1,
H3/5, H4/8, PRF/3, s/2, calcR1/1, calcR2/1,
checkAnon/5, deanon/0}
The aenc, adec andpk operators come from the asymmetric-encryptionbuilt-inwhere
as all the other operators are specific to our models. The multiplication operator is repres-
ented as ’multp’, addition by ’plus’, and subtraction by ’minus’. The properties of the other
operators in Σ are defined as equations and we describe each in turn.
Equation 1. Message Authentication Codes (MAC): To model MACs used in the JOIN oper-
ation as defined by Chen et al.@[60] in order to provide authentication and integrity during
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the challenge-response between a PSIGNER and ISSUER we define the following equation:
verifyMAC(m,MAC(m,k),k)= accept (6.1)
Given a messagem, the MAC ofm signed under key k, and the key k, we can model that a
MAC has been signed and constructed correctly with knowledge of k. Successful applica-
tion of this equation will reduce to the accept constant.
Equation 2. DAACredential Verification: ECC-DAA has two different credential verification
stages. One verifies that a credential, cre, received by the ISSUER and signed by a PSIGNER
was correctly constructed in the JOIN operation. The other allows other VERIFIERs to verify
a randomised credential ĉre in the SIGN operation.
One of the final steps of the JOIN operation is to verify that the credentials, (A,B ,C ),
are received from the ISSUER and that the D element constructed by the PSIGNER, that is
dependent on B also originates from the same ISSUER. To achieve this we express the equa-
tion verifyCre to take A, B , C , D and the ISSUER’s pkI as inputs. If the ISSUER’s private key
embedded within A, B ,C andD corresponds to the same ISSUER pkI , then the cre is valid.
verifyCre(A,B ,C ,D,pk(skI ))= accept (6.2)
The equation in the model fully defines A, B , C and D to be the appropriate terms, for
example A is multp(creRandom,P1).
During the VERIFY operation VERIFIERs are required to validate the randomised creden-
tial, ĉre=< R ,S,T,W > that is constructed from A, B , C and D by multiplying it by a ran-
domly chosen factor l . The randomising of the credential takes place during the SIGN op-
eration by the ASIGNER, where each element of the cre is randomised by l ; for example,
multp(l,multp(creRandom,P1)), etc. The validation is expressed as the equation verifyBlind-
Cre, and as in the previous equation ensures that the private key of the ISSUER and public
key of the ISSUER match. Again R , S, T and W in the equation are fully expanded in the
model.
verifyBlindCre(R ,S,T,W ,pk(skI ))= accept (6.3)
The following two equations capture our mathematical abstractions of the ECC-DAA
non-interactive proof of knowledge within our ECC-DAA model.
Equation 3. Calculation ofU ′ :
The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in the ISSUER JOIN Two step of the JOIN opera-
tion (Figure 6.1) is that the two values of the hashH2, i.e., v and v
′, are computed equally by
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the PSIGNER and ISSUER respectively. The structures of the hashes are identical, differing on
only theU term. Therefore, to demonstrate ZKPK in the symbolic settingwe are required to
show thatU ′ is equal toU during the construction of the ISSUER’s v ′. This is defined using
the following equation.
calcU(minus(multp(w,P1),multp(v,Q2)))=U(u,P1) (6.4)
The functionality of the equation represents the following reduction:
U ′ = [w]P1− [v ]Q2=U
= [u+v ·tsk]P1− [v ][tsk]P1
= [u]P1+ [v ·tsk]P1− [v ·tsk]P1
= [u]P1
=U
(6.5)
In the TAMARIN model the equation is fully expanded to define w and v explicitly and
what we show here is the structure of the equation. Here we demonstrate how the equation
for the calculation ofU ′ is encoded within TAMARIN:
1 // U' = [w]P1 - [v]Q2
2 calcU(
3 minus(
4 multp( plus( u,
5 multp(
6 H2( P1, multp( P1 , PRF( DAASeed ,
7 Ki , cnt ) ),
8 U( u, P1 ), pk( isk ),
9 ni ),
10 PRF( DAASeed , Ki, cnt ) )
11 ),
12 P1),
13 multp(
14 H2( P1 , multp( P1 , PRF( DAASeed , Ki, cnt ) ),
15 U( u, P1 ), pk( isk ), ni ),
16 multp( P1 , PRF( DAASeed , Ki , cnt ) )
17 ) ) ) = U( u, P1 ) // U = [u]P1
Lines 3 to 10 represents the symbolic form [w]P1 and embedded within that from lines 4
to 8 is the representation of u+ [v ]t sk.
Therefore, in ISSUER JOIN Two (Figure 6.1), if v ′ = v then the signature is valid otherwise
it is not. Our TAMARIN equation takes as inputU ′ and provided the terms (w,v) used in the
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construction pattern match, we can reduce the term toU . Thus, this is representative of
the mathematical computation.
Equation 4. DAA Signature Verification: The ZKPK in the ECC-DAA VERIFY operation re-
quires that the two hash values, h and h′, are the same, and h is defined in PSIGNER SIGN
One in Figure 6.2. Their H4 structures are identical apart from the R1 and R2 terms in h and
R ′1 and R
′
2 terms in h
′. Therefore, we provide two equations to state that R ′1 reduces to R1
and similarly for R ′2:
calcR1(minus(multp(r, J ),multp(h,K )))=multp(r, J ) (6.6)
and R ′2 is equal to R2:
calcR2(minus(multp(r,S),multp(h,W )))=multp(r,S) (6.7)
The equations for calcR1 and calcR2 are defined as follows:
1 // R1' = minus( multp( s, J ), multp( h, K ) )
2 calcR1( minus(
3 multp(s(randS1 , PRF(DAASeed , Ki, cnt)), J),
4 multp(
5 H4(
6 H3(
7 multp(l,multp(creRandom , P1)), // R
8 multp(l,multp(isk , multp(creRandom ,P1))), // S
9 multp(l,plus(multp(isk , multp(creRandom , P1)),
10 multp(multp(creRandom, isk),
11 multp(P1 , PRF(DAASeed , Ki , cnt))))), // T
12 multp(l,multp(PRF(DAASeed , Ki , cnt),
13 multp(isk , multp(creRandom, P1)))), // W
14 nv), // H3 end
15 m, J,
16 multp(PRF(DAASeed , Ki , cnt), J), // K
17 bsn ,
18 multp(randS1 , J), // R1
19 multp(randS1 , multp(l, multp(isk , multp( creRandom, P1)))), // R2
20 nt), // H4 end
21 multp( PRF(DAASeed , Ki , cnt), J)) // K
22 )) = multp(randS1 , J) // R1
Line 3 represents the symbolic form [s]J , lines 4 to 21 is the representation of [h]K and the
equation reduces to its normal formR1 on line 22. This equationmakes extensive use of the
TAMARIN PROVER’s patternmatching, ensuring that no arbitrary terms can be submitted to
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the equation, more specifically R ′1 encapsulates that a J value is associated with a specific
PSIGNER ECC-DAA key, tsk.
1 // R2' = minus( multp( s, S ), multp( h, W ) )
2 calcR2( minus(
3 multp(
4 s(randS1 , PRF( DAASeed , Ki , cnt)),
5 multp(l,multp(isk , multp( creRandom, P1)))
6 ),
7 multp(
8 H4(
9 H3(
10 multp(l,multp(creRandom , P1)), // R
11 multp(l,multp(isk , multp(creRandom ,P1))), // S
12 multp(l,plus(multp(isk , multp(creRandom , P1)),
13 multp(multp(creRandom, isk),
14 multp(P1 , PRF(DAASeed , Ki , cnt))))), // T
15 multp(l,multp(PRF(DAASeed , Ki , cnt),
16 multp(isk , multp(creRandom, P1)))), // W
17 nv), // H3 end
18 m, J,
19 multp(PRF(DAASeed , Ki , cnt), J), // K
20 bsn ,
21 multp(randS1 , J), // R1
22 multp(randS1 , multp(l, multp(isk , multp( creRandom, P1)))), // R2
23 nt), // H4 end
24 multp(l, multp(PRF(DAASeed , Ki , cnt),
25 multp(isk , multp(creRandom , P1))))) // W
26 ) ) = multp(randS1 , multp(l, multp(isk , multp(creRandom , P1)))) // R2
The input terms to the equation calcR2 are more complex than that of calcR1 for the cal-
culation of R ′2. Lines 3 and 4 symbolically represent [s]S and lines 6 to 20 represents [h]W .
This equation for R ′2 encapsulates that the randomised credential, S in ĉre, was construc-
ted by the ASIGNER correctly and it is a valid credential that was issued by the ISSUER in the
JOIN operation.
Clearly the structure of h within calcR1 and calcR2 are the same (shown by lines 5 - 19
in calcR1 and lines 7 - 20 in calcR2 respectively). Therefore when a VERIFIER computes its h′
in the VERIFY operation the value used for h will need to be the same in both.
Our abstraction for s is defined in terms of s(randS1,PRF(DAASeed,Ki,cnt)) which is an
abstraction of r and tsk. In the standard [137] s is defined as (r +h · f )mod p but incorpor-
ating the h into the abstraction would yield repeated subterms of the LHS of the equation
and lead to partial deconstructions, a possible source of non-termination for TAMARIN.
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Equation 5. DAADe-anonymisation: In the event a PSIGNER DAA key, tsk, is compromised
and known by the DY adversary, it is possible to identify messages produced by a specific
PSIGNER. We capture this in the checkAnon equation which takes as its input the following
terms from a given ECC-DAA signature:
checkAnon(S,W , J ,K , t sk)= deanon (6.8)
If the tskmatches in these formulae then the signature can be linked to the PSIGNER whose
tsk was revealed. The functionality of the equation represents the following computation:
S = [l ]B
W = [l ]D = [l ][tsk]B = [tsk][l ]B = [tsk]S
K = [tsk]J
(6.9)
Hence, a DY adversary with knowledge of a PLATFORMs DAA key and DAA signatures can
check whether W and K can be computed by multiplying S and J by tsk respectively to
reveal whether the PLATFORM produced the signature.
Figure 6.3 Network with all communication routed through the DY adversary
Channels. Chen et al. [60] note that the communication between an ASIGNER and a
PSIGNER is done in a secure manner. We have already state in Section 6.2 that the DY
adversary cannot view the communication between the ASIGNER and a PSIGNER. In our
TAMARIN model we define the communication between these two entities over a Secure
Channel to provide an appropriate abstraction. Secure channels have the required prop-
erty of being both confidential and authentic. This means that a DY adversary can neither
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modify nor learn messages that are sent over the channel. They have previously been used
in TAMARIN [21] and we follow their modelling ideas.
Secure channel communication uses two rules, ChanOut_S and ChanIn_S, to create an ex-
tra layer of abstraction based on linear facts to explicitly model secure channels. This pre-
vents communication being broadcast via the DY adversary, over the standard In and Out
channels.
rule ChanOut_S:
[ Out_S( $A , $B , x ), !Paired( $A ,
$B ) ]
--[ ChanOut_S( $A , $B, x ) ]->
[ Sec( $A, $B, x ) ]
Figure 6.4 ChanOut_S rule
The fact Out_S($A,$B,x) in Figure 6.4 mod-
els that the PSIGNER or ASIGNER (A, B
or vice versa) sends a message x on
the secure channel. The persistent fact
!Paired($A,$B) is a predicate on the chan-
nel storing state information about the one
to one association between a ASIGNER and
PSIGNER. This ensures that only the designated PSIGNER can communicate with its corres-
ponding ASIGNER. The conclusion of the rule is a linear fact containing the message x, that
the DY adversary cannot see or forge.
rule ChanIn_S:
[ Sec( $A, $B, x ) ]
--[ ChanIn_S( $A, $B , x ) ]->
[ In_S( $A , $B, x ) ]
Figure 6.5 ChanIn_S rule
The linear fact Sec(...) in Figure 6.5
ensures that the secure channel is replay
protected, i.e., when the message x is con-
sumed by one of the paired entities, x is
not stored to be replayed later as a con-
sequence of the shared In_S($A,$B,x) fact
which is not known to the DY adversary. The secure channel is justified as being replay pro-
tected as this channel is only ever used on the PLATFORM between the ASIGNER and PSIGNER.
Recall that in a JOIN operation the communication between an ISSUER and a PSIGNER
needs to be encrypted under the public endorsement key. Note that — unlike the secure
channel between PSIGNER and ASIGNER — this communication can be observed by the DY
adversary, as shown in Figure 6.3.
6.5.2 Model Abstractions and Restrictions
To simplify the number of cases in the proof, we consider the VERIFIER to be an abstract role.
This means that a VERIFIER is not a PLATFORM in our model whereas in reality it could be
another PLATFORM or some other device, e.g., embedded device. An abstraction of this role
is possible as a PSIGNER is not required to verify a ECC-DAA signature. We have abstracted
the ISSUER’s public key (X ,Y ) and private key (x, y) to pkI and skI respectively.
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We employ a number of restrictions in our model of ECC-DAA (we refer to them as A1 -
A6 to avoid confusion with R1 and R2 in themodel description):
A1 - Single Issuer: We consider the ISSUER to be a distinct role in the scheme. This choice
has been made to simplify the proof, and it is important to note that the ISSUER can
still be a corrupt entity.
A2 - Unique Pairing: We constrain a PSIGNER to belong to a single unique ASIGNER, and a
ASIGNER to have exactly one PSIGNER. This models an ideal system and is representat-
ive of the real world.
A3 - Single Platform Initialisation: Once a PLATFORM has performed its SETUP to generate
its unique values and endorsement key-pair, it is not allowed to do this again. This re-
striction captures themanufacturingprocess, where secrets are installed to a PSIGNER
at manufacture time.
A4 - Equality checks: We use the TAMARIN equality restriction so that all instances of an
equality action in a trace ensure that both arguments within an action are equal. We
use them for modelling the verification of MACs, cre, ĉre and ECC-DAA signatures.
A5 - Inequality checks: Such checks are used to ensure that two arguments of a check are
not equal in a trace. This is used specifically during the PLATFORM initialisation rule
to specify the ASIGNER and PSIGNER identities are different, which is also the case in
practice.
6.5.3 Modelling the ECC-DAA operations
In Section 6.4 we noted that there are five ECC-DAA operations and each of them match
to one or more TAMARIN rules. This section summarises the mapping from operations to
TAMARIN rules and provides some illustrative examples. The SETUP operation corresponds
to two rules, one to capture the setup of the ISSUER and one to setup a PLATFORM. The
LINK operation maps to one rule. The JOIN operation maps to eight rules, representing
ISSUER JOIN One etc. from Figure 6.1 and three of the rules represent the forwarding of
messages from the ISSUER to the PSIGNER via the ASIGNER over the secure channel. Similarly
the SIGN operationmaps to four sign rules. TheVERIFY operationmaps to two rules in order
to capture the behaviour of a VERIFIER verifying themessage it sent and verifying amessage
sent by a different VERIFIER. The rule for setting up a PLATFORM is defined in Figure 6.6.
The PLATFORM_SETUP rule initialises the PLATFORM, which is a combination of an ASIGNER
and PSIGNER.
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rule PLATFORM_SETUP:
let pk_ek = pk( ~sk_ek ) in
[ Fr( ~sk_ek ) ]
--[ PlatformInit(), PlatformStart( $AS , $PS ),
Create( $PS ), Neq($AS , $PS),
UniqueExecJoin( 'PS_SETUP ' ),
Unique_Pairing( $PS ),
Unique_Pairing( $AS ) ]->
[ !F_PSEk($PS ,~sk_ek) ,!F_PSPkEk($PS ,pk_ek),
!F_Paired($PS ,$AS) ,!F_Paired($AS ,$PS),
St_PlatformInit( $AS , $PS ),
Out( pk_ek ) ]
Figure 6.6 PLATFORM_SETUP rule
Chen et al. [60] identified that an endorsement key is bound to a particular PSIGNER
so that it can be used to authenticate a PSIGNER. We model this in TAMARIN through the
generation of one fresh term to compute a PSIGNER endorsement key-pair and a persistent
fact !F_PSEK($PS,~sk_ek).
There are a number of action labels, for example Unique_Pairing that captures the re-
striction A2. The conclusion of the rule stores the generated terms and introduces a linear
fact to control moving to the next step of the ECC-DAA scheme. The public endorsement
key is shared with the ISSUER and is modelled using the Out(pk_ek) fact. Note that this also
makes the public endorsement key available to the DY adversary in our model.
As stated earlier there are eight rules to support the definitionof the JOIN operation. It is
in these rules that we see the use of the endorsement key-pair so that an ISSUER can authen-
ticate to a PSIGNER and a MAC to provide integrity and authenticity of messages between a
PSIGNER and the ISSUER.
To provide one example illustration of where the endorsement key and MAC are used
we show a fragment of the PS_JOIN_ONE rule in Figure 6.7. The tsk is generated using a
pseudo-random function, PRF, whichwas introduced as part ofΣ. It provides a fine-grained
traceable abstraction to the construction of tsk, rather than a fresh term. We can see that
msg is defined as an encryption under the public endorsement key and thismessage is sent
to the PSIGNER over the secure channel from the ASIGNER and is where the decryption takes
place. In the rule, γ shows that a MAC is created to ensure the integrity of Q2, v and w
and this is sent back to the ASIGNER over the secure channel (Out_s). The ASIGNER will then
send the MAC over the network so that the ISSUER compares the received MAC with one it
computes. This verification occurs in another JOIN rule (not illustrated here), and is where
Equation 1 (6.1) is called.
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rule PS_JOIN_ONE:
let
tsk = PRF( ~DAASeed , Ki , ~cnt )
pk_ek = pk( sk_ek )
msg = aenc( < 'ISSUER_REQ', km , ni >, pk_ek )
gamma = MAC( < 'gamma', P1 , Q2 , v, w >, km )
...
in
[ In_S( $AS , $PS , msg ), Fr(~ DAASeed), Fr(~cnt),
! F_IssuerKi( $I , Ki ), ...
]
--[ ... HonestPS( tsk ) ... ]->
[ Out_S( $PS , $AS , <'PS_RESP_OUT', ..., gamma > )
! F_PSDaaSeed( $PS , ~DAASeed ),
!F_PSCnt($PS ,~cnt) ,!F_PSTsk($PS ,tsk) ]
Figure 6.7 PS_JOIN_ONE rule
While the rules in Figures 6.6 and 6.7 do not allow the DY adversary to learn the private
endorsement key, skekps , or the private DAA key tsk, we have also defined two additional
TAMARIN rules that allow theDY adversary to learn the private keys. This models a possible
threat of corrupted PLATFORMs that can be identified during the security analysis.
As stated earlier there are four rules to support the definitionof the SIGN operation. One
example rule is shown in Figure 6.8. This rule represents the PSIGNER SIGN One step in Fig-
rule PS_SIGN_ONE:
let
PSSign = < 'PSSign', c, ~J, S, nv , bsn >
tsk = PRF( DAASeed , Ki , cnt )
K = multp( tsk , ~J )
R1 = multp( ~randS1 , ~J )
R2 = multp( ~randS1 , S )
h = H5( c, nv, ~J, K, bsn , R1, R2 , ~nt )
s = s( ~randS1 , tsk )
PSResp = < 'PSSignResp', K, h, s, ~nt >
in
[ In_S( $AS , $PS , PSSign ), Fr( ~nt ),
Fr( ~randS1 ), !F_PSTsk( $PS , tsk ) ]
--[ PSSignOne( ), UniqueExecSign( 'PS_SIGN_ONE' ) ]->
[ Out_S( $PS , $AS , PSResp ) ]
Figure 6.8 PS_SIGN_ONE rule
ure 6.2 where the input to the rule over the secure channel In_S are the terms produced by
the ASIGNER from ASIGNER SIGN One in Figure 6.2. The LHS also generates two fresh terms
nt and randS1, which correspond to nT and r , respectively. The ECC-DAA key, tsk, is known
by the PSIGNER and is used in the generation of K , which, together with the term J , is used
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Goal Lemma Model A Model B
G1 functional_correctness_group_verification X X
G2 functional_correctness X X
G3 functional_correctness_dishonest_send X X
G4 aliveness X X
G5 weak_agreement_any_reveal X X
G6 weak_agreement × ×
G7 ni_agreement_any_reveal X X
G8 ni_agreement × ×
G9 i_agreement × ×
G10 secrecy_cre × ×
G11 can_be_deanonymised X X
G12 user_controlled_independent_link_tokens X n/a
G13 user_controlled_linkability n/a X
Goal Observational Equivalence Model C
G14 unlinkability X
Table 6.1 Summary of Results
for controlled traceability of signed messages to a PLATFORM. The actions are information
labels that will be used in a security property in Section 6.6.2 to verify a successful protocol
execution. The RHS securely outputs PSResp to the ASIGNER that includes K to control trace-
ability. The hash h capturing the proof of knowledge for the ECC-DAA SIGN operation, s,
which is needed to recompute h by the VERIFIER and a nonce nT .
6.6 Threat Model and Properties
All the properties we establish for our ECC-DAA model are identified in Table 6.1. We useX
to indicate that the associated property holds, and × is used when the property does not
hold. Recall in Section 6.5.1 two variants of themodel were introduced and they are referred
to as Model A and Model B in Figure 6.1 respectively. Model A represents the basename
being unset whereas Model B represents the basename as a constant. In the analysis of
unlinkability in Section 6.6.3, we introduce and justify the introduction of a third model,
referred to as Model C.
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6.6.1 Threat Model
As stated in Section 3.5.3 the model considers a DY adversary. Notably, the DY can com-
promise a PSIGNER to gain knowledge of the private endorsement key, and the private DAA
key. Additionally, the DY adversary can corrupt the ISSUER and learn its private key.
6.6.2 Security Properties
In this section, we focus on how we encode the correctness, authentication, and secrecy
properties, as given by goalsG1 -G10. The definition of correctness from [40] simply refers
to a correct execution of the scheme. Normally, within a symbolic setting, correctness is a
notion that applies over all traces. Hence correctness here in a symbolic setting is also in the
context of a single run of the protocol (and uses exists-trace) but we refer to it as functional
correctness to avoid confusion. Our lemmas not only encode correctness from [40], we also
explore correctness of a group signature to build confidence in our model.
In the model we additionally define authentication lemmas to determine what level of
authentication the scheme satisfies. This enables us to establish the authentication in the
scheme in the usual way using formal analysis.
G1 Functional Correctness (group verification)
lemma functional_correctness_group_verification: exists -trace
"Ex V V1 nv #i #j .
Send( V, nv ) @ i & Confirm( V1 , nv ) @ j & not( V = V1 )"
Figure 6.9 functional_correctness_group_verification (G1)
ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 mechanism 4 [137] defines that group signature verification is re-
quired for ECC-DAA which means there exist two VERIFIERs, one that sends a message to
be signed by a PLATFORM, and another VERIFIER that verifies the message. This property is
captured by our lemma functional_correctness_group_verification that states that there
exists a send from one VERIFIER that is then signed by a signer PLATFORM, and verified by a
different VERIFIER than the one which sent the message to be signed.
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G2 Functional Correctness
lemma functional_correctness: exists -trace
"Ex #a #i #j #k #l #m #n #o #p #q #r #s #t #u .
not( Ex C #k1 . IssuerKeyReveal( C ) @ k1 ) &
not( Ex C #k2 . RevealEK( C ) @ k2 ) &
not( Ex C #k3 . RevealTsk( C ) @ k3 ) &
/* JOIN */
PlatformInit( ) @ a & IssuerJoinOne( ) @ i &
ASJoinOne( ) @ j & PSJoinOne( ) @ k &
ASJoinTwo( ) @ l & IssuerJoinTwo( ) @ m &
ASJoinThree( ) @ n & PSJoinTwo( ) @ o &
ASJoinFour( ) @ p &
/* SIGN */
VerifierSignOne( ) @ q & ASSignOne( ) @ r &
PSSignOne( ) @ s & ASSignTwo( ) @ t &
/* VERIFY */
VerifierVerifyOneWS( ) @ u &
a < i & i < j &
j < k & k < l &
l < m & m < n &
n < o & o < p &
p < q & q < r &
r < s & s < t &
t < u &
( All #i #j x .
UniqueExecJoin( x ) @ i & UniqueExecJoin( x ) @ j
==>
#i = #j ) &
( All #i #j x .
UniqueExecSign( x ) @ i & UniqueExecSign( x ) @ j
==> #i = #j )"
Figure 6.10 functional_correctness (G2)
We encode the ECC-DAA functional correctness property as one lemma. The lemma states
that if both the PLATFORM and VERIFIER are honest, the signatures and their links will be
accepted by a VERIFIER. This means that the following must have occurred: i) SETUP has oc-
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curred and the ISSUER has generated its private key and published its parameters. ii) JOIN
has successfully executed under the ISSUER private key and parameters, therefore produ-
cing a ECC-DAA credential including the PSIGNERs generated ECC-DAA key (tsk). iii) SIGN has
produced a ECC-DAA signatureσ0 on themessagem0 with tsk and a randomised credential
ĉre. Given the steps i, ii and iii have successfully executed, then a ECC-DAA VERIFY on σ0
has executed to accept the signature.
G3 Functional Correctness of SIGN in presence of a DY adversary
Given the capabilities of theDY adversary, it would be able to generate and inject amessage
on the network and request that a signer executes the SIGN protocol and signs the mes-
sage. This would result in a signed message that was crafted by the DY adversary, which
all other group members would be able to verify. This property is captured by our lemma
functional_correctness_dishonest_send.
lemma functional_correctness_dishonest_send: exists -trace
"Ex V V1 nv #i #j .
Send( V, nv ) @ i & Confirm( V1 , nv ) @ j & not( V = V1 )"
Figure 6.11 functional_correctness_dishonest_send (G3)
This lemma, G3, is used to prove the ECC-DAA SIGN operation, in the presence of a DY
adversary that sends a message on the network. The intuition for this lemma is that there
exists a VERIFIER that receives and verifies a signed ECC-DAA message which may have been
sent by the DY adversary or the DY adversary has corrupted a PLATFORM so that it could
forge a message.
G4−G9 Authentication in JOIN
Lowe identifies [150] a hierarchy of authentication specifications. In this chapter we ex-
plore which form of authentication as defined by Lowe the ECC-DAA scheme satisfies: alive-
ness, weak agreement, non-injective agreement and injective agreement. Recall from Sec-
tion 3.3.2 the definition of each property. We capture these properties in lemmas asG4,G5,
G6,G7,G8 andG9 respectively. Note thatweak agreement andnon-injective agreement are
captured two lemmas respectively. The first variant of the lemmas enables us to prove au-
thentication if any key reveal has happened and if keys have been revealed then the lemma
holds vacuously. The second variant of the lemmas guarantees that both the PSIGNER and
ISSUER are honest when a PSIGNER has authenticated to an ISSUER (i.e. they have completed
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the JOIN operation) but all other entities may have leaked their keys by that point. In this
chapter we present the second variant of these lemmas.
lemma aliveness:
"All a b n #i .
Commit( a, b, n ) @ i
==>
( Ex #j . Create( a ) @ j )
| ( Ex C #r . IssuerKeyReveal( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )
| ( Ex C #r . RevealEK( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )
| ( Ex C #r . RevealTsk( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )"
Figure 6.12 aliveness (G4)
Aliveness in the ECC-DAA schemewould guarantee that the ISSUER and a PLATFORM have
completed a JOIN operation, and the ISSUER was involved in the run of the protocol or an
agent involved in the session claimed to be honest, at timepoint i, has been compromised,
at some timepoint r. The Create(a) action is added to the trace when the ISSUER sends out
its initialmessage in ISSUER JOIN One (Figure 6.1). The Commit(a,b,n) action is added to the
trace when the ASIGNER verifies the DAA credential, cre, in ASIGNER JOIN Four (Figure 6.1)
where n is the terms A, B andC of cre.
lemma weak_agreement:
"All a b n #i .
Commit( a, b, n ) @ i
==>
( Ex n2 #j . Running( b, a, n2 ) @ j )
| ( Ex C #r . IssuerKeyReveal( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )
| ( Ex C #r . RevealEK( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )
| ( Ex C #r . RevealTsk( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )"
Figure 6.13 weak_agreement (G6)
Weak agreement gives a stronger claim about the ISSUER has been runningwith a PLATFORM
but not necessarily with the same terms. The lemma states that whenever an agent com-
mits to a session, Commit(a,b,n) occurs at timepoint i, then either this is a conclusion of a
valid protocol run or an agent involved in the session claimed to be honest, at timepoint i,
has been compromised, at some timepoint r. The Running(a,b,n2) action is added to the
trace when the ISSUER outputs the terms A, B andC of cre in ISSUER JOIN Two (Figure 6.1).
The Commit(a,b,n) action is added to the trace when the ASIGNER verifies the DAA creden-
tial, cre, in ASIGNER JOIN Four (Figure 6.1) where n is the terms A, B and C of cre. Note
130 A Symbolic Analysis of ECC-based Direct Anonymous Attestation
that the termsmay not be the same terms as produced by the ISSUER in the running claim
denoted by n2.
lemma ni_agreement:
"All a b n #i .
Commit( a, b, n ) @ i
==>
( Ex #j . Running( b, a, n ) @ j )
| ( Ex C #r . IssuerKeyReveal( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )
| ( Ex C #r . RevealEK( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )
| ( Ex C #r . RevealTsk( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )"
Figure 6.14 ni_agreement (G8)
Non-injective agreement in the ECC-DAA scheme would guarantee that the ISSUER and
a PLATFORM both agree upon the completion of a JOIN operation. This means that in the
JOIN operation, the contents of the received messages correspond to the sent messages
for the specific JOIN session. For example, the terms A, B and C of cre produced by the
ISSUER are the terms received by the PLATFORM and agree to this running session. Or it is
the case that an agent involved in the session claimed to be honest, at timepoint i, has been
compromised, at some timepoint r.
lemma i_agreement:
"All a b n #i .
Commit( a, b, n ) @ i
==>
( Ex #j . Running( a, b, n ) @ j
& #j < #i
& not ( Ex a2 b2 #i2 . Commit( a2 , b2 , n ) @ i2
& not ( #i2 = #i )))
| ( Ex C #r . IssuerKeyReveal( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )
| ( Ex C #r . RevealEK( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )
| ( Ex C #r . RevealTsk( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i )"
Figure 6.15 i_agreement (G9)
Injective agreement in the ECC-DAA scheme would guarantee that the ISSUER and a
PLATFORM both agree upon the completion and order of the JOIN operation, and the JOIN
session is unique. Or it is the case that an agent involved in the session claimed to be honest,
at timepoint i, has been compromised, at some timepoint r. The ordering of the actions is
denoted in the lemma by #j < #i, i.e., a Running action before a Commit action in the trace.
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G10: Secrecy in JOIN
lemma secrecy_cre:
"All A B x #i. Secret( A, B, x ) @ i
==>
not(Ex #k. K( x ) @ k)
| (Ex C #r. IssuerKeyReveal( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i)
| (Ex C #r. RevealEK( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i)
| (Ex C #r. RevealTsk( C ) @ r & Honest( C ) @ i)"
Figure 6.16 secrecy_cre (G10)
The lemma, G10, is used to prove secrecy of a credential cre in the ECC-DAA JOIN opera-
tion. The intuition for this lemma is that the ISSUER and a PLATFORM have established a
shared secret, since the cre is sent to a PLATFORM encrypted under its public endorsement
key. We model this by the DY adversary not knowing the cre, unless any of the involved
parties keys have been revealed. This means that the ISSUER’s key has been revealed, or the
endorsement key reveal of the used PLATFORM, or the tsk key reveal of the used PLATFORM.
6.6.3 Privacy Properties
Thepurpose of this section is to capture the user-controlled anonymity,and user-controlled
traceability properties of ECC-DAA by Brickell et al. [40].
G11 andG14User-controlled Anonymity
User-controlled anonymity [40] requires two properties to hold. Firstly anonymity, it is
hard to recover the identity of the signer from its signature unless its private DAA key is
known. Secondly user-controlled unlinkability, ensures that a DY adversary cannot tell if
the signatures were produced by one or two PSIGNERs.
Within TAMARIN unlinkability is established via observational equivalence (G14). The
intuition behind this is that the DY adversary is given two signatures from one signer, or
one each from two signers. However, the DY adversary is unable to distinguish between
these two instances. To encode this in TAMARIN requires augmenting our model to gener-
ate two signatures from one PLATFORM, or two signatures from two different PLATFORMs. It is
possible to express this using TAMARIN rules in the existing models but the resultant state
space was too large for exploration. Therefore, we developed a third model, Model C, to
support this analysis which simplified the model of the JOIN operation but did not reduce
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the DY adversary’s capability as a result of the simplification. With this revised model ob-
servational equivalence holds applying diff on two signatures, and hence unlinkability is
established.
In Figure 6.17wepresent two rules, DIFF_DAA_SIGMA and SHUFFLE, that capture the encod-
ing of observational equivalence (G14) in Model C. Due to the size of the DIFF_DAA_SIGMA
rule, the macros are abbreviated, and the rule is presented in full in [228]. The rule
DIFF_DAA_SIGMA defines three ECC-DAA signatures sigma and sigma2 produced by PLATFORMA ,
and sigmaP produced by PLATFORMB . In this rule we abstract the entire JOIN operation by in-
stantiating the PLATFORM’s DAA keys, tsk, and credentials, cre. To achieve this in the LHS
of the rule the ISSUER parameters and private key is obtained and fresh randomness for the
credentials are generated. The PLATFORM’s generate fresh unique DAA seeds and counter
values. With the aforementioned terms for each PLATFORM can be initialised with the fol-
lowing:
• PLATFORMA : A private DAA key tsk, public DAA keyQ2, and a cre=< A,B ,C ,D >
• PLATFORMB : A private DAA key tsk
′, public DAA keyQ2′, and a cre′=< A′,B ′,C ′,D ′ >
With these terms, a PLATFORM can now produce ECC-DAA signatures. To construct a signa-
ture, a PLATFORM needs to generate a fresh blinding factor l, fresh link token J, and two
nonces randS and nt. These terms are generated for each signature sigma and sigma2 pro-
duced by PLATFORMA , and sigmaP produced by PLATFORMB . To simplifyModel C we also gen-
erate a fresh message, m and nonce nv in the LHS also. Note that there are two action facts
in this rule however they are not used for the specification of observational equivalence.
The RHS of the rule has two Out facts. The first Out contains the diff -term that specifies
the bi-system. When outputting the diffSigma message to the network on the left running
system the DY adversary will see sigma and sigma2; and in the right running system sigma
and sigmaP. Additionally, the nonce and message used in the SIGN is output, with Q2 and
Q2′ since during a JOIN operation the DY adversary would have seen those terms.
Due to tooling limitations in Model C all the equational theories were removed. How-
ever, from the terms output in the DIFF_DAA_SIGMA rule, equations for calcR1 and calcR2
would be applicable, thereforewe output all theR1’s andR2’s to not limit theDY adversary’s
knowledge. The last fact on the RHS, Shuffle, takes two tuples containing each the R1 and
R2 facts associated with each signature. The + operator is the associative-commutative
multiset operator in TAMARIN, and this operator in affect re-orders the terms such that the
DY adversary cannot trivially break anonymity based on the order of the facts output on to
the network. The Shuffle fact is consumed on the LHS of the SHUFFLE rule, and on the RHS
outputs the tuples containing R12, R22, R1P, and R2P. The DY adversary with knowledge of
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rule DIFF_DAA_SIGN:
let
...
sigma = < 'sigma', R, S, T, W, ~J, K, h, s, ~nv, ~nt >
...
sigma2 = < 'sigma', RR2 , S2 , T2, W2 , ~J2 , K2 , h2, s2, ~nv , ~nt2 >
...
sigmaP = < 'sigma', RP , SP, TP , WP , ~JP , KP, hP, sP , ~nv , ~ntP >
in
[
!F_IssuerSK( $I , isk )
, !F_IssuerGenerator( $I , P1 )
, !F_IssuerKi( $I , Ki )
, !F_BSN( $I , bsn )
// PlatformA
, Fr( ~creRandom ), Fr( ~DAASeed )
, Fr( ~cnt )
// PlatformA - sigma
, Fr( ~l ), Fr( ~J )
, Fr( ~randS1 ), Fr( ~nt )
// PlatformA - sigma2
, Fr( ~l2 ), Fr( ~J2 )
, Fr( ~randS12 ), Fr( ~nt2 )
// PlatformB
, Fr( ~DAASeedP ), Fr( ~cntP )
, Fr( ~creRandomP )
// PlatformB - sigmaP
, Fr( ~lP ), Fr( ~JP )
, Fr( ~randS1P ), Fr( ~ntP )
// Messages
, Fr( ~nv ), Fr( ~m )
]
--[ Finished( ), UniqueExecSign( 'SIGN' ) ]->
[
Out( < 'diffSigma ', sigma , diff( sigma2 , sigmaP ) > )
, Out( < ~nv , ~m, Q2, Q2P , R1 , R2 > )
, Shuffle( < R12 , R22 > + < R1P , R2P > )
]
rule SHUFFLE:
[ Shuffle( x + y ) ]
-->
[ Out( < x, y > ) ]
Figure 6.17 diff rules
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all these terms will then attempt to distinguish between the left and right running systems,
and if the DY adversary can distinguish the systems, it wouldmean that unlinkability is not
satisfied.
As stated above, anonymity should not be broken unless the key is leaked. Therefore,
the unlinkability above already covers the case that anonymity cannot be broken when the
key is not revealed. Model C does not permit a tsk key to be revealed and since two signa-
tures cannot be distinguished to be from the same or different PSIGNERs then this undesir-
able behaviour is not possible.
lemma can_be_deanonymised: exists -trace
"Ex AS PS sigma tsk #i #j #k #l.
( PlatformStart( AS, PS ) @ i
& RevealPSTsk( PS , tsk ) @ j
& ASSendFullSignature( AS, PS , sigma )@ k
& DeAnonymised( PS , tsk , sigma ) @ l )"
Figure 6.18 can_be_deanonymised (G11)
In models A and B which do allow for a tsk reveal, we formulate an additional lemma
in Figure 6.18, can_be_deanonymised (G11). It states that, if the tsk is known to the DY ad-
versary then the identity of the PLATFORM is revealed and therefore anonymity is broken.
ThusG14 andG11 together address user-controlled anonymity.
G12− 13User-controlled Traceability
Recall fromSection 2.10.2 the definition of user-controlled traceability. The user-controlled
traceability by Brickell et al. [40] requires two properties to hold; the first property is un-
forgeability and relies on the perfect cryptography assumption; while the second one is
user-controlled linkability. In our ECC-DAA model we do not need to capture the first prop-
erty as a lemma because the symbolic method relies on cryptography being perfect.
The second propertymeans that if two ECC-DAA signatures are computedwith the same
bsn, i.e., the J values are equal, then signatures are linkable as coming from the same
PLATFORM. Alternatively, if the ECC-DAA signatures are computed with two different bsns
and hence the J values are different then the signatures are unlinkable. The LINK opera-
tion in the ECC-DAA scheme is used to ascertain whether signatures are linkable or not. We
encode two lemmas to determine whether two signatures are linkable.
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lemma user_controlled_independent_link_tokens:
"All k kP j jP #i .
CompareLinkTokens( k, kP , j, jP ) @ i
& not( j = jP )
==> not( k = kP )"
Figure 6.19 user_controlled_independent_link_tokens (G12)
InModel A we define the lemma user_controlled_independent_link_tokens (G12). The
intuition for this lemma is that the corresponding link tokens of two ECC-DAA signatures
are different since the J ’s are unique. The action CompareLinkTokens appears in a trace only
after two signatures have been constructed.
lemma user_controlled_linkability:
" All k kP j jP #i .
( All #i #j x . UniqueExecJoin( x ) @ i
& UniqueExecJoin( x ) @ j
==> #i = #j )
& CompareLinkTokens( k, kP , j, jP ) @ i
& j = jP
==> k = kP "
Figure 6.20 user_controlled_linkability (G13)
In Model B we expect to establish linkability. We define a lemma
user_controlled_linkability (G13) to capture linkability. It is expressed as the contrapos-
itive to the way linkability is expressed by Brickell et al. [40]. The lemma states that if two
ECC-DAA signatures are computed by the same PLATFORM with the fixed J then the LINK op-
eration would yield linkability and hence the K ’s would be equal. InG13 we only consider
traces for a single PLATFORM. If the traces included two PLATFORMs and each created a signa-
turewith a fixed J wewould not be able to establish linkability since theK valueswithin the
signatures would be different. Note that anonymity within this variant of the model does
not hold since linkability is present.
Our model allows us to create two signatures explicitly within a trace and therefore,
linkability can be expressed as a trace property as discussed. This means we do not have to
encode user-controlled traceability via observational equivalence.
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6.7 Analysis and Results
In this section we review our analysis of our ECC-DAA model and present both a weakness
in the SIGN operation and an attack on the JOIN operation.
Clarifying parts of the ECC-DAA operations which were not stated in I-MECH4, e.g., dis-
covering the source of the basenameused in the SIGN operation, was a significant task even
before the TAMARINmodelling analysis. Identifying the appropriatemodelling abstractions
and restrictions for the analysis was necessary because TAMARIN would not have been able
to support proving the model otherwise. For example, to encode our calcR1 equation re-
quires 34 operators that comprises 49 terms on the LHSof the equationwith the abstraction
of the s term. Similarly for calcR2 with the abstraction the equation requires 40 operators
and 54 terms, whereas without the abstraction it requires 67 operators and 94 terms.
Determining how to express the lemmas to capture the security and privacy properties
was also an iterative process in order to ensure that they clearly mapped to those in [40].
We analysed ourmodels on the followingmachine specification: Intel i7-7600U (2 cores)
@ 2.80GHz and 16GB RAM using the TAMARIN PROVER version 1.5.0 [157]. The model itself
is reasonably efficient onmemory and consumes 3GB of RAM in the course of a proof, how-
ever a great deal of the processor resources is required to perform the proof. For themodels
presented in this chapter, the proofs and disproofs for Model A (which focuses on user-
controlled untraceability) takes 3 minutes, andModel B (which focuses on user-controlled
traceability) takes 10 minutes to verify. Figure 6.1 on page 125 summarises the results of all
of the properties of our ECC-DAA models.
The results affirm that our formalmodel of the ECC-DAA schememeets all the functional
correctness properties in [40] (G1 toG3). It also demonstrates that standard authentication
properties are met when all the participants are honest and there are no key reveals and
that the highest level of authentication that can be achieved is non-injective agreement
(G4, G5 and G7 hold). When keys are revealed, the highest level of authentication that
can be achieved is only aliveness (G4) of a PSIGNER whenever the ISSUER completes the run
of a JOIN operation, apparently with a PSIGNER that has previously been running the JOIN
operation.
The privacy analysis also demonstrates that it is not possible to link two ECC-DAA signa-
tures when the J ’s are fresh (G12). Conversely, the analysis shows that it is possible to link
two ECC-DAA signatures when the J ’s are fixed (G13). G12 vacuously holds in Model B and
G13 vacuously holds in Model A.G11 also holds in both Models.
Notably, Models A and B are auto-provable using the TAMARIN PROVER’s default heur-
istics, and this was invaluable when changes to the model occurred as it allowed all the
ECC-DAA operations to be re-proved quickly.
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The analysis ofG14 established unlinkability, but proving this usingModel C required a
guided proof.
Our analysis of functional correctness of the SIGN operation in the presence of a DY ad-
versary indicates that I-MECH4 may not be protected from honest sender starvation and
more interestingly resource exhaustion. Honest sender starvation is expected in a DY set-
ting where the adversary can block or modify a message sent by a VERIFIER, therefore the
VERIFIER would never receive a response to its message. Resource exhaustion is where the
signer expends effort to continually signmessages since a DY adversary can submit its own
messagem′ and n′V to a signer and it will produce a valid ECC-DAA signature. The produc-
tion of such a signature is a costly operation.
Moreover, our model revealed that I-MECH4 is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle at-
tack and an attack on secrecy, when the security of any PSIGNER private endorsement key
is compromised. This is the first symbolic analysis to highlight these attacks for an ECC-
DAA scheme. Therefore the lemmas weak_agreement, ni_agreement, and secrecy_cre do not
hold when one or more private endorsement key is compromised and revealed to the DY
adversary.
Note also that injective agreement does not hold since the encryptedmessage that com-
municates the generated credential to a PLATFORM can be replayed by theDY adversary. This
is because there is no freshness in themessage communication from the ISSUER in the JOIN
operation. Hence, this violates the requirement of a unique running session in order to es-
tablish injective agreement.
6.7.1 Man-in-the-middle and Secrecy Attack and Fix
Our TAMARIN analysis indicates that the JOIN operation (Figure 6.1) cannot guarantee that
the ISSUER authenticates any PLATFORM if a single PSIGNER is corrupted, but that the corrup-
ted PLATFORM is still regarded by the ISSUER as being honest. Additionally, in the JOIN oper-
ation our analysis indicates that secrecy of any PLATFORM’s cre cannot be guaranteed, if a
single PSIGNER is corrupted. These attacks were found by aman-in-the-middle attackwhen
performing authentication analysis in the context of a DY adversary revealing a PSIGNER
private endorsement key (G6 and G8), and when performing secrecy analysis in the con-
text of another PSIGNER’s private endorsement key reveal (G10). Therefore, the security of
I-MECH4 relies heavily on the integrity of all PSIGNERs.
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Both attacks require an ISSUER and two PLATFORMs, and one PLATFORM is corrupted by
the DY adversary. The attack on authentication shows that the ISSUER believes it has au-
thenticated with PLATFORMA , whereas it actually authenticated with PLATFORMB . The attack
is detailed in Figure 6.21. Additionally, the attack on secrecy shows that the ISSUER believes
it has established a shared private, cre, with PLATFORMA , whereas the private is shared with
PLATFORMB and it is known by the DY adversary.
The following details the steps of the attack, shown in Figure 6.21, on authentication for
an ISSUER and two PLATFORMs one of which is corrupt:
1. For some PSIGNER the private endorsement key (skekps A) is compromised, modelled
by the DY revealing this key. We refer to this entity as PLATFORMA .
2. There has been anhonest PLATFORM and ISSUER SETUP, we refer to these as PLATFORMB
and ISSUER respectively. Note that the ISSUER is unaware that the unrelated skekps A
has been leaked.
3. The ISSUER sends out a JOIN request, JOINA , containing nI A and MAC key kmA en-
crypted under the public endorsement key pkekps A for PLATFORMA .
4. The DY intercepts the JOINA request. With knowledge of skekps A it decrypts the mes-
sage and gains knowledge of the nonce nI A andMAC key kmA. The DY then encrypts
nI A and kmA under PLATFORMB ’s public endorsement key pkekpsB .
5. PLATFORMB receives JOINA and forwards JOINA to its PSIGNER. The PSIGNER follows the
command to produceQ2B , vB , wB and γB , and returns it to PLATFORMB .
6. This is the key step to the attack: the ISSUER receives and validates the response for
JOINA that was performed by PLATFORMB . The ISSUER then continues to create the
cre elements < AA ,BA,CA > and encrypts it under pkekps A and sends the message,
{| < AA,BA,CA > |}pkekps A , out on the network.
7. The DY intercepts the cre message encrypted under pkekps A and decrypts it with
knowledge of skekps A to retrieve < AA ,BA,CA >. The DY then re-encrypts this under
pkekpsB and forwards the message to HOST B .
8. PLATFORMB receives {| < AA,BA,CA > |}pkekps B and forwards to its PSIGNER. The PSIGNER
then creates its part of the creDB and returns< AA ,BA,CA,DB > to the ASIGNER. The
ASIGNER then verifies this as a valid credential.
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9. The ISSUER believes it was running the JOIN operation session with PLATFORMA un-
der < AA,BA ,CA >, when actually PLATFORMB was committed to the JOIN operation
session with its self-constructedDB .
Even though our ECC-DAAmodel contains an endorsement key-pair and aMAC tomodel
how an authentic channel can be established the attack identified is present. It is similar to
one described by Backes et al. [13] on the pre-standardised RSA-DAA scheme. They include
the identity of a joining TPM in the zero-knowledge proof as a fix to the attack. Chen et
al. [61] proposed an alternative anonymous authentication to DAA which was also suscept-
ible to a comparable attack for a compromised TPM, referred to as the Chosen Comprom-
ised TPM attack. For their privacy-preserving Certificate Authority protocol, they similarly
suggested that this type of attack could be removed by including the public endorsement
key of a TPM in the JOIN operation.
We have mirrored the inclusion of the PSIGNER’s identity using its public endorsement
key in the proof of knowledge v as a fix to both attacks in ourmodel. This solution does not
require any change in the overall functionality of I-MECH4. Therefore
v←H2(P1||Q2||U ||pkI ||nI )
in PS JOIN One in Figure 6.1 is amended to
v←H2(pkekps ||P1||Q2||U ||pkI ||nI )
and v ′ in ISSUER JOIN Two is similarly amended. We extended our model to capture this
fix by modifying the equation calcU to encapsulate the public endorsement key within v .
Additionally, we amended the two rules PS_JOIN_ONE and ISSUER_JOIN_TWO to represent v
and v ′ respectively.
With this fix the vB in step 5 of the attackwould additionally contain pkekpsB for PLATFORMB .
Therefore, step 6 of the attack would not be possible since the ISSUER would produce a v ′
based on its knowledge of pkekps A. Consequently vB and v
′
A computed by the ISSUERwould
not be equal and the JOIN operation would abort. The TAMARIN theory for this fix can be
found in [228] and verifies the effectiveness of the change.
6.8 Summary
In this chapter we presented the development of a fine-grained symbolicmodel of ISO/IEC
20008-2:2013 mechanism 4 standard and the implementation mechanisms (inclusion of
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MAC and endorsement key) from Chen et al. [60]. This chapter also makes a contribution
to howcomplex zero-knowledge proofs can be captured for symbolic reasoning. Themodel
contains lemmas to capture all the correctness, security and privacy properties required by
the ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013mechanism 4.
Even thoughour TAMARIN model employed the secure and authentic channel as recom-
mended by Chen et al. [60], we identified an attack using the TAMARIN PROVER. The attack
reveals a fundamental issue, i.e., if a single PSIGNER is compromised then no PSIGNER can be
authenticated reliably. The attack is similar to that reported by Backes et al. for the RSA-DAA
scheme and therefore highlights that the weakness is still present in ECC-DAA. Backes et
al. [13] proposed a fix for the RSA-DAA scheme and verified associated security properties.
Our fix follows a similar embedding of the public endorsement key of a TPM in the proof-of-
knowledge which provides the basis for establishing all security and privacy properties.
Our model can be used for future ECC-DAA formal analysis. Through the modelling pro-
cess we gained valuable insights. The main lesson learned is the approach we applied for
representing themathematical equations involved in protocol using TAMARIN’s equational
theory. While TAMARIN’s equational theory does not perform themathematical operations
involved in the protocol, it does provide a level of abstraction which maps the mathemat-
ical formulae directly to the corresponding TAMARIN syntax. This allows for our TAMARIN
model to be closer to the implementation detail than previously verified models. We be-
lieve this is a useful modelling style that we and others will be able to apply in future mod-
elling of complex protocols.
Our TAMARIN models, Model A and Model B, are both proved automatically using the
default proof heuristicwithin the tool. As previouslymentioned in Section 6.7,our TAMARIN
model variant C that proves G14 required a guided proof. When we initially tried to prove
G14 using the default heuristic, the TAMARIN PROVER did not terminate and consumed
all available memory. To identify the source of the problem, we loaded model C in the
TAMARIN PROVER’s interactive mode to manually inspect how the tool planned to perform
the proof. We noticed that the default heuristic was not prioritising any of the persistent
facts, and this resulted in a state space explosion. To solve the state space explosion, and
enable automated proving ofG14 wemade use of the TAMARIN PROVER’s proof-oracle [159].
This re-orders the ranking of the proof goals in the TAMARIN PROVER, and thus enabling it
to pick the goals that results in an automated proof. Using the proof-oracle was invaluable
since it allowed us to make changes to the model, and prove model C without any manual
intervention.

Chapter 7
Discussions and FutureWork
In this chapter we conclude and briefly mention directions for future work. This thesis
has examined widely adopted V2X architectures, and specifically addresses challenges of
revocation and scalability.
7.1 Review of Contributions
In Chapter 4 we formalised the REWIRE revocation protocols using the TAMARIN PROVER.
Previously we presented our definitions of functional correctness and authentication as
properties of the protocols of the REWIRE revocation protocols. These protocols were not
previously formally analysed. Our analysis revealed that the PLAIN model does not preserve
functional correctness, which means that a vehicle is not guaranteed to be revoked and
therefore could continue to participate in V2X message exchanges within an ITS. Further-
more, our analysis of the R-TOKEN protocol revealed that it does not guarantee various au-
thentication properties, including, that the confirmation of revocation actually came from
the intended vehicle.
The insights gained from the formal modelling motivated our proposal for O-TOKEN
which addresses all the issues found as part of the formal analysis. In particular, we pro-
posed improvements to the REWIRE protocols to ensure correct revocation of an entity un-
der anypseudonymwithout requiring resolution,even if its active pseudonymhas changed
by the time of revocation. The O-TOKEN protocol’s novelty is the inclusion of an additional
asymmetric key pair used to augment the pseudonyms that are utilisedwithin V2Xmessage
exchange for verifiable revocation. The O-TOKEN protocol was then shown to preserve all
the desired authentication and functional correctness properties.
In Chapter 5 we outlined a novel V2X architecture that uses trusted computing techno-
logies to significantly enhance the state-of-the-art in security and privacy of V2X. As part of
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this novel, decentralised approach, anonymous credentials are leveraged through the use
of DAA. Our DAA pseudonym framework for V2X, provides a comprehensive set of secur-
ity, privacy and accountability services to V2X systems. Leveragingwidely accepted trusted
computing technologies, our solution caters to the needs of vehicular users while overcom-
ing the limitations of existing VPKIs. More specifically, our proposed solution:
• is scalable and decentralised removing the need for federated trust of the infrastruc-
ture entities in existing V2X architectures.
• is the first instance that applies DAA to provide strong privacy protection and user-
controlled linkability without the limitations of current pseudonym schemes.
• proposes a simplifiedDAA-based version of pseudonymprovision,management, and
revocation only requiring a limited set of trusted third party infrastructure entities.
• efficiently removes misbehaving vehicles without revealing the vehicle’s identity nor
requiring the use of computationally intensive technologies (e.g., CRLs).
In Chapter 6 we contributed to the growing body of work demonstrating the use of
formal tools in supporting standardisation processes for cryptographic protocols. We de-
velop a symbolic model of all the ECC-DAA operations described in ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013
mechanism 4 and provided formal definitions of all the security and privacy properties re-
quired. Note that our symbolic model combined ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013mechanism 4 and
recommendations in the literature [60]. Using the TAMARIN PROVER we discovered an at-
tack against the JOIN operation. The attack reveals a fundamental issue with the scheme,
i.e., if a single TPM is compromised then no TPM can be authenticated reliably. Our contri-
bution is a provable symbolic model for the suite of ECC-DAA operations with proofs of its
security and privacy properties. The analysis performed covers all operations of the DAA
scheme. The novelty of our contribution is as follows:
• We modelled the TPM and the HOST as two separate actors that communicate over a
secure channel. Note that our model does not restrict the number of TPMs or HOSTs.
The split of the HOSTs and TPMs is consistent with recent computational proofs. We
provided a faithful abstraction of the operations of ECC-DAA which includes separat-
ing a HOST and a TPM as well as providing a secure channel between them, that is not
covered by previous work.
• Wedefined amethod for performing symbolic non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
for ECC-DAAwithin TAMARIN. Weprovide the first concrete example of zero-knowledge
proofs in TAMARIN that did not require any modifications or additions to the tool.
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This approach to modelling ZKPKs can be used in other protocol analysis containing
zero-knowledge proofs.
• This is the first symbolicmodel to prove all security andprivacy properties of ISO/IEC
20008-2:2013 with additions from the literature. Our analysis revealed a man-in-the-
middle attack such that the compromise of a single TPM means that no other TPM can
be authenticated reliably, and secrecy cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, the secur-
ity of all PLATFORMs relies heavily on the integrity of all other TPMs. We proposed a
solution to address this issue based on the privacy CA protocol by Chen et al. [59, 61],
which uses the TPM public endorsement key in the creation of the proof of knowledge
in the JOIN operation and this provably fixes the attack found.
• We present a TAMARIN model which clearly maps onto ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 and
its associated properties. Our model is annotated against the standards document,
which provides an easy way to validate that the formal model is a faithful represent-
ation of the standardised scheme. It also provides a foundational formal model for
future symbolic ECC-DAA analysis within TAMARIN.
7.2 V2X Future Work
In this section we discuss possible avenues for future work in the V2X domain, aimed at
revocation and developing a trust model that supports our designed architecture’s shift of
trust enabled through the use of TEEs.
7.2.1 Revocation
In this section we identify four directions for future research related to revocation:
• Mechanisms for efficient revocation, e.g., storing pseudonymswithin a key hierarchy.
• Protection against malicious or malfunctioning vehicles by implementing localised
CRLs within vehicles.
• Incorporating pseudonym re-use.
To enable more efficient revocation a key hierarchy could also be considered as an exten-
sion to our V2X architecture. Since we are currently targeting TPM 2.0 for implementation,
the TPM has a key store hierarchy. Keys in the TPM are kept in a tree hierarchy with a storage
primary key at the root, and all keys stored under the storage key are leaves of the tree. To
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use any leaf key it must load the root storage key into the TPM so that it can decrypt the
child’s private key. Therefore, by making use of the key hierarchy an implementation could
store keys in groups. As such, all leaf keys of a group could be revoked by deleting its parent
key. Thus, revocation would only require one key to be deleted and all other keys would be
inaccessible immediately.
Revocation in our proposed solution relies on a trustworthy HOST always passing re-
vocation messages to its associated TEE. Designing a scheme, or schemes that ensures
revocation messages are passed through to a TEE from an untrustworthy HOST is an open
problem. Currently, revocation messages are broadcast, and nearby vehicles will also re-
ceived the messages. Only one vehicle will action the revocation message designated to it
whilst the others ignore it. Future work could consider the other vehicles building localised
revocation lists of pseudonyms when they see revocation messages that are not meant for
them. The local revocation list could be time stamped and periodically refreshed, to en-
sure the list is kept as small as possible. Therefore, even though themalicious vehicle could
ignore revocation messages designated to it the other vehicles would know to ignore mes-
sage from that pseudonym in future but this would not address the problem of a malicious
vehicle changing its pseudonym and continuing to engage on the network.
Our revocation protocol erases all pseudonyms during revocation. Future work could
investigate a relaxation of this policy to enable pseudonym reuse after a vehicle was al-
lowed to rejoin the ITS. This may provide a way of using pseudonyms that were generated
previously.
7.2.2 TrustModel
Weneed to explore an appropriate trustmodel locally within vehicles for our proposed V2X
architecture. For instance, what operational functions are reasonable to be placed within
the “trusted world” of a TEE without compromising the overall performance? The same
question can be reversed for the context of the “untrusted world” provided by a Host: what
types of services can be placed in this model without compromising the overall security
and privacy? These are interesting challenges for future work, where implementation and
experimentation would need to be performed to evaluate the feasibility of a DAA solution,
and identify a TEE capable of performing the required functionality.
As V2X architectures continue to evolve, potentially without trusted computing techno-
logy, it would also be interesting to explore how our proposed DAA V2X solution could be
realised. We have mentioned in Section 5.4 the close coupling of DAA and TPMs, however
it would be interesting to investigate the use of DAA in a V2X solution without a TPM. For
example, could a cryptographic accelerator or any other specialised FPGA-based device be
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used for DAA? Clearly DAA can be implemented using other hardware or even entirely in
software, however the challenge for revocation still remains, since a malicious HOST can
block revocation messages.
7.3 Formal Analysis FutureWork
The thesis has looked at observational equivalence for ECC-DAA and revisiting the O-TOKEN
protocol with respect to its privacy properties would be one aspect of future work. Extend-
ing the formal analysis provides a number of research avenues for future work including
those outlined in the next section.
7.3.1 Extending ECC-DAA Analysis
The TCG, which is an industrial standards body and the developer of TPM specifications, is
continuously working on improvement of the TPM technology. Since ISO/IEC 20008-2 was
published in 2013, several modifications on the ECC-DAA TPM API in the TPM 2.0 specifica-
tion have been made and adopted by ISO/IEC as another international standard, ISO/IEC
11889:2015 [139]. These modifications are due to attacks found against early versions of
the ECC-DAA TPM API on TPM 2.0 [7, 233]. Acar et al. [7] demonstrated that the API for the
TPM allow an adversary to use a TPM as a static DH oracle. Brown and Gallant [42] found
that although solving a static DH problem is still computationally infeasible, it is simpler to
solve than the computational DH problem. The modifications to the ECC-DAA scheme are
as follows:
• Instead of receiving the elliptic curve point J←H1(bsn), the TPM receives two values
s2, y2, where J = (x2, y2) and x2 = H(s2) for a hash function H . The computation of
this hash function avoids the use of the TPM as a static DH oracle.
• The operation of receiving the elliptic curve point B and computing the point D by
the TPM has been removed for the same reason as again it turned the TPM into a static
DH oracle. Instead the ISSUER computes the value D and provides a Schnorr signa-
ture, σ, to prove that the computation is correct. As a result, the DAA credential is
(A,B ,C ,D,σ) instead of (A,B ,C ).
With thesemodifications, the ECC-DAA implementation in the current versionof the TPM 2.0
specification is not compatible with ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 mechanism 4. Extending the
models to include these modifications will then provide a formal analysis of the ISO/IEC
11889:2015 for ECC-DAA implementations.
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Symbolic analyses in Chapter 6 was based on an abstract ECC-DAA specification. There-
fore, analysing a model that contains implementation detail, i.e., actual TPM function calls,
to see whether the attack we identified in Chapter 6 is still present and whether new at-
tacks not found in the abstract model exist would also be interesting. The complexity of
a more detailed model could mean that it is a non-terminating and investigating how to
compositionally verify it would be another avenue of research.
7.4 Architecture and Analysis Framework
This thesis has provided the foundations necessary for formalising a vehicle architecture
based on DAA and TPMs. It introduced:
1. A high-level systems architecture for a V2X solution that uses DAA.
2. A formal analysis of an abstract ECC-DAA model using the TAMARIN PROVER.
Formalising the high-level systems architecture in terms of TAMARIN and integrating it with
the ECC-DAA model would provide a formal V2X model. Refining the ECC-DAA TAMARIN
model using TPM calls as discussed above, would provide a formal reference architecture at
an implementation level of ECC-DAA. Moreover, refining the high-level systems architecture
to include the TPM calls, would provide an implementation level V2X architecture. A formal
V2X model at an implementation level could then be produced.
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